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Introduction
In their entry “Econometrics” for The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,
John Geweke, Joel Horowitz, and Hashem Pesaran (2008) write that
Econometric theory and practice seek to provide information required for
informed decision-making in public and private economic policy. This
process is limited not only by the adequacy of econometrics but also by
the development of economic theory and the adequacy of data and other
information. Effective progress, in the future as in the past, will come
from simultaneous improvements in econometrics, economic theory and
data.
In the spirit of the above quote, this thesis contains four chapters contributing to the
improvement of econometrics, economic theory, and data. The first two chapters deal
with econometric theory and specifically with the development of diagnostic tests
for spatial dependence in cross-sectional data (Chapter 1) and serial correlation in
panel data (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 improves on economic theory by developing a
structural framework in which the influence of policy risk on the business cycle can be
modeled and estimated. In Chapter 4, we tackle the data aspect by constructing, and
subsequently analyzing, a unique and novel database on central bank communication
about financial stability. A more detailed description of each chapter is given in the
remainder of the introduction.
1
Introduction
Chapter 1.1 This chapter proposes simple and robust diagnostic tests for spatial
dependence, specifically for spatial error autocorrelation and spatial lag dependence.
Spatial dependence is a form of cross-sectional dependence where the correlation
between cross-sectional units depends on their relative position in space. Over the
last 30 years, this issue has received a growing amount of attention as, driven by
an increased availability of geo-referenced data and the development of easy-to-use
software, the whole field of spatial econometrics has moved “from the margins to the
mainstream of applied econometrics and social science methodology” (Anselin, 2010).
Because spatial dependence can render ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation and
inference inefficient or even biased and inconsistent, depending on the specific form of
the dependence (Anselin, 1988b), it is of utmost importance to have reliable diagnostic
tests. We therefore propose diagnostic tests for spatial error autocorrelation and
spatial lag dependence as simple and robust alternatives to the existing Moran’s I
statistic (Cliff and Ord, 1972, 1981; Moran, 1948) and the Lagrange Multiplier (LM)
test statistics by Burridge (1980) and Anselin (1988a).
The idea of our tests is to reformulate the testing problem such that the outer
product of gradients (OPG)-variant of the LM test (see e.g. Davidson and MacKinnon,
2004, p. 427) can be employed. Our versions of the tests are based on simple auxiliary
regressions, where ordinary regression t and F -statistics can be used to test for spatial
autocorrelation and lag dependence. Monte Carlo simulations show that while, under
homoskedasticity, our tests perform similarly to the established LM tests, the latter
suffer from severe size distortions under heteroskedasticity. Therefore our approach
gives practitioners an easy to implement and robust alternative to existing tests.
Chapter 2.2 Here, we move from the cross-section to a panel data framework.
With the additional time series dimension comes a number of advantages (see e.g.
Hsiao, 2003, p. 3ff), but also additional possibilities of misspecification. One issue,
well-known from the time series literature, is serial correlation of the errors. This
chapter proposes various tests for serial correlation in fixed-effects panel data regression
models with a small number of time periods.
1The chapter is based on the paper “Simple Regression Based Tests for Spatial Dependence”,
jointly written with Jörg Breitung (Born and Breitung, 2011a).
2This chapter is based on joint work with Jörg Breitung, “Testing for Serial Correlation in
Fixed-Effects Panel Data Models” (Born and Breitung, 2011b).
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First, a simplified version of the test for serial correlation suggested by Wooldridge
(2002) and Drukker (2003) is considered. The second test is based on the LM statistic
suggested by Baltagi and Li (1995), and the third test is a modification of the classical
Durbin-Watson statistic (Bhargava et al., 1982). Under the null hypothesis of no serial
correlation, all tests possess a standard normal limiting distribution as N →∞ and
T is fixed. Analyzing the local power of the tests, we find that the LM statistic has
superior power properties. Furthermore, a generalization to test for autocorrelation
up to some given lag order and a test statistic that is robust against time dependent
heteroskedasticity are proposed.
The first two chapters dealt with developing econometric tools. In the final two
chapters, the focus now shifts to economic theory and the application of econometric
tools. The common theme is the analysis of the influence of government actions – by
fiscal and monetary authorities, respectively – on economic activity.
Chapter 3.3 In this chapter, we analyze the role of policy risk in explaining
business cycle fluctuations by using an estimated New Keynesian model featuring
policy risk as well as uncertainty about technology. The aftermath of the financial
and economic crisis is clearly characterized by extraordinary uncertainty regarding
U.S. economic policy. Hence, the argument that policy risk, i.e. uncertainty about
monetary and fiscal policy, has been holding back the economic recovery in the U.S.
during the Great Recession has a large popular appeal. But the empirical literature
is still inconclusive with respect to the aggregate effects of (mostly TFP) uncertainty.
Studies using different proxies and identification schemes to uncover the effects of
uncertainty producing a variety of results.
We analyze the role of policy risk in explaining business cycle fluctuations by
using an estimated New Keynesian model featuring policy risk as well as uncertainty
about technology. We directly measure uncertainty from aggregate time series using
Sequential Monte Carlo Methods. While we find considerable evidence of policy risk
in the data, we show that the “pure uncertainty”-effect of policy risk is unlikely to
play a major role in business cycle fluctuations. In the estimated model, output
effects are relatively small due to i) dampening general equilibrium effects that imply
a low amplification and ii) counteracting partial effects of uncertainty. Finally, we
3The work in this chapter, “Policy Risk and the Business Cycle”, has been conducted jointly with
Johannes Pfeifer, (Born and Pfeifer, 2011).
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show that policy risk has effects that are an order of magnitude larger than the ones
of uncertainty about aggregate TFP.
Chapter 4.4 Central banks regularly communicate about financial stability issues,
by publishing Financial Stability Reports (FSRs) and through speeches and interviews.
The chapter asks how such communications affect financial markets. For that purpose,
we construct a unique and novel database on CB communication comprising more
than 1000 releases of FSRs and speeches/interviews by central bank governors from
37 central banks over a time period from 1996 to 2009, i.e. spanning nearly one and
a half decades. The degree of optimism that is expressed in these communications is
determined using a computerized textual-analysis software. We then use an event
study approach to analyze how financial sector stock indices react to the release of
such communication.
The findings suggest that FSRs have a significant and potentially long-lasting
effect on stock market returns. At the same time, they tend to reduce stock market
volatility. Speeches and interviews, in contrast, have little effect on market returns
and do not generate a volatility reduction during tranquil times. However, they
had a substantial effect during the 2007-10 financial crisis. It seems that financial
stability communication by central banks are perceived by markets to contain relevant
information, underlining the importance of differentiating between communication
tools, their content, and the environment in which they are employed.
4The chapter is based on the ECB working paper “Central Bank Communication on Financial
Stability”, jointly written with Michael Ehrmann and Marcel Fratzscher (Born et al., 2011a).
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Chapter1
Simple Regression Based Tests for Spatial
Dependence
1.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen an increasing availability of regional datasets, leading to a
growing awareness of spatial dependence (see Anselin, 2007), an issue that can render
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation and inference inefficient or even biased and
inconsistent (see e.g. Anselin, 1988b; Krämer, 2003; Krämer and Donninger, 1987).
Arguably the most commonly used test for spatial dependence is Moran’s I (see Cliff
and Ord, 1972, 1981; Moran, 1948), which is based on regression residuals and which
has been shown to be best locally invariant by King (1981). In a Gaussian maximum
likelihood framework, Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistics were proposed by
Burridge (1980) against a spatial error alternative and Anselin (1988a) against a
spatial lag alternative and against the joint alternative of spatial lag and spatial error.
We show how to compute the outer product of gradient (OPG) variants of these
LM tests (see e.g. Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004, p. 427) based on a simple
transformation of the spatial weight matrix. This allows us to compute the test
statistics as n (the sample size) times the R2 from an auxiliary regression. An
important advantage of the OPG variant is that it is robust against heteroskedastic
and non-normal disturbances. In an alternative regression based approach, Baltagi
and Li (2001) use Davidson and MacKinnon’s (1984; 1988) double length artificial
5
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regression approach to test for spatial error and spatial lag dependence but this is
computationally more demanding and not robust to heteroskedasticity.
Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate that (under standard assumptions) our
versions of the tests perform similarly to the original LM tests. However, if the errors
are heteroskedastic, the latter tests suffer from severe size distortions, whereas the
OPG variants turn out to be robust against heteroskedastic errors processes.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing
maximum likelihood-based test procedures. The regression-based OPG variants of
the LM test are presented in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes the asymptotic properties
of these tests. Sizes and powers in finite samples are compared in section 5. Section
6 concludes.
1.2 LM Test Statistics
Consider the linear spatial first order autoregressive model with spatially autocor-
related disturbances (see e.g. Anselin, 1988b) given by
y = φW n1 y +Xβ + u
u = ρW n2 u+ ε , (1.1)
where y is an n × 1 vector of observations on a dependent variable, X is an n × k
matrix of regressors, β is the associated k × 1 vector of coefficients, φ and ρ are
spatial autoregressive parameters, and ε is a vector of independent and identically
normally1 distributed random variables. W n1 and W n2 are spatial weight matrices of
known constants with zero diagonals.
The spatial error model is obtained by setting φ = 0, yielding
y = Xβ + u, where u = (In − ρW n2 )−1ε . (1.2)
Setting ρ = 0, the linear spatial autoregressive model (1.1) with first order autore-
1The normality assumption is only required to derive the test statistics from the LM principle.
6
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gressive disturbances becomes the spatial lag model
y = φW n1 y +Xβ + ε . (1.3)
Accordingly, we will consider the three null hypotheses:
Ha0 : ρ = 0 in (1.2)
Hb0 : φ = 0 in (1.3)
Hc0 : ρ = 0 and φ = 0 in (1.1).
Burridge (1980) shows that the LM statistic2 for Ha0 results as
LMa = (û
′W n2 û)2
σ̂4 tr[(W n2 )2 +W n
′
2 W
n
2 ]
, (1.4)
where û = y −Xβ̂, β̂ is the OLS estimator of β in the regression y = Xβ + u, and
σ̂2 = n−1û′û.
To test hypothesis Hb0, Anselin (1988a) derives the LM test statistic for the null
hypothesis φ = 0:
LM b = (û
′W n1 y)2
σ̂4tr
[
(W n1 )2 +W n
′
1 W
n
1
]
+ σ̂2ŷ′W n′1 MW n1 ŷ
, (1.5)
where ŷ = Xβ̂, and M = In −X(X ′X)−1X ′.
The LM test of the joint null hypothesis Hc0 is obtained as (Anselin, 1988a)
LM c = 1
σ̂2
û′W n2 û
û′W n1 y
′
tr[(W n2 )2 +W n′2 W n2 ] tr[(W n2 +W n′2 )W n1 ]
tr[(W n2 +W n
′
2 )W n1 ] tr[(W n1 )2 +W n
′
1 W
n
1 ] + σ̂2ŷ′W n
′
2 MW
n
2 ŷ
−1û′W n2 û
û′W n1 y
 .
(1.6)
Although these test statistics are derived by applying the LM principle, they cannot
2Note that the square of the well-known Moran’s I-statistic is asymptotically equivalent to LMa.
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be computed as nR2 from a regression of a vector of ones on the gradients of the
log-likelihood function (see Engle, 1982). For illustration, consider the gradient of the
spatial error model (1.2) with respect to the parameter ρ:
g(β, σ2, ρ) = −tr
[
(In − ρW n2 )−1W n2
]
− 12σ2 (y −Xβ)
′W n2 (y −Xβ) .
Inserting the estimates under the null hypothesis Ha0 , we obtain
g(β̂, σ̂2, 0) ≡ ŝa =
n∑
i=1
ŝai =
1
σ̂2
n∑
i=1
ûiẑ
n
i , (1.7)
where ẑni denotes the i’th element of the vector ẑn = W n2 û and ŝai = σ̂−2ûiẑni . It is
important to note that in general ŝai is (asymptotically) correlated with ŝaj for i 6= j
and, therefore, n−1∑ni=1(ŝai )2 does not converge in probability to the information of
the likelihood function. Hence, the usual OPG variant of the LM test is invalid.
1.3 Regression Variants
To compute the OPG variants of the LM tests, the scores are decomposed into
uncorrelated components. Let us first consider the spatial error model. To focus on
the main issues, we assume that β is known so that û is replaced by u = y−Xβ. Let
u′zn =
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
wnij,2uiuj =
n∑
i=2
i−1∑
j=1
(wnij,2 + wnji,2)uiuj =
n∑
i=2
uiξ
n
i ,
where ξni =
∑i−1
j=1(wnij,2 + wnji,2)uj and wnij,2 is the (i, j) element of the matrix W n2 .
Defining ξn = (0, ξn2 , . . . , ξnn)′, we have
u′zn = u′(Cn2 +Dn
′
2 )u = u′(Cn2 +Dn2 )u = u′ξn ,
where Cn2 and Dn2 are lower triangular matrices such that W n2 = Cn2 + Dn
′
2 and
ξn = (Cn2 + Dn2 )u. However, there is an important difference between the two
formulations of the sum u′zn. Whereas ξni is associated with an increasing σ-field
generated by {u1, . . . , ui−1}, this is not the case for zni =
∑
j 6=iwnij,2uj , as this variable
8
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depends on {uj|j 6= i}. This has important consequences for the variance of u′zn.
Specifically, under the null hypothesis we have
Var(u′ξn) = σ2E(ξn′ξn) , but Var(u′zn) 6= σ2E(zn′zn) .
If W n2 is symmetric, it is not difficult to show that Var(u′zn) = 2σ2E(zn
′
zn). The
factor 2 results from the fact that, due to the symmetric nature of the sum, the
product uiuj occurs two times for each combination of i and j. We therefore suggest
to use ξn instead of zn = W n2 u for constructing the test statistic.
Using these results, the scores (1.7) are represented as
ŝa = 1
σ̂2
û′W n2 û =
n∑
i=2
s˜ai =
1
σ̂2
n∑
i=2
ûiξ̂
n
i , (1.8)
where ξ̂ni is the i’th element of the vector ξ̂n = (Cn2 +Dn2 )û and s˜ai = σ̂−2ûiξ̂ni . Since
s˜ai is (asymptotically) uncorrelated with s˜aj for i 6= j, we can construct the OPG
variant of the LM statistic as
L˜M
a =
(
n∑
i=1
s˜ai
)2
n∑
i=1
(s˜ai )2
. (1.9)
The test statistic L˜Ma can be seen as a heteroskedasticity robust version of the
squared t-statistic in the regression ûi = ρ∗ξ̂ni + ei, where the estimated variance of
the least-squares estimator ρ̂∗ is replaced by the estimator
V̂ ar(ρ̂∗) =
n∑
i=2
(ûiξ̂ni )2(
n∑
i=1
(ξ̂ni )2
)2 .
This estimator is similar to the heteroskedasticity robust variance estimator suggested
by Eicker (1963, 1967) and White (1980), where the residuals are estimated under
the null hypothesis.
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For Hb0 the scores result as
ŝb = 1
σ̂2
ŷ′MW n1 y =
1
σ̂2
(û′W n1 û+ û′W n1 ŷ) =
1
σ̂2
û′ζ̂n ,
where
ζ̂n = (Cn1 +Dn1 )û+MW n1 ŷ (1.10)
and Cn1 and Dn1 are lower triangular matrices such that W n1 = Cn1 +Dn
′
1 . Note that
we have introduced the projection matrix M in the last term of (1.10). Due to
the idempotency of M , this matrix does not affect the product ŷ′MW1y. However,
introducing the matrix M yields a consistent estimator of the asymptotic variance
(see the proof of Proposition 1 for more details). We can now form the OPG variant
of the score statistic as
L˜M
b =
(
n∑
i=1
ûiζ̂
n
i
)2
n∑
i=1
(ûiζ̂ni )2
. (1.11)
Finally, for the hypothesis Hc0 the scores are given by
ŝc = 1
σ̂2
û′W n2 û
û′W n1 y
 = 1
σ̂2
n∑
i=2
ûiΥ̂ni ,
where Υ̂ni = [ξ̂ni , ζ̂ni ]′. The OPG variant of the score statistic results as
L˜M
c =
(
n∑
i=1
ûiΥ̂ni
)′ ( n∑
i=1
û2i Υ̂ni Υ̂n
′
i
)−1 ( n∑
i=1
ûiΥ̂ni
)
, (1.12)
which is equivalent to nR2 obtained from a regression of a constant on ûiΥ̂ni .
1.4 Asymptotic Properties
In the previous section, some regression variants of the LM test statistics were
suggested. These test statistics are equivalent to heteroskedasticity-robust t and
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F -statistics of the following regressions:
Ha0 : ρ∗ = 0 in ûi = ρ∗ξ̂ni + ei (1.13)
Hb0 : φ∗ = 0 in ûi = φ∗ζ̂ni + ei (1.14)
Hc0 : ρ∗ = 0 and φ∗ = 0 in ûi = ρ∗ξ̂ni + φ∗ζ̂ni + ei , (1.15)
where ûi = yi − x′iβ̂, and β̂ denotes the OLS estimator of β. The regressors ξ̂ni and
ζ̂ni are defined in Section 1.3. To analyze the asymptotic properties, we make the
following assumptions:
Assumption 1. (i) The errors εi are independent random variables with E(εi) = 0,
E(ε2i ) = σ2i < c <∞ and E(|εi|4+δ) <∞ for all i and some δ > 0. (ii) The vector
xi is a k × 1 vector of constants with limn→∞ n−1∑ni=1 xix′i → CX (positive definite).
Assumption 2. (i) The diagonal elements of W nh = (wnij,h) are zero. (ii) All row
and column sums of W nh and W n′h W nh are uniformly bounded for all n and h ∈ {1, 2}.
These assumptions are standard in the asymptotic analysis of spatial models (e.g.
Kelejian and Prucha, 2001; Lee, 2007).
The following proposition states that the OPG variants of the LM tests suggested in
Section 3 possess the usual asymptotic distributions if the errors are heteroskedastic.
Furthermore, if the errors are homoskedastic, the test statistics are asymptotically
equivalent to the original LM tests suggested by Burridge (1980) and Anselin (1988a).
Proposition 1. (a) Under Assumptions 1 – 2 and hypotheses Ha0 , Hb0, and Hc0, we
have
L˜M
a d−→ χ21, L˜M
b d−→ χ21 , and L˜M
c d−→ χ22 .
(b) If σ21 = · · · = σ2n (homoskedastic errors), it follows that
L˜M
a − LMa p−→ 0, L˜M b − LM b p−→ 0, and L˜M c − LM c p−→ 0 .
The proof of this proposition can be found in the appendix.
An important implication of this proposition is that if the errors are homoskedastic,
the LM tests can be performed by using the ordinary t-statistics for ρ∗ = 0 or φ∗ = 0
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in (1.13) and (1.14). The hypothesis Hc0 can be tested by computing the F -statistic
of the joint hypothesis in (1.15).
1.5 Monte Carlo Simulations
In this section, we conduct a small Monte Carlo study to demonstrate the finite
sample properties of our new tests and investigate their relative performance compared
to the original LM approaches of Burridge (1980) and Anselin (1988a).3 We simulate
three different models. Models (1.2) and (1.3) are employed to evaluate the spatial
error test and the spatial lag test, respectively. The test for the joint hypothesis is
based on model (1.1). The matrix of exogenous regressors, X, contains two regressors,
x1 and x2, with associated parameters β1 and β2, where β = (1, 1)′. x1 is a vector
of ones and the elements of x2 are drawn independently from a standard normal
distribution. The elements of the vector ε are generated as independent normally
distributed random variables such that E(εε′) = I. Furthermore, we set W1 = W2.
Our weight matrix design closely follows Arraiz et al. (2010).4 The authors use
a setup that mimics the spacing of US states, i.e., units located in the northeast
portion of their model space are closer to each other and have more neighbors than
the units in the other three quadrants. They refer to a weight matrix defined in such
a way as north-east modified rook matrix. We choose a specification where the share
of units located in the northeast is approximately 75%.5 The distance between any
two units is defined as the Euclidean distance
d(i1, i2) =
[
(x1 − x2)2 + (y1 − y2)2
]1/2
.
3There are alternative tests developed for the heteroskedastic case. Kelejian and Robinson (1998)
propose a joint test for spatial error dependence and heteroskedasticity, where the variance is a
(possibly unknown) function of explanatory variables. Kelejian and Robinson (2004) propose
a heteroskedasticity robust version of Moran’s I that is based on a consistent estimator of σ2i .
Since we focus on tests that do not require any knowledge about the variance function, we do
not include these alternative tests in our Monte Carlo experiment.
4See the online appendix (http://www.ect.uni-bonn.de/spatialtest_webappendix.pdf) for
additional results using alternative weight matrices.
5See Arraiz et al. (2010) for a detailed description of this weight matrix design.
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The elements of the row normalized weighting matrix are then defined as
wij =
w∗ij∑n
j=1w
∗
ij
, where w∗ij =
1 if 0 < d(i1, i2) ≤ 10 else .
The original LM tests remain valid under heteroskedasticity as long the het-
eroskedasticity is not itself spatially correlated (Kelejian and Robinson, 2004). In
practice, however, it is reasonable to assume that the heteroskedasticity possesses a
spatial pattern. We therefore introduce a disturbance ψi = εix2i with a “medium”
extent of heteroskedasticity (see Kelejian and Robinson, 1998), where the spatial
correlation in the heteroskedasticity is induced by the sorted vector x2.
Table 1.1: Empirical sizes under heteroskedasticity, 5% level
n LMa L˜Ma LM b L˜M b LM c L˜M c LMaboot LM bboot LM cboot
105 0.229 0.050 0.243 0.045 0.399 0.047 0.052 0.049 0.066
166 0.235 0.044 0.243 0.046 0.406 0.041 0.051 0.053 0.057
241 0.265 0.044 0.267 0.050 0.457 0.045 0.046 0.054 0.063
486 0.305 0.048 0.310 0.048 0.494 0.047 0.050 0.049 0.053
974 0.353 0.051 0.355 0.050 0.581 0.042 0.051 0.049 0.050
Note: Empirical sizes are calculated using 5000 replications.
Table (1.1) presents the empirical sizes obtained from the Monte Carlo simulations
under heteroskedasticity. Not shown here are the empirical sizes under homoskedas-
ticity which are all close to the nominal size. The results change considerably in the
presence of heteroskedastic errors as the original LM tests are now strongly oversized.
Our OPG variants, on the other hand, do not exhibit any notable size distortions.
An alternative approach to produce heteroskedasticity-robust test statistics is to
bootstrap the original LM tests.6 We report the empirical sizes of the bootstrapped
LM tests in the last three columns of table (1.1).
6We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the bootstrap test. Specifically, we employ the wild
bootstrap (Liu, 1988). In this approach, the true OLS residuals ûi are replaced in the bootstrap
DGP by û∗i = ûiεi, where εi = 1 with probability 0.5 and εi = −1 with probability 0.5 (see
Davidson and Flachaire, 2008).
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Figure 1.1: Size corrected power under homo- and heteroskedasticity (n=241)
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Size corrected power curves7 for the tests are depicted in figure (1.1). The left
column of plots shows size corrected power curves of original and OPG versions of
the LM tests under homoskedasticity. The OPG variants are nearly as powerful as
the original LM tests. In the right column, we only plot the size corrected power
curves of our proposed OPG variants, as the original LM tests suffer from massive
size distortions under heteroskedasticity.
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose simple and robust diagnostic tests for spatial error
autocorrelation and spatial lag dependence. We reformulate the testing problem such
7As pointed out by Krämer (2005) and Martellosio (2010), the power of spatial autocorrelation
tests can drop to zero for some combinations of X and Wn2 . Since the regression based test is
asymptotically equivalent to Moran’s I, our test suffers from the same deficiency.
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that the outer product of gradients (OPG) variant of the LM tests can be employed.
Our versions of the tests are based on simple auxiliary regressions, where ordinary
regression t and F statistics can be used to test for spatial autocorrelation and lag
dependence. We show that these tests are asymptotically equivalent to the existing
LM tests, yet simpler to implement. An important advantage of the proposed test
statistics is that they are robust against heteroskedastic errors.
Monte Carlo simulations suggest that our new tests have good size properties, even
under heteroskedasticity, where the original LM tests suffer from size distortions.
Hence, we believe that the proposed tests will give researchers a robust and easily
implementable tool for their applied work.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
Proof of Proposition 1:
(a) We first assume that β is known such that ui = yi − x′iβ, u = [u1, . . . , un]′, and
u′W n2 u =
n∑
i=2
i−1∑
j=1
(wnij,2 + wnji,2)uj
ui = n∑
i=2
uiξ
n
i ,
where ξni is the i’th element of the vector ξn = (Cn2 +Dn2 )u. It is important to note
that although the sequence {(u2ξ2), . . . , (unξnn)} is different for a different ordering
of the cross section units and the respective weights, the sum ∑uiξni is invariant to
the ordering of the units i. Thus, since we are only interested in the distribution of∑
uiξ
n
i , the ordering of the units does not matter for our asymptotic results.8
Let Fn be the increasing σ-algebra generated by {u1, . . . , un} and Zn = ∑ni=2 uiξni .
Note that Zn is a martingale difference sequence with respect to the filtration Fn.
From Assumptions 1 and 2 it follows that9
(i) 1
n
Zn p−→ 0
(ii) 1
n
n∑
i=2
u2i (ξni )2
p−→ lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=2
i−1∑
j=1
(wnij,2 + wnji,2)2σ2jσ2i ≡ s2Z
(iii) 1√
n
Zn d−→ N(0, s2Z) .
It is not difficult to see that the limiting distribution does not change if ui is replaced
by the OLS residual ûi. To see this, consider
Ẑn =
n∑
i=2
ûiξ̂
n
i =
n∑
i=2
i−1∑
j=1
(wnij,2 + wnji,2)ûj
 ûi .
8As pointed out by a referee, this invariance property may be lost if the weight matrices are
renormalized for different orderings.
9Using different techniques, a similar result is derived by Kelejian and Prucha (2001, Theorem 1).
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Using û = u−X(β̂ − β), we obtain
Ẑn = Zn + (β̂ − β)′X ′W n2 X(β̂ − β)− (β̂ − β)′X ′(W n2 +W n
′
2 )u .
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that β̂ − β is Op(n−1/2) and, therefore,
1√
n
Ẑn = 1√
n
Zn +Op(n−1/2) .
In a similar manner, it can be shown that
1
n
n∑
i=2
û2i (ξ̂ni )2
p−→ s2Z .
It follows that
L˜M
a = Ẑ
2
n
n∑
i=2
û2i (ξ̂ni )2
d−→ χ21 .
Regarding the asymptotic distribution of L˜M b, we first consider the case that β is
known. Let ζn be constructed as ζ̂n, where β̂ is replaced by β:
Z∗n = u′ζn = u′W n1 u+ u′W n1 Xβ = u′(Cn1 +Dn1 )u+ u′W n1 Xβ
=
n∑
i=1
ui(ξi + µi) ,
where µi is the i’th element of the vector µ = W n1 Xβ. It follows that
1
n
Var(Z∗n) → s2Z + limn→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
µ2iσ
2
i ≡ s2Z∗
and 1√
n
Z∗n d−→ N (0, s2Z∗).
Using similar arguments as for Ẑn, we can show that
1√
n
Ẑ∗n =
1√
n
Z∗n +Op(n−1/2) ,
where Ẑ∗n is constructed as Z∗n, with β replaced by β̂. However, some caution is
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necessary to derive the variance
Var(Ẑ∗n) = Var(û′W n
′
1 û) + 2E(û′W n1 ûû′W n1 Xβ̂) + E(β̂′X ′W n
′
1 ûû
′W n1 Xβ̂) .
Let µ̂i denote the i’th element of the vector µ̂ = W n1 Xβ̂. Then,
1
n
E(û′W n′1 ûû′W n1 Xβ̂) =
1
n
E
[(
n∑
i=2
ûiξ̂i
)(
n∑
i=1
ûiµ̂i
)]
= E
{[(
1√
n
n∑
i=2
uiξi
)
+Op(n−1/2)
] [
1√
n
(
n∑
i=1
uiµi − µix′i(β̂ − β)
)
+Op(n−1/2)
]}
= O(n−1/2) .
Finally,
1
n
E(β̂′X ′W n′1 ûû′W n1 Xβ̂) =
1
n
β′X ′W n
′
1 M E(uu′)MW n1 Xβ +O(n−1/2)
= 1
n
n∑
i=1
µ˜2iσ
2
i +O(n−1/2) ,
where µ˜2i is the i’th element of the vector µ˜ = MW n1 Xβ. It follows that
ŝ2Ẑ∗ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(ûiζ̂ni )2 ,
with ζ̂ni as defined in (1.10), converges to the limiting variance of n−1/2Ẑ∗n. Hence,
L˜M
b = (Ẑ
∗
n)2
n∑
i=1
(ûiζ̂ni )2
d−→ χ21 .
Finally, using these results, it is easy to verify that
L˜M
c = Ŷ ′n
(
n∑
i=1
û2i Υ̂ni Υ̂n
′
i
)−1
Ŷn d−→ χ22 ,
where Ŷn = [Ẑn, Ẑ∗n]′ and Υ̂ni = [ξ̂ni , ζ̂ni ]′.
(b) If the errors are homoskedastic, the LM statistic suggested by Burridge (1980)
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has the asymptotic representation
LMa = (u
′W n2 u)2
σ4tr
[
(W n2 )2 +W n
′
2 W
n
2
] + op(1) .
To analyze the asymptotic distribution of the statistic L˜Ma under homoskedasticity,
we first note that
tr
[
(W n2 )
2 +W n′2 W n2
]
= tr
[(
Cn2 +Dn
′
2
) (
Cn2 +Dn
′
2
)
+
(
Cn
′
2 +Dn2
) (
Cn2 +Dn
′
2
)]
= tr
(
Cn
′
2 C
n
2
)
+ tr
(
Dn
′
2 D
n
2
)
+ 2 tr
(
Dn
′
2 C
n
2
)
= tr
[
(Cn2 +Dn2 )
′ (Cn2 +Dn2 )
]
.
It follows that
1
n
n∑
i=1
û2i (ζ̂ni )2
p−→ lim
n→∞
σ4
n
tr [(Cn2 +Dn2 )′(Cn2 +Dn2 )] = limn→∞
σ4
n
tr
[
(W n2 )2 +W n
′
2 W
n
2
]
.
Therefore,
L˜M
a = (u
′(Cn2 +Dn2 )′(Cn2 +Dn2 )u)2
σ4tr[(W n2 )2 +W n
′
2 W
n
2 ]
+ op(1)
and L˜Ma − LMa p−→ 0.
To analyze the asymptotic properties of L˜M b under homoskedastic errors, we first
note that from the results in (a) we obtain
1√
n
Ẑ∗n =
1√
n
[u′(Cn1 +Dn1 )u+ u′W n1 Xβ] + op(1)
and
1
n
n∑
i=2
û2i (ζ̂ni )2
p−→ lim
n→∞
σ2
n
E [(Cn1 +Dn1 )u+MW n1 Xβ]
′ [(Cn1 +Dn1 )u+MW n1 Xβ]
= σ4tr
[
(W n1 )2 +W n
′
1 W
n
1
]
+ σ2β′X ′W n′1 MW n1 Xβ
It follows that
L˜M
b = [u
′(Cn1 +Dn1 )u+ u′W n1 Xβ]
2
σ4tr
[
(W n1 )2 +W n
′
1 W
n
1
]
+ σ2β′X ′W n′1 MW n1 Xβ
+ op(1)
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and, therefore, the test statistic L˜M b is asymptotically equivalent to the original LM b
statistic presented in (1.5). The asymptotic equivalence of the joint test statistics
LM c and L˜M c follows directly from these results.
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Testing for Serial Correlation in
Fixed-Effects Panel Data Models
2.1 Introduction
Panel data models are increasingly popular in applied work as they have many
advantages over cross-sectional approaches (see e.g. Hsiao, 2003, p. 3ff). The classical
linear panel data model assumes serially uncorrelated disturbances. As argued by
Baltagi (2008, p. 92), this assumption is likely to be violated as the dynamic effect of
shocks to the dependent variable is often distributed over several time periods. In
such cases, serial correlation leads to inefficient estimates and biased standard errors
and, therefore, tests for serial correlation are nowadays routinely applied in regression
analysis based on time series.
For panel data a number of tests for serial error correlation have been proposed in
the literature. Bhargava et al. (1982) generalize the Durbin-Watson statistic to the
fixed-effects panel model. Baltagi and Li (1991, 1995) and Baltagi and Wu (1999)
derive LM statistics for first order serial correlation. Drukker (2003), elaborating on
an idea originally proposed by Wooldridge (2002), proposes an easily implementable
test for serial correlation based on the OLS residuals of the first-differenced model.
However, all these tests have limitations. A serious problem of the Bhargava et al.
(1982) statistic is that the distribution depends on N and T and, therefore, the
critical values have to be provided in large tables depending on both dimensions.
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Baltagi and Li (1995) noted that, for fixed T , their test statistic does not possess
the usual χ2 limiting distribution due to the (Nickell) bias in the estimation of the
autocorrelation coefficient. The Wooldridge-Drukker test is not derived from the
usual test principles (like LM, LR or Wald) and, therefore, it is not clear whether the
test has desirable properties. Furthermore, these tests are not robust against temporal
heteroskedasticity and not applicable to unbalanced panels (with the exception of
the statistic proposed by Baltagi and Wu (1999)).
In this chapter, we propose new test statistics and modifications of existing test
statistics that correct some of these limitations. In Section 2, we first present the
model framework and briefly review the existing tests. Our new test procedures are
considered in Section 3 and the small sample properties of the tests are studied in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Preliminaries
Consider the usual fixed effects panel data model with serially correlated distur-
bances
yit = x′itβ + µi + uit (2.1)
uit = ρui,t−1 + εit , (2.2)
where i = 1, . . . , N denotes the cross-section dimension and t = 1, . . . , T is the time
dimension. In our benchmark situation, the following assumption is imposed:
Assumption 3. (i) The error εit is independently distributed across i and t with
E(εit) = 0, E(ε2it) = σ2i , limN→∞max(σ2i )/
(∑N
i=1 σ
2
i
)
= 0 and E |εit|4+δ < ∞ for
some δ > 0. (ii) For the vector of regressors it is assumed that
1
NT
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(xit − xi)(xit − xi)′ p−→ C
is a finite and positive definite matrix. Furthermore, xit is independent of εis for all
i, t and s.
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To test the null hypothesis ρ = 0, Bhargava et al. (1982) propose a pooled Durbin-
Watson statistic given by
pDW =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=2
(ûit − ûi,t−1)2
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
û2it
,
where ûit = yit − x′itβ̂ − µ̂i, and β̂ and µ̂i denote the least-squares dummy-variable
(or within-group) estimator of β and µi, respectively. A serious problem of this test
is that its null distribution depends on N and T and, therefore, the critical values
are provided in large tables depending on both dimensions in Bhargava et al. (1982).
Furthermore, no critical values are available for unbalanced panels.
Baltagi and Li (1995) derive the LM test statistic for the hypothesis ρ = 0 assuming
normally distributed errors. The resulting test statistic is equivalent to (the LM
version of) the t-statistic of % in the regression
ûit = %ûi,t−1 + νit . (2.3)
The LM test statistic results as
LM =
√
NT 2
T − 1

N∑
i=1
T∑
t=2
ûitûi,t−1
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
û2it
 .
Baltagi and Li (1995) show that if N → ∞ and T → ∞, the LM statistic has a
standard normal limiting distribution. However, if T is fixed and N → ∞, the
application of the respective critical values leads to severe size distortions (see Section
3.2).
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2.3 Test Statistics for Fixed T
In this section, we consider test procedures that are valid for fixed T and N →∞.
All statistics have the general form
λNT =
∑N
i=1 ê
′
iAT êi√∑N
i=1(ê′iAT êi)2 − 1N
(∑N
i=1 ê
′
iAT êi
)2 , (2.4)
where êi = [êi1, . . . , êiT ]′, êit = yit−x′itβ̂ and AT is a deterministic T ×T matrix. The
matrix AT eliminates the individual effects from êi and ensures that N−1E(ê′iAT êi)
converges in probability to zero, as N →∞.
The following lemma presents the limiting distribution of the test statistic under a
sequence of local alternatives assuming that T is fixed and N →∞.
Lemma 1. Let AT denote a T ×T matrix obeying AT ι = 0, A′T ι = 0, and tr(AT ) = 0.
Under Assumption 1 and the sequence of local alternatives ρN = c/
√
N , the asymptotic
distribution of the test statistic is given by
λNT
d−→ N

cκ
(
T∑
t=2
at,t−1 + at−1,t
)
√
T∑
t=1
T∑
s=1
a2ts + atsast
, 1
 ,
where κ = m2/
√
m4 with mk = limN→∞N−1
∑N
i=1 σ
k
i , and ats denotes the (t, s)
element of the matrix AT .
Remark 1: Under the null hypothesis (c = 0), all test statistics considered in this
section are asymptotically standard normal.
Remark 2: The limiting distribution does not depend on the regressor matrix X
and, therefore, the estimation error β̂ − β does not affect the limiting distribution.
We therefore treat eit = yit − x′itβ as being known in what follows.
Remark 3: A straightforward extension to unbalanced panel data with individual
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specific Ti yields
λNT
d−→ N
c
tr
(
lim
N→∞
N−1
N∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=2
σ2i (at,t−1 + at−1,t)
)
√√√√tr( lim
N→∞
N−1
N∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
Ti∑
s=1
σ4i (a2ts + atsast)
) , 1
 .
Hence, to accommodate unbalanced panel data the tests are computed with individual
specific transformation matrices ATi instead of a joint matrix AT .
2.3.1 The Wooldridge-Drucker Test
To obtain a valid test statistic for fixed T , Wooldridge (2002, p. 282f) suggests to
run a least squares regression of the first differences ∆eit = eit − ei,t−1 on the lagged
differences ∆ei,t−1. Under the null hypothesis ρ = 0, the first order autocorrelation of
the first differences converges in probability to −0.5. Since ∆eit is serially autocor-
related, Drukker (2003) suggests to employ heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent (HAC) standard errors,1 yielding the test statistic
WD = θ̂ + 0.5
ŝθ
.
Here, θ̂ denotes the least-squares estimator of θ in the regression
∆eit = θ∆ei,t−1 + ηit , (2.5)
and ŝ2θ is the HAC estimator of the standard errors given by
ŝ2θ =
N∑
i=1
(
T∑
t=3
∆ei,t−1η̂it
)2
(
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=3
∆e2i,t−1
)2 ,
with η̂it as the pooled OLS residual from the autoregression (2.5).
1This approach is also known as “robust cluster” or “panel corrected” standard errors.
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In the following theorem, we propose a simplified and asymptotically equivalent
version of the Wooldridge-Drucker test.
Theorem 2. Let zT i =
T∑
t=3
(eit − 12ei,t−1 − 12ei,t−2)(ei,t−1 − ei,t−2) and
W˜D =
N∑
i=1
zT i√√√√ N∑
i=1
z2T i − 1N
(
N∑
i=1
zT i
)2 . (2.6)
(i) Under Assumption 1, T ≥ 3, and ρN = c/
√
N , it follows that
W˜D d−→ N
c κ(T − 2)√
2(T − 3) + 3
, 1
 ,
where κ is defined in Lemma 1.
(ii) The test statistic W˜D is asymptotically equivalent to WD in the sense that
W˜D−WD p−→ 0.
Remark 4: The form of the test statistic results from
θ̂ + 0.5 =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=3
(∆eit∆ei,t−1 + 12∆e
2
i,t−1)
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=3
∆eit∆ei,t−1
=
N∑
i=1
zT i
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=3
∆eit∆ei,t−1
.
The W˜D statistic deviates from WD by computing the HAC variance based on the
residuals obtained under the null hypothesis, i.e., η0it = ∆eit + 0.5∆ei,t−1 instead of
the residuals η̂it used to compute the original WD statistic.
Remark 5: It is interesting to note that under the alternative we have as N →∞
θ̂ + 0.5 p−→ r1 − r22(1− r1) +O(T
−1) ,
where rj is the j’th autocorrelation of uit. This suggests that WD (and W˜D) is a test
against the difference between the first and second order autocorrelation of the errors.
Therefore, the test is expected to have poor power against alternatives with r1 ≈ r2.
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Remark 6: The test statistic is robust against cross-sectional heteroskedasticity.
However, using θ = −0.5 requires that the variances do not change in time, i.e.,
E(u2it) = E(u2is) = σ2i . Thus, this test rules out time dependent heteroskedasticity.
2.3.2 The LM Test
An important problem with the LM test suggested by Baltagi and Li (1995) is that
the limit distribution depends on T . This is due to the fact that the least-squares
estimator of % in regression (2.3) is biased and the errors νit in (2.3) are autocorrelated.
Under fairly restrictive assumptions the following asymptotic null distribution is
obtained:
Lemma 3. Under Assumption 1 and uit iid∼ N (0, σ2) for all i and t, it holds for fixed
T and N →∞ thatLM +
√
N
T − 1
 d−→ N (0, (T + 1)(T − 2)2(T − 1)3
)
.
It follows that applying the usual critical values derived from the χ21 distribution to
the (two-sided) test statistic LM2 yields a test with actual size tending to unity as
N →∞. Note also that the limit distribution of the LM statistic tends to a standard
normal distribution if T →∞ and √N/T → 0. To obtain an asymptotically valid
test for fixed T , the transformed statistic
L˜M =
√√√√ (T − 1)3
(T + 1)(T − 2)2
LM +
√
N
T − 1

may be used, which has a standard normal limiting null distribution. An important
limitation of this test statistic is, however, that the result requires the errors to be
normally distributed with identical variances for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. To obtain a
test statistic that is valid in more general (and realistic) situations, we propose a
regression based test statistic related to the approach suggested by Wooldridge and
Drukker.
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Let %̂ denote the least-squares estimator of % in the regression
eit − ei = %(ei,t−1 − ei) + νit , (2.7)
where ei = T−1
∑T
t=1 eit. It is convenient to introduce the T × 1 vector of ones ι and
the matrices M1 and MT that result from M = IT − T−1ιι′ by dropping the first or
the last row, respectively. Using this matrix notation we obtain
%̂
p−→ %0 = tr(M
′
1MT )
tr(M ′TMT )
= − (T − 1)/T(T − 1)2/T = −
1
T − 1 , (2.8)
Thus a regression t-statistic is employed to test the modified null hypothesis H ′0 :
% = %0 = −1/(T − 1). To account for autocorrelation in νit, (HAC) robust standard
errors are employed, yielding the test statistic
LM∗ = %̂− %0
v˜ρ
,
where
v˜2ρ =
N∑
i=1
e′iM
′
T ν˜iν˜
′
iMT ei(
N∑
i=1
e′iM ′TMT ei
)2 =
N∑
i=1
e′iM
′
T (M1 − %̂MT )eie′i(M1 − %̂MT )′MT ei(
N∑
i=1
e′iM ′TMT ei
)2 .
As for the WD test, we propose a simplified version of this test that is asymptotically
equivalent to the statistic LM∗.
Theorem 4. Let wT i =
T∑
t=2
[
(eit − ei)(ei,t−1 − ei) + 1T−1(ei,t−1 − ei)2
]
and
L˜M∗ =
N∑
i=1
wT i√√√√ N∑
i=1
w2T i − 1N
(
N∑
i=1
wT i
)2 . (2.9)
(i) Under Assumption 1, T ≥ 2, and the local alternative ρN = c/
√
N , the test
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statistic L˜M∗ is asymptotically distributed as
N
c κ
√
T − 3 + 2
T 2 − T , 1
 ,
with κ as defined in Lemma 1.
(ii) Under the the local alternative, the statistic L˜M∗ is asymptotically equivalent to
LM∗.
2.3.3 A Modified Durbin-Watson Statistic
The pDW statistic suggested by Bhargava et al. (1982) is the ratio of the sum of
squared differences and the sum of squared residuals. Instead of the ratio (which
complicates the theoretical analysis), our variant of the Durbin-Watson test is based
on the linear combination of the numerator and denominator of the Durbin-Watson
statistic. Let
δT i = e′iMD′DMei − 2 e′iMei ,
where D is a (T − 1)× T matrix producing first differences, i.e.
D =

−1 1 0 · · · 0
0 −1 1 · · · 0
... . . . ...
... . . . ...
0 0 0 · · · −1 1

,
and M as defined above. Using tr(MD′DM) = 2(T − 1) and tr(M) = T − 1, it
follows that E(δT i) = 0 for all i.
The panel test statistic is based on the normalized mean of the individual statistics:
mDW = 1
ŝδ
√
N
N∑
i=1
δT i ,
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where
ŝ2δ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δ2T i −
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
δT i
)2
.
The following theorem presents the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic.
Theorem 5. Under Assumption 1, T ≥ 3, and the local alternative ρN = c/
√
N , the
limiting distribution is
mDW d−→ N
(
−cκ T − 1
T
√
T − 2, 1
)
.
2.3.4 Tests for Higher Order Autocorrelation
In this section, the test for first order autocorrelation is generalized to testing
against autocorrelation of order p. Consider the regression
eit − ei = %k(ei,t−k − ei) + it , t = k + 1, . . . , T ; i = 1, . . . , N . (2.10)
In the following lemma, we present the probability limit of the OLS estimator of %k
for fixed T and N →∞.
Lemma 6. Let %̂k be the pooled OLS estimator of %k in (2.10). Under Assumption 1
and ρ = 0 we have
%̂k
p−→ − 1
T − 1 ,
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , T − 2}.
Using this lemma, a test for zero autocorrelation at lag k can be constructed based
on the (heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust) t-statistic of the hypothesis
%k = −1/(T − 1). An asymptotically equivalent test statistic is obtained by letting
w
(k)
T i =
T∑
t=k+1
[
(eit − ei)(ei,t−k − ei) + 1
T − 1(ei,t−k − ei)
2
]
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and
L˜M∗k =
N∑
i=1
w
(k)
T i√√√√ N∑
i=1
w
(k)2
T i − 1N
(
N∑
i=1
w
(k)
T i
)2 . (2.11)
Along the lines of the proof of Theorem 4, it is not difficult to show that, under the
null hypothesis, L˜M∗k has a standard normal limiting distribution.
In empirical practice it is, however, more interesting to test the hypothesis that
the errors are not autocorrelated up to order p. Unfortunately, the probability limit
of the autoregressive coefficients φ1, . . . , φp in the autoregression
eit − ei = φ1(ei,t−1 − ei) + · · ·+ φp(ei,t−p − ei) + υit
is a much more complicated function of T , since the regressors are mutually cor-
related. Instead of presenting the probability limit, we therefore suggest a simple
transformation of the regressors such that the autoregressive coefficients can be
estimated unbiasedly under the null hypothesis. Specifically, we propose an implicit
correction that eliminates the nonzero mean. In matrix notation, the (transformed)
autoregression is given by
Mei = φ1L1Mei + φ2L2Mei + · · ·+ φpLpMei + υi , (2.12)
where
Lk =

ψk/T 0 · · · 0
0 ψk/T · · · 0
... ...
1 · · · 0 . . .
... . . . ...
0 · · · 1 ψk/T

,
k ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Note that the matrix Lk (i) produces lagged values of the (mean-
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adjusted) residuals and (ii) includes further terms to yield E(e′iMLkMei) = 0. Let
LkMei =

0
...
0
ei1 − ei
...
ei,T−k − ei

+ (ψk/T ) ei ,
where the first vector on the right hand side represents the lagged values of the
demeaned residuals, whereas the second vector is introduced to remove the bias. It is
not difficult to show that
E(e′iMLkMei) = 0 for ψk =
T − k
T − 1 ,
and all k = 1, . . . , p and, therefore, under the null hypothesis, the least-squares
estimators of φ1, . . . , φp converge to zero in probability for all T and N →∞. The
null hypothesis φ1 = · · · = φp = 0 can therefore be tested using the associated Wald
statistic
Q(p) = φ̂′Ŝ−1φ̂ , (2.13)
where
Ŝ =
(
N∑
i=1
Z ′iZi
)−1 ( N∑
i=1
Z ′iυ̂iυ̂
′
iZi
)(
N∑
i=1
Z ′iZi
)−1
is the HAC estimator for the covariance matrix of the vector of coefficients with
φ̂ =
[
φ̂1, . . . , φ̂p
]′
, Zi = [L1Mei, . . . , LpMei] and υ̂i = Mei − Zφ̂. The Q(p) statistic
is asymptotically equivalent to the statistic
Q˜(p) =
N∑
i=1
e′iMZi
[
N∑
i=1
Z ′iMeie
′
iMZi −
1
N
(
N∑
i=1
Z ′iMei
)(
N∑
i=1
e′iMZi
)]−1 N∑
i=1
Z ′iMei .
Along the lines of Theorem 4, it is straightforward to show that the statistics Q(p)
and Q˜(p) are asymptotically equivalent and have an asymptotic χ2 distribution with
p degrees of freedom.
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2.3.5 A Heteroskedasticity Robust Test Statistic
An important drawback of all test statistics considered so far is that they are
not robust against time dependent heteroskedasticity. This is due to the fact that
the implicit or explicit bias correction of the autocovariances depends on the error
variances. To overcome this drawback of the previous test statistics, we construct
an unbiased estimator of the autocorrelation coefficient. The idea is to apply back-
ward and forward transformations such that the products of the transformed series
are uncorrelated under the null hypothesis. Specifically, we employ the following
transformations for eliminating the individual effects:
zfit = eit −
1
T − t+ 1 (eit + · · ·+ eiT )
zbit = eit −
1
t
(ei1 + · · ·+ eit) .
The hypothesis can be tested based on the regression
zfit = ψzbi,t−1 + ωit , t = 3, . . . , T − 1 , (2.14)
or, in matrix notation,
V0ei = ψV1ei + ηi ,
where the (T − 3)× T matrices V0 and V1 are defined as

−12 12 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
−13 −13 23 0 . . . 0 0 0... ...
− 1
T−2 − 1T−2 − 1T−2 − 1T−2 . . . T−3T−2 0 0

and 
0 0 T−3
T−2 − 1T−2 − 1T−2 . . . − 1T−2 − 1T−2
0 0 0 T−4
T−3 − 1T−3 . . . − 1T−3 − 1T−3... ...
0 0 0 0 0 . . . 12 −12
 .
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Under the null hypothesis of no (first order) autocorrelation, we have ψ = 0. Since the
error term ηi is heteroskedastic and autocorrelated, we again employ robust (HAC)
standard errors. The resulting test statistic is equivalent to the test statistic
H˜R =
N∑
i=1
ζT i√√√√ N∑
i=1
ζ2T i − 1N
(
N∑
i=1
ζT i
)2 ,
where ζT i =
∑T−1
t=3 z
f
itz
b
i,t−1. Since ζT i is independent of ζTj for all i 6= j, it follows from
the central limit theorem for independent random variables that H˜R has a standard
normal limit distribution.
2.4 Monte Carlo Study
This section presents the finite sample performance of the test statistics for serial
correlation and assesses the reliability of the asymptotic results derived in Section
3. We also conduct experiments with different forms of serial correlation and het-
eroskedasticity.
The benchmark data generating process for all simulations is a linear panel data
model of the form
yit = xitβ + µi + uit,
where i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T . We set β to 1 in all simulations and draw the
individual effects µi from a N (0, 2.52) distribution. To create correlation between the
regressor and the individual effect, we follow Drukker (2003) by drawing x0it from a
N (0, 1.82) distribution and computing xit = x0it + 0.5µi. The regressor is drawn once
and then held constant for all experiments. In our benchmark model, the disturbance
term follows an autoregressive process of order 1,
uit = αui,t−1 + εit ,
where εit ∼ N (0, 1) and we discard the first 100 observations to eliminate the influence
of the initial value.
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Table 2.1 presents the results of the local power analysis. The empirical values
are computed using 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations, while the asymptotic values
(given in parentheses) are computed according to the results given in Theorems 2,
4, and 5. All tests exhibit good size control (i.e. for c = 0).2 They reject the null
hypothesis of no serial correlation slightly more often than the nominal size of 5%
but are never above 6%. In all cases, the LM statistic has superior power compared
to the competing statistics. While the modified Durbin-Watson statistic is close to
the LM statistic, the Wooldridge-Drukker test has considerably less power.
To evaluate the small-sample properties of the test for higher-order autocorrelation
Q˜(p), we simulate a model with disturbances following an AR(2) process:
uit = α1ui,t−1 + α2ui,t−2 + εit ,
where again εit ∼ N (0, 1) and we discard the first 100 observations to eliminate
the influence of the initial value. The results for three different AR(2) processes
are presented in Table 2.2. The Q˜(2) statistic has good power properties in all
configurations considered. Not surprisingly, the Wooldridge-Drukker test shows
considerable power when α1 = 0.1 and α2 = −0.1 or α1 = 0 and α2 = 0.2. As
mentioned in Remark 5, the WD (and W˜D) statistic is a test of the difference
between the first and second order autocorrelation of the errors. As a consequence, it
also has power against most AR(2) alternatives. However, choosing α1 = α2 = 0.1,
which implies equal first- and second-order autocorrelations of uit, leads to a complete
loss of power of the Wooldridge-Drukker test, confirming our assertion in Remark 5.
The LM statistic has less power than the Q˜(2) statistic, in particular for the setup
with α1 = 0 and α2 = 0.2.
We consider four different types of time-dependent heteroskedasticity by using the
following error process:
uit =
√
htεit ,
where εit ∼ N (0, 1). The first type is a break in the variance function, i.e. ht = 10
for t = 1, . . . , T/5 and ht = 1 otherwise. The second specification is a U-shaped
2The cross-sectional dimension is held constant at N = 100. Values of c = 0, c = 0.5, and c = 1
therefore imply α = 0, α = 0.05, and α = 0.1, respectively.
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variance function of the form ht = (t − T/2)2 + 1. The third and fourth types of
heteroskedasticity are positive and negative exponential variance functions, i.e. ht =
exp(−0.5t) and ht = exp(0.5t), respectively. Table 2.3 shows that the modified Durbin-
Watson test has massive size distortions under all four types of heteroskedasticity.
While the Wooldridge-Drukker test has the proper size in case of a U-shaped variance
function, the break in the variance function and the exponential variance functions
lead to large size distortions. The modified LM statistic does surprisingly well under
heteroskedasticity, but there are some size distortions when T is small, especially
for the negative exponential variance function. On the other hand our proposed
heteroskedasticity-robust test statistic retains its correct size under all types of
heteroskedasticity considered here.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter proposes various tests for serial correlation in fixed-effects panel data
regression models with a small number of time periods. First, a simplified version
of the test suggested by Wooldridge (2002) and Drukker (2003) is considered. The
second test is based on the LM statistic suggested by Baltagi and Li (1995), and
the third test is a modification of the classical Durbin-Watson statistic. Under the
null hypothesis of no serial correlation, all tests possess a standard normal limiting
distribution as N →∞ and T is fixed. Analyzing the local power of the tests, we find
that the LM statistic has superior power properties. We also propose a generalization
to test for autocorrelation up to some given lag order and a test statistic that is
robust against time dependent heteroskedasticity. Monte Carlo simulations show that
the proposed tests have favorable size and power properties compared to the popular
Wooldridge-Drukker test.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 1:
Let yi = [yi1, . . . , yiT ]′ and Xi = [xi1, . . . , xiT ]′. The residual vector can be written
as
êi = ei −Xi(β̂ − β) .
It follows that
N∑
i=1
ê′iAT êi =
N∑
i=1
e′iAT ei − 2
N∑
i=1
e′iATXi(β̂ − β) +
N∑
i=1
(β̂ − β)′X ′iATXi(β̂ − β) .
For the estimation error of β̂, we obtain
β̂ − β =
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(xit − xi)(xit − xi)′
)−1 T∑
t=1
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
(xit − xi)uit
)
=
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(xit − xi)(xit − xi)′
)−1 T∑
t=1
ξNt ,
where ξNt = N−1
∑N
i=1(xit − xi)uit. Assumption 1 implies
1
NT
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(xit − xi)(xit − xi)′ p−→ C
and ξNt = Op(N−1/2). It follows that β̂ − β = Op(N−1/2). Furthermore,
‖ 1
N
N∑
i=1
X ′iATXi‖ ≤ ‖AT‖
1
N
N∑
i=1
‖X ′iXi‖ = Op(1)
‖ 1√
N
N∑
i=1
X ′iAT ei‖ ≤ ‖AT‖ · ‖
1√
N
N∑
i=1
X ′iei‖ = Op(1) .
Using e′iAT ei = (µiι′ + u′i)AT (µiι+ ui) = u′iATui, it follows that
N∑
i=1
ê′iAT êi =
N∑
i=1
u′iATui +Op(N−1/2) .
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Under the sequence of local alternatives, we have
Ω = E(uiu′i) =
σ2i
1− ρ2N

1 ρN ρ2N · · · ρT−1N
ρN 1 ρN · · · ρT−2N
... ...
ρT−1N ρ
T−2
N ρ
T−3
N · · · 1
 = IT +
c σ2i√
N
HT +O(N−1) ,
where HT is a band matrix with ones on the first off-diagonals and zeros elsewhere.
Since tr(AT ) = 0 it follows that
E(u′iATui) = E(ATΩ) =
cσ2i√
N
tr(ATHT ) +O(N−1) .
Using standard results for the variance of quadratic forms (e.g. Searle, 1971), we have
var(u′iATui) = σ4i tr(A2T + A′TAT ) +O(N−1/2) .
It follows from the Lindeberg-Feller central limit theorem
1√
N
N∑
i=1
u′iATui
p−→ N
(
cm2tr(ATHT ),m4 tr(A2T + A′TAT )
)
,
where m2 and m4 are defined in Lemma 1.
For the second moment we obtain from the law of large numbers
1
N
N∑
i=1
(ê′iAT êi)2 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
u′iATui +Op(N−1/2)
)2
= 1
N
N∑
i=1
(u′iATui)
2 +Op(N−1/2)
p−→ m4 tr(A2T + A′TAT ) .
Furthermore, under the sequence of local alternatives
1
N
(
1√
N
N∑
i=1
ê′iAT êi
)2
= Op(N−1)
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and, therefore, the second term of the denominator in (2.4) does not affect the limiting
distribution.
It follows that the limiting distribution of the test statistic is given by
λNT =
1√
N
N∑
i=1
u′iATui√
1
N
∑N
i=1 (u′iATui)
2
+ op(1) d−→ N
c κtr(ATHT )√
tr(A2T + A′TAT )
, 1
 .
Finally, we have
tr(ATHT ) =
T∑
t=2
at,t−1 + at−1,t
tr(A′TAT ) =
T∑
t=2
T∑
s=1
a2ts
tr(A2T ) =
T∑
t=2
T∑
s=1
atsast ,
which gives the limiting distribution as stated in Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 2:
(ii) Define the (T − 1)× T first-difference matrix
D =

−1 1 0 · · · 0
0 −1 1 · · · 0
... . . . ...
... . . . ...
0 0 0 · · · −1 1

and let Dk denote a (T − 2)× T matrix that results from dropping the k’th row of
D so that
zT i = e′i(D′TD1 + 0.5D′TDT )ei ≡ e′iAT ei ,
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where
AT =

0.5 −0.5 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.5 0 −0.5 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 1.5 0 −0.5 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −1 1.5 0 −0.5 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −1 1.5 0 −0.5 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0
...
... · · · ... ...
0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · −1 1.5 0 −0.5 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 −1 1.5 0 −0.5 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 −1 1.5 −0.5 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 −1 1 0

.
If uit iid∼ N(0, σ2i ), the variance of the quadratic form e′iAT ei = u′iATui is
σ4i tr(A2T + A′TAT ), where
tr(A2T ) = −
3
2(T − 3)
tr(A′TAT ) = 3 +
7(T − 3)
2 .
It follows that var(e′iAT ei) = σ4i [2(T − 3) + 3]. Furthermore,
tr(ATHT ) = T − 2
and, by using Lemma 1, we obtain
W˜D d−→ N
c κ(T − 2)√
2(T − 3) + 3
, 1
 .
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(ii) The original version of the WD test can be written as
WD =
N∑
i=1
zT i√√√√ N∑
i=1
(
T∑
t=3
∆ei,t−1(∆eit − θ̂∆ei,t−1)
)2
=
1√
N
N∑
i=1
zT i√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
T∑
t=3
∆ei,t−1(∆eit + 0.5∆ei,t−1) + (θ̂ + 0.5)∆e2t−1
)2
=
1√
N
N∑
i=1
zT i√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
T∑
t=3
∆ei,t−1(∆eit + 0.5∆ei,t−1)
)2 +Op(N−1/2)
=
1√
N
N∑
i=1
zTi√
1
N
N∑
i=1
z2T i
+Op(N−1/2) ,
where θ̂ + 0.5 = Op(N−1/2) under the null hypothesis and local alternative. Further-
more, by using the results in the proof of Lemma 1:
W˜D =
N∑
i=1
zT i√√√√ N∑
i=1
z2T i − 1N
(
N∑
i=1
zT i
)2
=
1√
N
N∑
i=1
zT i√
1
N
N∑
i=1
z2T i
+Op(N−1/2)
It follows that WD− W˜D = Op(N−1/2).
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Proof of Lemma 3:
For the first order autocorrelation, Cox and Solomon (1988) derive the following
asymptotic approximation:
√
N

N∑
i=1
T∑
t=2
(uit − ui)(ui,t−1 − ui)
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(uit − ui)2
 d−→ N
(
− 1
T
,
(T + 1)(T − 2)2
T 2(T − 1)2
)
.
Using this result, the limiting distribution of the LM statistic is easily derived.
Proof of Theorem 4:
(i) Using the matrix notation introduced in section 2, we have
wT i = u′i
(
M ′1MT +
1
T − 1M
′
TMT
)
ui ≡ u′iATui .
The variance of wT i is obtained as var(wT i) = σ4i tr(A2 +AA′) by using the following
results:
tr(M ′1MTM ′1MT ) = −(T 2 − 2T − 1)/T 2
tr(M ′1MTM ′TM1) = tr(M ′TMTM ′TMT ) = (T 3 − 2T 2 + 1)/T 2
tr(M ′1MTM ′TMT ) = tr(M ′TMTM ′1MT ) = tr(M ′TMTM ′TM1) = −(T 2 − T − 1)/T 2 .
It follows that
var(wT i) = σ4i
(
T − 3 + 2
T (T − 1)
)
.
Furthermore,
tr(M ′1MTHT ) = tr(S ′TMHTMS1) = tr(S ′THTS1)−2T−1tr(S ′T ιι′HTS1)+T−2tr(S ′T ιι′HT ιι′S1) ,
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where Sk, is a T × (T − 1) selection matrix that eliminates the k’th row. Using
tr(S ′THTS1) = T − 1
tr(S ′THTST ) = 0
tr(S ′T ιι′HTS1) = tr(S ′T ιι′HTST ) = 2(T − 1)− 1
tr(S ′T ιι′HT ιι′S1) = tr(S ′T ιι′HT ιι′ST ) = 2(T − 1)2
yields
tr(ATHT ) = tr
(
M ′1MTHT −
1
T − 1M
′
1MTHT
)
= T − 3 + 2
T (T − 1) ,
which is identical to tr(A2 +A′A). With these results the limiting distribution follows.
(ii) Using %̂+ 1
T
= Op(N−1/2), the LM∗ statistic can be written as
LM∗ =
N∑
i=1
wT i√√√√ N∑
i=1
[
T∑
t=2
(ei,t−1 − ei)
(
eit − %̂ei,t−1 − (1− %̂)ei
)]2
=
1√
N
N∑
i=1
wT i√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
[
T∑
t=2
(ei,t−1 − ei)(eit + 1T ei,t−1 − T+1T ei) + (%̂+ 1T )(ei,t−1 − ei)2
]2
=
1√
N
N∑
i=1
wT i√
1
N
N∑
i=1
w2T i
+Op(N−1/2)
Furthermore, under the null hypothesis and local alternative
L˜M∗ =
1√
N
N∑
i=1
wT i√
1
N
N∑
i=1
w2T i
+Op(N−1/2) .
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Proof of Theorem 5:
Let
δT i = e′iM(D′D − 2IT )Mei = u′iATui ,
where
AT = M

−1 −1 0 0 · · · 0 0 0
−1 0 −1 0 · · · 0 0 0
0 −1 0 −1 · · · 0 0 0
... ...
0 0 0 0 · · · −1 0 −1
0 0 0 0 · · · 0 −1 −1

M
is a symmetric T × T matrix. The variance is obtained as
var(δT i) = 2σ4i tr(A2T )
= 4σ4i (T − 2) .
Furthermore,
tr(ATHT ) = −T − 1
T
2(T − 2) .
It follows from Lemma 1 that under the local alternative
mDW d−→ N
(
c κ
T − 1
T
√
T − 2, 1
)
.
Proof of Lemma 6:
Rewrite equation (2.10) in matrix terms as
L˜0Mei = %kL˜kMei + i ,
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where
L˜0 =

0 · · · 0 1 0 · · · 0
0 · · · 0 0 1 ...
... ... ... . . . 0
0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 1
 L˜k =

1 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
0 1 ... 0 · · · 0
... . . . 0 ... ...
0 · · · 0 1 0 · · · 0

are (T − k)× T matrices. Under Assumption (1) and using the following results:
tr(ML˜′kL˜0M) = tr
[(
L˜′k −
1
T
ιι′L˜′k
)
L˜0
]
= tr
(
L˜′kL˜0
)
− 1
T
tr
(
ι′L˜′kL˜0ι
)
= −T − k
T
,
tr(ML˜′kL˜kM) = tr
[(
L˜′k −
1
T
ιι′L˜′k
)
L˜k
]
= tr
(
L˜′kL˜k
)
− 1
T
tr
(
ι′L˜′kL˜kι
)
= (T − 1)T − k
T
,
it follows as N →∞:
%̂k
p−→ tr(ML˜
′
kL˜0M)
tr(ML˜′kL˜kM)
= = − 1
T − 1 ,
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , T − 2}.
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Table 2.1: Size and power of alternative tests
T WD W˜D LM∗ L˜M∗ mDW
c = 0
10 0.059 0.057 0.056 0.053 0.055
20 0.058 0.057 0.059 0.056 0.057
50 0.059 0.059 0.057 0.056 0.055
100 0.054 0.054 0.053 0.053 0.054
c = 0.5
10 0.172 0.187 0.272 0.264 0.253
(0.163) (0.163) (0.263) (0.263) (0.247)
20 0.321 0.338 0.545 0.541 0.527
(0.316) (0.316) (0.541) (0.541) (0.522)
50 0.675 0.687 0.925 0.924 0.921
(0.683) (0.683) (0.929) (0.929) (0.924)
100 0.933 0.936 0.998 0.998 0.998
(0.937) (0.937) (0.998) (0.998) (0.998)
c = 1
10 0.487 0.508 0.746 0.739 0.713
(0.492) (0.492) (0.755) (0.755) (0.721)
20 0.820 0.832 0.983 0.982 0.979
(0.841) (0.841) (0.985) (0.985) (0.981)
50 0.997 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.998) (0.998) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
100 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
Note: N = 100. Empirical values are computed using
10,000 Monte Carlo simulations. Asymptotic values (given
in parentheses) are computed according to the results in
Theorems 2 – 5.
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Table 2.2: AR(2) processes
T WD W˜D LM∗ L˜M∗ mDW Q˜(2)
α1 = 0.1, α2 = −0.1
10 0.781 0.798 0.654 0.635 0.589 0.741
20 0.984 0.986 0.902 0.897 0.882 0.978
50 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.998 1.000
100 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
α1 = α2 = 0.1
10 0.063 0.059 0.293 0.276 0.288 0.438
20 0.057 0.056 0.732 0.722 0.722 0.922
50 0.061 0.060 0.996 0.996 0.995 1.000
100 0.061 0.060 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
α1 = 0, α2 = 0.2
10 0.776 0.714 0.188 0.173 0.144 0.870
20 0.983 0.974 0.116 0.109 0.101 0.999
50 1.000 1.000 0.082 0.080 0.077 1.000
100 1.000 1.000 0.072 0.071 0.070 1.000
Note: N = 50. Rejection frequencies are computed using 10,000
Monte Carlo replications.
Table 2.3: Size under temporal heteroskedasticity
T W˜D L˜M∗ mDW HR W˜D L˜M∗ mDW HR
break in variance u-shaped variance
10 0.946 0.084 0.438 0.059 0.056 0.064 0.798 0.057
20 0.340 0.065 0.211 0.058 0.061 0.059 0.601 0.059
50 0.145 0.055 0.102 0.057 0.060 0.057 0.319 0.057
100 0.101 0.057 0.081 0.057 0.059 0.058 0.197 0.057
negative exponential trend positive exponential trend
10 0.855 0.101 0.445 0.059 0.343 0.058 0.454 0.054
20 0.868 0.072 0.719 0.057 0.361 0.059 0.723 0.058
50 0.868 0.055 0.834 0.058 0.372 0.058 0.836 0.058
100 0.871 0.055 0.867 0.056 0.377 0.060 0.862 0.058
Note: N = 50. Rejection frequencies are computed using 10,000 Monte Carlo
replications.
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Chapter3
Policy Risk and the Business Cycle
3.1 Introduction
The supposedly negative influence of “policy risk”, i.e. uncertainty about fiscal and
monetary policy, has become a recurring theme in the political discourse. The popular
argument espoused in speeches and newspaper articles by politicians and economists
alike is that the uncertainty surrounding future policy stuns economic activity by
inducing a “wait-and-see approach”.1 In the following, we think of uncertainty as
the dispersion of the economic shock distribution. Rational consumers and firms will
react to the fact that future shocks will be drawn from a wider distribution. This
reaction is distinct from the ex-post effect of higher uncertainty resulting from on
average more extreme shock realizations.2 The goal of the present study is to isolate
the first effect and answer the question: Are uncertainty shocks to policy variables
quantitatively important?
1See e.g. The Wall Street Journal, October 29th, 2009: “For these small businesses, and many others
[. . . ], there’s an additional dark cloud: uncertainty created by Washington’s bid to reorganize a
wide swath of the U.S. economy.” (Fields, 2009). For other proponents of this view, see Boehner
(2010); Cantor (2010); Imrohoroglu (2010); Lowrie (2010); McKinnon (2010); see Klein (2010);
Reeve (2010); Wingfield (2010) for dissenting opinions.
2Uncertainty shocks are mean preserving spreads to the shock distribution. They are not associated
with the expectation of shocks going into a specific direction, like expecting an expansionary
stimulus package. Hence, they are also distinct from news shocks (Beaudry and Portier, 2006;
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2010), which are future level shocks of which both the sign and the
magnitude are already perfectly known today.
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Clearly, during the so-called Great Recession U.S. citizens were facing a period
of extraordinary uncertainty regarding economic policy. On the one hand, both the
output decline due to the financial crisis and the fiscal stimuli designed to counteract
this decline had led to a considerable deterioration of the U.S. fiscal situation. Given
this unsustainable fiscal path, many commentators and politicians were arguing for a
quick consolidation of government finances, possibly by raising taxes. On the other
hand, the U.S. unemployment rate stood at 9.6% at the end of 2010, its highest value
since 1983. Hence, there were considerable calls for more fiscal stimulus, preferably
in the form of reduced taxes due to supposedly higher multipliers (see e.g. Romer
and Romer, 2010). At the same time, Republicans and Democrats were fighting over
the continuation of the Bush tax cuts. On the monetary side, the amount of policy
risk was equally high. Hawks and doves at the Federal Reserve System fought over
the extent of quantitative easing and the correct monetary stance given conflicting
signals from core and headline inflation measures.
Scientific evidence on the aggregate effects of uncertainty is still inconclusive and
mostly confined to TFP uncertainty. Empirical studies using different proxies and
identification schemes to uncover the effects of uncertainty have produced a variety
of results. One group of studies reports an important impact of uncertainty about
productivity on real aggregate variables like GDP and employment (Alexopoulos
and Cohen, 2009; Bloom, 2009; Bloom et al., 2010). A one-standard deviation shock
to uncertainty in these studies typically leads to a 1%-2% drop in GDP, followed
by a recovery with a considerable overshooting. In contrast, a second group of
studies reports little to no impact at all (Bachmann and Bayer, 2011; Bachmann
et al., 2010; Bekaert et al., 2010; Chugh, 2011; Popescu and Smets, 2010). In the
theoretical literature, while most studies have emphasized the contractionary effects
of uncertainty on economic activity, it is generally acknowledged that there are
different effects working in opposite directions, thereby making the overall effect
ambiguous. For example, while an increase in uncertainty may depress investment due
to a “wait-and-see approach”, economic agents may want to self-insure by working
more to build up a buffer capital stock, which ceteris paribus leads to an increase in
investment.
We answer the question of whether policy risk shocks are quantitatively important
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in an estimated DSGE-model. We focus on aggregate uncertainty as it has been
shown to have potentially important output effects (Fernández-Villaverde et al.,
forthcoming). We add to the previous literature in the following ways. First, we
are to our knowledge the first to study the effect of policy risk on business cycles.3
Second, we directly measure aggregate uncertainty from the respective time series
without the need to resort to proxies. Third, we jointly consider level shocks and
uncertainty shocks. Regarding uncertainty shocks, we focus on policy risk, i.e.
uncertainty about future tax liabilities, government spending, and monetary policy,
to test the hypothesis that policy risk may be an important factor in explaining the
prolonged Great Recession. We also include uncertainty with respect to total factor
productivity (TFP) and investment-specific technology in order to have a benchmark
against which we can judge our findings. Fourth, we integrate these processes into
a medium-scale New Keynesian DSGE-model of the type typically used for policy
analysis (see e.g. Christiano et al., 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2007) and solve this
model using third-order perturbation methods. We then estimate the model using the
Simulated Method of Moments. This approach allows us to control for the effects of
level shocks to TFP, investment-specific technology, government spending, monetary
policy, and taxes when estimating the importance of policy risk.
We find that the role of policy risk in explaining the prolonged slump is largely
overstated. Although the output effects of policy risk are an order of magnitude larger
than the effects of TFP uncertainty, even a large (two-standard deviation) shock
to policy risk decreases output by a mere 0.025%. The reason for this result is the
existence of strong general equilibrium effects that dampen the effects of aggregate
uncertainty and imply a low shock amplification. Most notably, monetary policy
reacts fast and decisively to current economic conditions, implying an interest rate
response that dampens aggregate fluctuations arising from uncertainty shocks. If we
3We have recently become aware of independently conducted work by Fernández-Villaverde et al.
(2011), studying a similar issue in a calibrated model. The studies differ in the set of shocks
considered and in the details of the model specification. However, the results are quite similar,
with even large uncertainty shocks generating only a contained output decline. In their baseline
calibration, a two-standard deviation policy risk shock decreases output by 0.06% compared
to 0.025% in our estimated baseline specification. The advantage of our approach is that
we estimate the parameters of our model. Moreover, we allow for time-varying volatility in
technology, allowing us to relate our findings to the literature on TFP uncertainty and to “good
luck” explanations of the Great Moderation.
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allow for a stronger amplification, uncertainty shocks generate considerably larger
output effects, but at the same time imply counterfactually volatile business cycles.
From a methodological viewpoint, the paper most closely related to our work
is Fernández-Villaverde et al. (forthcoming). Their study also employs Sequential
Monte Carlo Methods combined with third-order perturbation to estimate the effect
of interest risk on the Argentinean economy. In terms of results, our paper is most
closely related to Bachmann and Bayer (2011), who show for the case of idiosyncratic
uncertainty about technology that general equilibrium effects may considerably reduce
the effect of uncertainty shocks typically found in partial equilibrium models (e.g.
Bloom, 2009). Our paper is also related to the work of Primiceri (2005) and Justiniano
and Primiceri (2008). Using a time-varying Bayesian VAR and an estimated DSGE-
model, respectively, the authors document the importance of time-varying volatility for
explaining the time series behavior of output and inflation and the Great Moderation
in particular. We differ from their work in two major points: first, we allow for
a non-linear transmission of volatility shocks into the economy. Second, by using
a third-order approximation instead of a first-order approximation, we are able to
distinguish uncertainty-effects from the ex-post effect of uncertainty in the form of
more extreme level shocks. We show that their result is mainly due to the differing
size of the realized level shocks when the dispersion of the distribution from which
they are drawn changes. In contrast, the pure uncertainty-effect is only of secondary
importance.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 presents a short literature review
on the transmission channels of uncertainty. In Section 3.3, we build a quantitative
business cycle model featuring several channels identified in the theoretical literature
through which aggregate uncertainty may impact economic activity. We measure
policy risk and technological uncertainty directly from aggregate time series using
Sequential Monte Carlo methods in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, we feed the uncertainty
processes estimated in Section 3.4 as driving processes into the model and fit it to U.S.
data using a Simulated Method of Moments approach. With the estimated model at
hand, we then study the effects of policy risk in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 Uncertainty: Potential Transmission Channels
Three different mechanisms through which aggregate uncertainty may affect eco-
nomic activity have been identified in the microeconomic literature: Hartman-Abel
effects, real option effects, and precautionary savings. While these categories are
helpful in shaping our thinking about the effects of uncertainty, they are partial
equilibrium effects. In general equilibrium, each of these effects necessarily induces
equilibrating price and quantity changes that may significantly dampen the aggregate
effects. While in a partial equilibrium model uncertainty may have ceteris paribus
largely contractionary effects on investment and output (e.g. Bloom, 2009), in general
equilibrium wages and interest rates may adjust, thereby significantly reducing the
resulting net effect (Bachmann and Bayer, 2011).
The first category are the so called Hartman-Abel-effects (Abel, 1983; Hartman,
1972). Under certain conditions,4 it follows from the firms’s FOC that the expected
marginal revenue product of capital is convex in output prices and TFP.5 Hence, due
to Jensen’s Inequality larger uncertainty about these variables increases the demand
for capital and thus investment. In our model, while capital is predetermined, both
the utilization of capital and labor input can be adjusted, opening up the possibility
of expansionary Hartman-Abel effects.
Second, there may be real option effects at work (Bernanke, 1983), e.g. through
investment being (partially) irreversible and/or partially expandable. For example, if
the resale (purchase) price of capital in the future differs from the current acquisition
price, a firm installing capital that it may sell later, effectively acquires a put option.
Moreover, investment today destroys a call option, namely the opportunity to buy
capital later at a possibly lower price. Hence, in the investment decision these
option values have to be taken into account (Abel et al., 1996). Higher uncertainty
decreases investment as the call option to purchase the capital later, which is “killed”
by investing today, becomes more valuable. However, in the presence of partial
4Constant-returns-to-scale production function with i) a predetermined capital stock, ii) perfect
competition, iii) risk neutrality, and iv) symmetric convex adjustment costs.
5The reason is that labor can flexibly react to shocks and hence the marginal revenue product
reacts stronger than one for one to the movement in the respective variable. To see this, assume
a fixed capital stock of capital and that the output price rises. There is a direct positive effect of
this price increase on profits via quantity times price change. Additionally, there is a positive
indirect effect through the increase in optimal output that is achieved by increasing labor.
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Table 3.1: Overview: Potential transmission mechanism
Hartman-Abel eff. Real option effects Precaution. sav.
Call Put Interest rate
Investment + − + +/− +
Consumption ? ? ? ? −
Notes: + indicates a positive effect of uncertainty, − a negative effect, and +/− an ambiguous effect
on the respective variable. ? denotes that the respective effect makes no prediction for this variable
due to its partial equilibrium nature.
reversibility, the value of the put option that is obtained by investing today increases
with higher uncertainty. Hence, the total effect of uncertainty on investment in such
a framework is generally ambiguous.
In our model, several features give rise to option effects. First, capital is predeter-
mined for one period. Second, the relative price of investment and consumption is
stochastic, thereby giving rise to potentially costly irreversibility and expandability.
Third, through the presence of depreciation allowances investment generates a tax
shield at historical costs of investment so that investment effectively “kills” the option
to purchase this tax shield later. Fourth, the interest rate in our model is stochastic,
giving rise to additional countervailing option effects as discussed in Ingersoll and
Ross (1992).
The third effect is the precautionary saving motive (Leland, 1968), defined as
the “additional saving that results from the knowledge that the future is uncertain”
(Carroll and Kimball, 2008). Faced with higher uncertainty, agents may both consume
less and work more in order to self-insure against future shocks, i.e. they build a
buffer stock.6 As the preferences of the agents in our model feature prudence (Garcia
et al., 2007; Kimball, 1990) uncertainty should increase precautionary savings in our
model.
In the end, due to these three effects acting on different variables and potentially
working in opposite directions as well as the presence of general equilibrium effects,
only a rigorous quantitative evaluation can answer the question what the net effect
6Real option effects and the precautionary saving motive are not disjunct effects. Consumption is
completely irreversible as the consumed good is not available for consumption in later periods
when the marginal utility of consumption may be high.
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of uncertainty on aggregate activity is. We pursue this question by estimating a
structural model featuring time-varying volatility, which we present in the next
section.
3.3 A DSGE-Model with Policy Risk
We use a standard quantitative New Keynesian business cycle model (Smets and
Wouters, 2007). The model economy is populated by a large representative family, a
continuum of unions j ∈ [0, 1] selling differentiated labor services to intermediate firms,
a continuum of intermediate firms producing differentiated intermediate goods using
bundled labor services and capital, and a final good firm bundling intermediate goods
to a final good. In addition, the model features a government sector that finances
government spending with distortionary taxation and transfers, and a monetary
authority which sets the nominal interest rate according to an interest rate rule.
3.3.1 Household Sector
The economy is populated by a large representative family with a continuum of
members, each consuming the same amount and working the same number of hours.
Preferences are defined over per capita consumption Ct and per capita labor effort
Lt. Following the framework in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006), labor is supplied to
a continuum of unions j ∈ [0, 1], which are monopolistically competitive and supply
differentiated labor services lt (j). Household members supply their labor uniformly
to all unions. Hence, total labor supply of the representative family is given by the
integral over all labor markets j, i.e. Lt =
∫ 1
0 lt (j) dj. The labor market structure
will be discussed in more detail below. We assume the preference specification of
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), but allow for habits in consumption:
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt

(
Ct − φcCt−1 − γ L
1+σl
t
1+σl St
)1−σc
− 1
1− σc
 , (3.1)
55
Chapter 3
where φc ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of internal habit persistence, σc ≥ 0 governs
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σl ≥ 0 is related to the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply, and γ ≥ 0 measures the relative disutility of labor effort. The term
St = (Ct − φcCt−1)σGS1−σGt−1 (3.2)
makes the preferences non-separable in both consumption and work effort, where
σG ∈ [0, 1] parameterizes the strength of the wealth effect on the labor supply. When
σG = 1, the preference specification is equal to the one discussed in King et al. (1988),
while with σG = 0 the preference specification of Greenwood et al. (1988) with no
wealth effect on the labor supply is obtained.
The household faces the budget constraint
Ct + zIt It +
Bt+1
Pt
= (1− τnt )
∫ 1
0
Wt (j) lt (j) dj +
(
1− τ kt
)
rkt utKt
+
(
1− τ kt
)
(Rt−1 − 1) Bt
Pt
+ Bt
Pt
+ Φt + Tt +
(
1− τ kt
)
Ξt , (3.3)
where the household earns income from supplying differentiated labor services lt(j)
at the real wage Wt (j) to union j, and from renting out capital services utKt at the
rental rate rkt . In addition, it receives lump sum transfers Tt from the government
and profits Ξt from owning the firms in the economy. All forms of income are taxed
at their respective tax rates τnt and τ kt . The term
(
1− τ kt
)
(Rt−1 − 1) BtPt + BtPt is the
after-tax return on savings in bonds, where the net returns are taxed at the capital tax
rate. Bonds are in zero net supply. The household spends its income on consumption
Ct and investment zIt It, where It is gross investment and zIt denotes a shock to the
relative price of investment in terms of the consumption good. This price is equal
to the technical rate of transformation between investment and consumption goods.
Due to the presence of a temporary shock, it is exogenous and stochastic. Changes
in zIt do not affect the productivity of already installed capital, but do affect newly
installed capital and become embodied in it. We assume the shock to follow an
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AR(2)-process7
log zIt = ρzI1 log zIt−1 + ρzI2 log zIt−2 + eσ
zI
t νzIt , (3.4)
where σzIt allows for time-varying volatility and is discussed in detail in Section
3.4. Apart from the fact that this form of investment-specific technology may
be an important source of economic fluctuations (Greenwood et al., 1997, 2000), a
stochastic relative price of investment introduces costly reversibility and expandability
of investment into the model as the future purchase/resale price is stochastic.
The term Φt captures depreciation allowances, which are an important feature of
the U.S. tax code. We assume depreciation allowances of the form
Φt = τ kt
∞∑
s=1
δτ (1− δτ )s−1 zIt−sIt−s , (3.5)
where δτ is the depreciation rate for tax purposes.8 By providing new investment
with a tax shield, depreciation allowances may be important in capturing the dy-
namics of investment following shocks (Christiano et al., 2007; Yang, 2005). Through
this tax shield at historical investment prices, combined with a stochastic relative
price of investment zI , depreciation allowances contribute to costly reversibility and
expandability of investment.
The household owns the capital stock Kt, whose law of motion is given by
Kt+1 =
[
1−
(
δ0 + δ1 (ut − 1) + δ22 (ut − 1)
2
)]
Kt + It − κ2
(
It
Kt
− δ0
)2
Kt , (3.6)
where It is gross investment. Household members do not simply rent out capital,
but capital services utKt, where ut denotes the capital utilization, i.e. the intensity
with which the existing capital stock is used. Without loss of generality, capital
utilization in steady state is normalized to 1. Using capital with an intensity higher
than normal incurs costs to the household in the form of a higher depreciation
7The lag lengths for the individual exogenous driving processes is chosen to provide a good empirical
fit. Details are provided in Section 3.4.
8Following Auerbach (1989), we allow the depreciation rate for tax purposes to differ from the
physical rate.
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δ (ut) = δ0+δ1 (ut − 1)+δ2/2 (ut − 1)2, which, assuming δ0, δ1, δ2 > 0, is an increasing
and convex function of the capital utilization. The last term in equation (3.6) captures
capital adjustment costs at the household level of the form introduced by Hayashi
(1982), where κ ≥ 0 is a parameter governing the curvature of the cost function. This
functional form implies that the capital adjustment costs are minimized and equal to
0 in steady state. We choose this type of adjustment costs for three reasons. First,
while this functional form clearly is unable to explain some micro-level phenomena like
lumpy investment, it has nevertheless been shown to provide a good fit of firm level
investment data and performs better than the Christiano et al. (2005)-formulation
with quadratic adjustment costs in investment changes (Eberly et al., 2008). Second,
with the flow specification of Christiano et al. (2005), Tobin’s marginal q would
be independent of the capital stock, which would essentially shut off intertemporal
linkages and thereby the option effects (Wu, 2009).
Thus, the household maximizes its utility (3.1) by choosing Ct, Bt+1, ut, Kt+1, It, St, Lt,
subject to the constraints (3.2) - (3.6) and the resource constraint for aggregate labor.
3.3.2 Labor Market
The household supplies labor lt (j) equally to a continuum of unions j, j ∈ [0, 1].
This labor market structure allows to introduce differentiated labor services and
staggered wage setting without letting idiosyncratic wage risk affect the household
members, which would make aggregation intractable. Monopolistically competitive
unions supply differentiated labor lt (j) to intermediate firms at wage Wt (j). Every
period, each union may re-optimize its wage with probability (1− θw) , 0 < θw < 1. If
a union j cannot re-optimize, its nominal wage is indexed to the price level according
to Wt (j)Pt = Πχwt−1Wt−1 (j)Pt−1, where χw ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of indexing.
Hence, when the union has not been able to re-optimize for τ periods, its real wage τ
periods ahead is given by:
Wt+τ (j) =

W optt+τ (j), if able to re-optimize in t+ τ,
τ∏
s=1
Πχwt+s−1
Πt+s Wt(j), otherwise.
(3.7)
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Household members supply the amount of labor services that is demanded at the
current wage. The objective of each union able to reset its wage is to choose the
real wage that maximizes the expected utility of its members, given the demand for
its labor services lt (j) = (Wt(j)/Wt)−ηw Lcompt , where Lcompt is the aggregate demand
for composite labor services and ηw is the substitution elasticity, the respective
resource constraint Lt = Lcompt
∫ 1
0 (Wt(j)/Wt)
−ηw dj, and the aggregate wage level
Wt =
(∫ 1
0 Wt (j)
1−ηw dj
) 1
1−ηw .
3.3.3 Firm Side
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods firms
i, i ∈ [0, 1], which produce differentiated intermediate goods Yit using capital services
Kservit = uitKit−1 and a composite labor bundle L
comp
it according to a Cobb-Douglas
production function with capital share α
Yit = zt (Kservit )
α (Lcompit )
1−α − φ , if zt (Kservit )α (Lcompit )1−α − φ > 0 (3.8)
and Yit = 0 otherwise. The fixed cost of production φ is set to reduce economic
profits to 0 in steady state, thereby ruling out entry or exit (Christiano et al., 2005).
The stationary TFP shock zt follows an AR(2)-process
log zt = ρz1 log zt−1 + ρz2 log zt−2 + eσ
z
t νzt . (3.9)
The composite labor bundle is built from differentiated labor inputs Lit (j) according
to a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator Lcompit =
(∫ 1
0 Lit(j)
ηw−1
ηw dj
) ηw
ηw−1 .
We assume staggered price setting a la Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). Each period,
intermediate firms can re-optimize their prices with probability (1− θp) , 0 < θp < 1.
In between two periods of re-optimization, the prices are indexed to the aggregate
price index Pt according to Pit+1 =
(
Pt
Pt−1
)χp
Pit = (Πt)χp Pit, where χp ∈ [0, 1] governs
the degree of indexation. Intermediate goods producers maximize their discounted
stream of profits subject to the demand from composite goods producers, equation
(3.11).
There is a competitive final goods firm which bundles a final good Yt from a
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continuum of intermediate goods using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation technology with
substitution elasticity ηp
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Y
ηp−1
ηp
it di
) ηp
ηp−1
. (3.10)
Expenditure minimization yields the optimal demand for intermediate good i as
Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ηp
Yt ∀ i . (3.11)
3.3.4 Government Sector
Government spending, which may be thought of as entering the utility function
additively separable, follows the process
log
(
Gt
G¯
)
= ρg1 log
(
Gt−1
G¯
)
+ ρg2 log
(
Gt−2
G¯
)
+ eσ
g
t νgt , (3.12)
where G¯ is government spending in steady state. The government finances its
expenditures by distortionary taxation of labor at the rate τnt and capital and interest
income at rate τ kt . We assume AR(2)-processes for the tax rates as this has been
found to be a good empirical description for the U.S. (McGrattan, 1994; Mertens and
Ravn, 2011)
τ kt = (1− ρτk1 − ρτk2 )τ¯ k + ρτk1 τ kt−1 + ρτk2 τ kt−2 + eσ
τk
t ντkt (3.13)
τnt = (1− ρτn1 − ρτn2 )τ¯n + ρτn1 τnt−1 + ρτn2 τnt−2 + eσ
τn
t ντnt , (3.14)
where τ¯n and τ¯ k are the unconditional means of the labor and capital tax rates,
respectively. The government also sets lump-sum transfers Tt to balance the budget.
This assumed structure yields the government budget constraint
Tt +Gt + Φt = τnt WtL
comp
t + τ kt
(
rkt utKt + Ξt
)
. (3.15)
Transfers plus government spending plus depreciation allowances equal tax revenues
from taxing labor, capital income, and profits.
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We close the model by assuming that the central bank follows a Taylor rule that
reacts to inflation and output growth.
Rt
R¯
=
(
Rt−1
R¯
)ρR(Πt
Π¯
)φpi( Yt
Yt−1
)φy1−ρR exp (mt) . (3.16)
Here, ρR is a smoothing parameter introduced to capture the empirical evidence of
gradual movements in interest rates (Clarida et al., 2000; Rudebusch, 1995), Π¯ is the
target interest rate set by the central bank, and the parameters φy and φΠ capture
the responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to deviations of inflation and output
growth from their steady state values. We assume that the central bank responds
to changes in output rather than its level as this specification conforms better with
empirical evidence and avoids the need to define a measure of trend growth that the
central bank can observe (see Lubik and Schorfheide, 2007). Finally, mt is a shock to
the nominal interest rate that follows an AR(1)-process
logmt = ρm logmt−1 + eσ
m
t νmt . (3.17)
The definition of equilibrium and the market aggregation are standard and omitted
for brevity.
3.4 Policy Risk: Time Series Evidence
In this section, we present empirical evidence on the importance of time-varying
volatility in modeling macroeconomic time series. We demonstrate that the data tend
to reject the homoskedasticity of macroeconomic driving processes and show that a
stochastic volatility (SV) model is able to capture the salient features of the data.
Using a particle smoother, we are able to recover the historical series of uncertainty
shocks and show that both “good luck” and “good policy” contributed to the Great
Moderation.
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3.4.1 Estimation Methodology
We perform a two-step estimation procedure. Due to the non-linear solution of the
model required to capture uncertainty effects and the high-dimensional state space, it
is computationally infeasible to jointly estimate all model parameters. Hence, we first
estimate the exogenous stochastic driving processes of the model using Sequential
Monte Carlo (SMC) methods. In the next section we feed these processes into the
model presented in Section 3.3 and estimate the parameters of the remaining model
equations with a Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) approach.
The model includes 6 exogenous stochastic driving processes with time-varying
volatility, i.e. capital and labor tax rates, government spending, a monetary policy
shock, total factor productivity, and investment-specific technology. We estimate
these processes on quarterly U.S. time series, starting in 1960Q1 and using the longest
available sample for each series. Details about the data sources can be found in
Appendix A. Because we use a stationary model, we need to extract the deviations
of the non-stationary time series from their respective trend. Hence, we apply a
one-sided HP-filter to the logarithms of government spending and the two technology
processes. Using a one-sided, i.e. “causal” filter (Stock and Watson, 1999) assures that
the time ordering of the data remains undisturbed and the autoregressive structure
is preserved. We allow for AR(2)-processes in all variables, except for the monetary
policy shocks,9 as the partial autocorrelations generally indicate the presence of a
second root different from zero. Figure 3.1 shows the time series of the exogenous
driving processes on which we estimate our laws of motion. In particular for monetary
policy, the presence of time-varying volatility is immediately evident. In Appendix C,
we provide further evidence for the presence of time-varying volatility.
There are two major competing approaches to model time-varying standard devia-
tions: GARCH models and stochastic volatility (SV) models (Fernández-Villaverde
and Rubio-Ramírez, 2010). In the standard GARCH model, σ2t is a function of the
squared scaled lagged innovation in the level equation ν2t−1 and its own lagged value:
σ2t = ω + α(σt−1νt−1)2 + βσ2t−1. The GARCH model has one important drawback:
there are no distinct volatility shocks. The only innovations to the volatility equation
9Although theory suggests that monetary policy shocks in the Taylor rule should be unpredictable
and thus i.i.d., we find a moderate degree of first-order autocorrelation.
62
3.4 Policy Risk: Time Series Evidence
Figure 3.1: Time series of exogenous driving processes
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Notes: From left to right and top to bottom: capital taxes, labor taxes, TFP, investment-specific
technology, monetary policy shocks, and government spending. Tax rates are demeaned; government
spending and technology processes are detrended using one-sided HP-filter.
are past level shocks, meaning that they cannot be separated from volatility shocks.
As we are especially interested in the effects of shocks to the volatility, we cannot use
a GARCH model but instead employ a stochastic volatility model. Specifically, we
model the standard deviations σit as an AR(1) stochastic volatility process (see e.g.
Fernández-Villaverde et al., forthcoming; Shephard, 2008)
σit = (1− ρσi) σ¯i + ρσiσit−1 + ηiεit , εit ∼ N (0, 1), (3.18)
where σ¯i is is the unconditional mean of σit, i ∈ {τk, τn, g,m, z, zI}. The shock to
the volatility εit is assumed to be independent from the level shock νit .
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Due to the nonlinearity embedded in the stochastic volatility setup of the shocks,
we cannot simply employ the Kalman filter as in the case of linearity and normally
distributed shocks. For this case, Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2007)
propose to use the Sequential Importance Resampling (SIR) particle filter, a special
application of the more general class of SMC methods, to evaluate the likelihood.10
After obtaining the likelihood of the observables given the parameters, we use a
Tailored Randomized Block Metropolis-Hastings (TaRB-MH) algorithm (Chib and
Ramamurthy, 2010) to maximize the posterior likelihood. The prior distributions of
the parameters, which are relatively weak, are given in Table 3.2.11
We are also interested in backing out the historical values of the latent state σt,
given the whole set of observations. After filtering, it is straightforward to employ the
backward-smoothing routine (Godsill et al., 2004) to obtain a historical distribution
of the volatilities. The smoothed values were computed at the mean of the posterior
distribution using 10,000 particles.
3.4.2 Estimation Results
The estimation results are presented in Table 3.2. Detailed convergence diagnostics
are shown in Appendix C. In general, all parameters are quite precisely estimated as
evidenced by the percentiles. All shocks, except for the monetary policy shock, exhibit
a high degree of persistence in their levels, with less persistence in their volatilities.
Moreover, the estimated processes show considerable evidence of uncertainty, with
ηi ranging between 0.3 and 0.6. As a one-standard deviation uncertainty shock
increases the volatility of the respective process by (exp(ηi)− 1)× 100 percent, such
a shock increases the variance of capital taxes, labor taxes, TFP, investment specific
technology, monetary policy, and government spending by 46%, 92%, 38%, 39%, 34%,
10Technical details of the algorithms used in this subsection can be found in Appendices B-B.
11For the autoregressive parameters of the level equation ρi1 and ρi2, we impose a uniform prior
for each of the corresponding autoregressive roots over the stability region (−1,+1). Let ξ1
and ξ2 be the roots of such an AR(2)-process. The autoregressive parameters corresponding to
these roots can be recovered from: ρ1 = ξ1 + ξ2 and ρ2 = −ξ1ξ2 . The posterior distribution was
computed from a 20,500 draw Monte Carlo Markov Chain using 3,000 particles, where the first
2,500 draws were discarded as burn-in draws. Acceptance rates were generally between 20% and
45%. We also checked identifiability of the SV-process by simulating data from the process and
trying to recover the true parameters from this artificial data.
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Table 3.2: Prior and posterior distributions of the shock processes
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distribution Mean Std. Dev. Mean 5 Percent 95 Percent
Capital Tax Rates
ρ1 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 0.856 0.819 0.893
ρ2 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 0.103 0.070 0.137
ρσ Beta* 0.90 0.100 0.795 0.745 0.860
ησ Gamma 0.50 0.100 0.379 0.333 0.426
σ¯ Uniform -7.00 5.333 -5.071 -5.361 -4.786
Labor Tax Rates
ρ1 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 1.051 1.018 1.084
ρ2 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 -0.052 -0.085 -0.019
ρσ Beta* 0.90 0.100 0.581 0.514 0.670
ησ Gamma 0.50 0.100 0.651 0.587 0.718
σ¯ Uniform -7.00 5.333 -5.901 -6.253 -5.531
Total Factor Productivity
ρ1 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 1.021 0.965 1.080
ρ2 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 -0.175 -0.230 -0.125
ρσ Beta* 0.90 0.100 0.679 0.611 0.781
ησ Gamma 0.50 0.100 0.320 0.272 0.369
σ¯ Uniform -7.00 5.333 -5.349 -5.555 -5.138
Investment-Specific Technology
ρ1 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 1.420 1.369 1.468
ρ2 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 -0.501 -0.536 -0.461
ρσ Beta* 0.90 0.100 0.807 0.765 0.861
ησ Gamma 0.50 0.100 0.332 0.295 0.368
σ¯ Uniform -7.00 5.333 -6.206 -6.427 -5.983
Government Spending
ρ1 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 0.919 0.866 0.972
ρ2 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 -0.028 -0.079 0.018
ρσ Beta* 0.90 0.100 0.719 0.623 0.865
ησ Gamma 0.50 0.100 0.295 0.227 0.368
σ¯ Uniform -7.00 5.333 -4.887 -5.193 -4.585
Monetary Policy Shock
ρ1 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 0.427 0.385 0.469
ρσ Uniform* 0.90 0.100 0.921 0.895 0.947
ησ Beta* 0.50 0.100 0.364 0.330 0.400
σ¯ Gamma -7.00 5.333 -5.188 -5.512 -4.849
Notes: Beta* indicates that the parameter divided by 0.999 follows a beta distribution. Uniform*
indicates that the roots of the autoregressive process are estimated instead of the autoregressive
coefficients and follow the specified prior distribution.
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and 45%, respectively.12 Appendix C shows the results of model misspecification
tests applied to the SV model. In general, the model fits the data well and cannot be
rejected.
The relevance of stochastic volatility in modeling the behavior of the exogenous
driving processes can be seen in the smoothed estimates of the historical variances
of the shocks in Figure 3.2. The end of the 1960s and particularly the 1970s were
plagued by high shock volatilities, both in the technology and the policy shocks.
Particularly during the 1970s, the volatilities increased and reached their sample
maxima for both tax rates and technology shocks. In contrast, the decade from
1985 to 2000 was characterized by shock volatilities to the technology variables well
below their unconditional mean, indicating the role of “good luck” in explaining the
Great Moderation. However, from about 1990 on “good policy” also contributed to
this phenomenon as is evidenced by the low volatilities of the tax and government
spending shocks, although the change in volatility is not as pronounced for the latter.
For monetary policy shocks, there is clear evidence of a lower shock volatility following
the Volcker disinflation from 1979-1983, a trend that also continued under Greenspan.
In contrast, the early tenure of Volcker experienced a volatility of monetary shocks
considerably larger than during the first oil price shock. With the height of the
dot-com bubble the volatility of TFP shocks somewhat increased again, while the
investment-specific technology growth remained tranquil over the whole 2000s. The
largest changes in volatility in the 2000s came under George W. Bush who considerably
changed the tax law, resulting in a pronounced increase in the volatility of tax rates.
At the end of our sample, the Great Recession again results in an increase in policy
risk with a rise in the volatility of government spending, tax rates, and monetary
policy to comparable levels as after 9/11. For government spending and taxes, this
mostly reflects the provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act that
contained $288 billion in tax relief to companies and individuals, e.g. in the form of
$116 billion in payroll tax relief.
Note that the SV-framework used in the present study does not imply a mechanical
link between the level shocks and the volatility shocks as a GARCH-model would do.
Of course, as a comparison of Figures 3.1 and 3.2 shows, a large level shock tends to
12Thus, e.g. a one-standard deviation monetary policy risk shock increases the volatility of the
monetary policy shocks from exp(−5.19) = 0.56% to exp(−5.19 + 0.364) = 0.8%.
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coincide with an increase in the conditional variance. However, the reason for this
increase in the estimated conditional variance is not a mechanical effect of this level
shock subsequently entering the volatility equation. Rather, the Bayesian estimation
of the SV-model weighs the likelihood of observing such a large shock being drawn
from a narrow distribution, i.e. without observing a simultaneous/previous volatility
shock, against the likelihood of observing a shock of this size that is drawn from a
wider distribution due to the occurrence of a variance shock.
Figure 3.2: Smoothed standard deviations
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Notes: From left to right and top to bottom: capital taxes, labor taxes, TFP, investment-specific
technology, monetary policy shocks, and government spending. Red dotted line: unconditional
mean; shaded area: two standard deviation bands.
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3.5 Fitting the Model to the Data
Using the parameter estimates of the stochastic driving processes obtained in the
previous section, we are now in a position to estimate the deep parameters of the
model presented in Section 3.3.
3.5.1 Simulated Method of Moments Estimation
We use the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) approach as proposed in Ruge-
Murcia (2010). Intuitively, this method minimizes the weighted distance between the
empirical moments and the moments resulting from artificial data simulated from
the model (details can be found in Appendix B).
In order to simulate data, we first need to solve the model non-linearly. Due to
the high-dimensional state space of our model, we employ perturbation methods to
obtain an approximation of the policy function around the deterministic steady state
(see e.g. Judd, 1998). Specifically, we need to obtain a third-order approximation,
because we are interested in the pure effects of volatility shocks, i.e. when holding
the level shocks constant. Loosely speaking, a first-order approximation yields no
effects of uncertainty; a second-order approximation yields both a constant effect and
an effect mediated through the corresponding level shock. Only in the third-order
approximation does time-varying uncertainty play a separate role (for a more detailed
explanation, see Appendix B).
Table 3.3 presents the values of parameters we fix prior to the estimation. We set
gross steady state inflation Π¯ to 1 and the discount factor β to 0.99. Regarding the
depreciation parameters, δ0 = 0.05 is chosen to imply a 10% annual depreciation
rate, δ1 = 0.0351 sets the steady state capital utilization to 1, and the depreciation
rate for tax purposes δτ is set to twice the rate of physical depreciation (Auerbach,
1989). The fixed-cost parameter φ = 0.038 implies that firms make zero profit in
steady state and the labor disutility parameter γ = 19.1 sets the steady state share
of hours worked to total time to 20%. Regarding the preference parameters, we set
the parameter governing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σc to 2 and set
σG = 0.001, the value chosen in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009).13 Hence, preferences
13When attempting to estimate this parameter, it hit the lower bound of 0 as in Schmitt-Grohé and
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Table 3.3: Parameters fixed prior to estimation
Param. Value Target/Motivation Param. Value Target/Motiv.
Π¯ 1 Zero infl. steady state σc 2 Standard value
β 0.99 Standard value ηp 10 11% Markup
δ0 0.025 10% annual deprec. ηw 10 11% Markup
δ1 0.0351 u¯ = 1 α 0.295 Sample mean
δτ 0.05 Auerbach (1989) τn 0.1984 Sample mean
φ 0.038 0 profits in SS τ k 0.388 Sample mean
γ 19.1 SS labor of 0.2 G/Y 0.2031 Sample mean
σG 0.001 Jaimovich-Rebelo (2009)
are close to the GHH-specification and imply a small wealth effect on the labor
supply, which is consistent with evidence from studies focusing on the effects of news
(Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2010) and government spending (Monacelli and Perotti,
2008). The elasticity of substitution parameters for differentiated labor services and
intermediate goods are set to 10, resulting in a steady state markup of 11%. The
capital share α, the steady state tax rates τ k and τn, and the steady state share of
government spending to output are set to their respective sample means.
The empirical moments to be matched are the standard deviations and first- and
second-order autocovariances of output, consumption, investment, inflation, the real
wage, and the nominal interest rate. Moreover, we target the covariance of output
with the other variables. All variables are logged and detrended using a one-sided
HP-filter with smoothing parameter λ = 1600. The second and fourth columns of
Table 3.5 display the respective sample moments.14
3.5.2 Parameter Estimates
The parameter estimates are shown in Table 3.4. All parameters except for the
capital adjustment cost parameter κ are precisely estimated as seen in columns 4
Uribe (2010). Hence, we fix the parameter to a small value that still assures a balanced growth
path.
14Some of the target moments are transformed to correlations for better interpretation. The relative
standard deviations with respect to the standard deviation of output are only implicitly targeted
through the standard deviations of the respective series.
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Table 3.4: Parameters estimated by SMM
Parameter Description Mean -1 std.-dev. +1 std.-dev.
φc Consumption habits 0.9665 0.9660 0.9671
δ2/δ1 Capital utilization costs 0.0414 0.0314 0.0546
κ Capital adjustment costs 10.0857 0.8007 127.0438
θp Calvo parameter prices 0.9644 0.9641 0.9646
θw Calvo parameter wages 0.7785 0.7615 0.7947
χp Price indexation 0.4170 0.3809 0.4539
χw Wage indexation 0.9751 0.9725 0.9774
σl Frisch elasticity parameter 0.0683 0.0652 0.0716
ρR Interest smoothing 0.4889 0.4541 0.5238
φpi Taylor rule inflation 1.9691 1.9058 2.0422
φy Taylor rule output growth 1.2195 0.8416 1.7671
and 5.15 Consumers have strong habits in consumption with φc = 0.97, which is at
the upper end of values generally considered plausible. Capital utilization costs show
little convexity with δ2/δ1 = 0.04, while capital adjustment is costly as indicated by
κ = 10.09, ensuring that investment is not excessively volatile. Prices are estimated
to be quite sticky with θp = 0.96, while the degree of wage stickiness is moderate with
an average duration of 4.3 quarters. The high degree of price stickiness compared
to e.g. Smets and Wouters (2007) reflects the absence of real rigidities like a non-
constant elasticity of substitution in our setup. The degree of indexation to past
inflation is considerably higher for wages than for prices, with the former being almost
perfectly indexed to past inflation. An estimated value of σl = 0.07 indicates almost
linear disutility of labor. In the Taylor rule, there is a moderate degree of interest
smoothing. The reaction coefficients of monetary policy are in line with values found
in the literature.
The first and third column of Table 3.5 show the fit of the model. Output is 92% as
volatile in the simulated as model as in the data, while investment is 108% as volatile.
The volatility of consumption is well-matched, while its correlation with output is
15The confidence bands rely on the asymptotic normality of the estimator as shown in equation (3.36).
However, this is only a rough approximation as most parameters, e.g. the Calvo parameters, have
bounded support. Unfortunately, SMM is computationally too intensive to rely on bootstrapping
the standard errors.
70
3.5 Fitting the Model to the Data
Table 3.5: Simulated and empirical moments
Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data
σ(xt) ρ(xt, yt) σxt/σyt ρ(xt, xt−1) ρ(xt, xt−2)
Y 1.44% 1.57% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.90 0.84 0.75
C 0.93% 0.95% 0.71 0.85 0.65 0.60 0.99 0.90 0.95 0.74
I 5.74% 5.30% 0.91 0.85 3.98 3.37 0.88 0.93 0.74 0.80
Π 0.22% 0.27% 0.23 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.91 0.50 0.75 0.32
W 0.82% 0.90% 0.23 0.10 0.57 0.57 0.97 0.84 0.91 0.69
R 0.40% 0.39% 0.28 0.34 0.28 0.25 0.73 0.86 0.49 0.67
Notes: Time Series Xt are output (Yt), consumption (Ct), investment (It), inflation (Πt), the real
wage (Wt), and the nominal interest rate (Rt). Small letters denote variables that are logged and
detrended using a one-sided HP-filter with smoothing parameter λ = 1600.
too low. The volatilities of the real wage, inflation, and the nominal interest rate are
on target. Their correlation with output is also well matched. Only the real wage
is somewhat too procyclical. The autocorrelations are also in general well-matched.
Only consumption exhibits a slightly too high autocorrelation.
3.5.3 The Effects of Time-Varying Volatility
With the estimated model at hand, we can perform a simple counterfactual experi-
ment to demonstrate the importance of time-varying volatility for explaining U.S.
macroeconomic time series. However, the effects of time-varying volatility reflect both
the ex-ante uncertainty effect of knowing that the shocks are drawn from a wider
distribution and the ex-post effect of more extreme shock realizations. In the next
section, we will therefore separate these two by using the model to keep the level
shocks constant.
In Figure 3.2, we found clear evidence of a decrease in the variance of both the
technological shocks and the policy shocks since the mid 1980s, which contributed
to the lower volatility of output and inflation during the Great Moderation. Using
our estimated DSGE-model, we can ask what a counterfactual economy without
time-varying volatility would have looked like. For this purpose, we completely shut
off time-varying volatility by setting uncertainty shocks to zero. We then simulate the
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model again using the new set of driving forces where both the uncertainty effect and
the effects of the corresponding more extreme level shocks are absent due to σit = σ¯i
for all i ∈ {τk, τn, g,m, z, zI}. This unconditional sample mean of the log-volatility
of the level shocks σ¯i lies between the high volatility pre-Great Moderation period’s
value and the value in the subsequent low volatility Great Moderation phase. The
corresponding simulated moments are presented in Table 3.6. The co-movement of
the model variables still fits the data quite well. However, compared to the actual
data, such an economy fails to generate sufficient volatility: output, consumption, and
investment are only about 65%, 73%, and 75% as volatile as the data, respectively.16
In contrast, as seen in Table 3.5, the model with time-varying volatility captures the
data moments well. These results clearly indicate the importance of time-varying
volatility in explaining U.S. macroeconomic time series (see e.g. Justiniano and
Primiceri, 2008; Primiceri, 2005).
Table 3.6: Simulated and empirical moments for the model without time-varying
volatility
Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data
σ(xt) ρ(xt, yt) σxt/σyt ρ(xt, xt−1) ρ(xt, xt−2)
Y 0.99% 1.57% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.90 0.85 0.75
C 0.71% 0.95% 0.67 0.85 0.72 0.60 0.99 0.90 0.95 0.74
I 3.91% 5.30% 0.89 0.85 3.97 3.37 0.92 0.93 0.79 0.80
Π 0.18% 0.27% -0.19 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.91 0.50 0.76 0.32
W 0.53% 0.90% 0.56 0.10 0.54 0.57 0.97 0.84 0.91 0.69
R 0.30% 0.39% -0.11 0.34 0.30 0.25 0.78 0.86 0.61 0.67
Notes: Time Series Xt are output (Yt), consumption (Ct), investment (It), inflation (Πt), the real
wage (Wt), and the nominal interest rate (Rt). Small letters denote variables that are logged and
detrended using a one-sided HP-filter with smoothing parameter λ = 1600.
16If we had used a linearized version of the model, this effect would not have been observed, as
periods of high volatility would offset periods of low volatility. However, due to the non-linearity
of our model, this is not the case here.
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3.6 The Aggregate Effects of Policy Risk
We now turn to analyzing the effects of aggregate uncertainty on business cycle
fluctuations. First, having estimated the deep parameters of the model, we conduct
policy experiments to trace out the effects of uncertainty shocks. We then study their
transmission into the economy and analyze the underlying amplification mechanisms.
We find that the model is in principle able to generate large effects of uncertainty,
but that the estimated parameterization implies that the aggregate effects of un-
certainty are quantitatively small. The reason for the small aggregate response to
uncertainty shocks is the presence of general equilibrium effects that imply only a
weak amplification.
3.6.1 Impulse Response Analysis
We first analyze the pure uncertainty effect resulting from time-varying volatility
by separating it from the ex-post effect of more extreme shock realizations. We do
so by computing impulse response functions to uncertainty shocks while keeping
constant the realizations of the level shocks.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the impulse response functions to two-standard deviation
policy risk and technology risk shocks with each column representing the impulse
responses to a different shock. The ex-post level effect has been shut off, which
is reflected in the flat impulse response for τ k, τn, g, m, z, and zI depicted in the
bottom row.17 The left column of Figure 3.3 shows that a capital tax risk shock acts
like a positive demand shock. Output and inflation both increase on impact and
slowly return to zero. Initially the output response is mostly driven by the positive
response of investment, which has a peak response on impact of 0.014%. Consumption
increases less strongly and follows a hump-shape, peaking after 12 quarters. Due to
the estimated strong degree of habit persistence in consumption, the consumption
response decays only slowly and drives the output response after about four years,
when investment is already almost back to its initial level. The middle and right
columns show the impulse responses to labor tax risk and government spending risk,
respectively. Both emulate the characteristics of a negative supply shock, with output,
17In the subsequent graphs, we generally omit the flat level impulse responses.
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Figure 3.3: Impulse responses to a two-standard deviation uncertainty shock to capital
taxes, labor taxes, and government spending (from left to right column)
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consumption, and investment exhibiting a hump-shaped decline, while inflation rises.
Labor tax risk induces the strongest output response of all uncertainty shocks
considered, with output showing a peak decline of 0.02% and investment dropping by
four times as much. The reason for this relatively strong response, compared to e.g.
the government spending risk shock, is that a two-standard deviation labor tax risk
shock increases uncertainty about labor taxes by about 120%, compared to around
60% for the other uncertainty shocks. Due to the relatively low persistence of the
underlying shock process for labor tax risk, the effect on inflation subsides after 10
quarters, while the effect on consumption is again considerable more drawn out.
The left column of Figure 3.4 displays the response to a two-standard deviation
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Figure 3.4: Impulse responses to a two-standard deviation uncertainty shock to mon-
etary policy, TFP, and investment-specific technology (from left to right
column)
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monetary policy risk shock. This shock has a contractionary effect on output, mostly
driven by a decline in investment that peaks at -0.03% after 7 quarters. In contrast,
consumption reacts sluggishly, peaking only after 30 quarters. Inflation initially drops,
overshoots after 10 quarters and then slowly returns, driven by a large persistence in
the underlying risk shock process.
The historical volatility estimates shown in Figure 3.2 indicated that uncertainty
about the future path of economic policy increased for all policy instruments during
the Great Recession. We simulate such a situation in the form of a simultaneous
two-standard deviation increase in policy risk.18 Results are shown in Figure 3.5. A
18Due to the nonlinearity inherent in our model and the solution method that preserves this
nonlinearity up to third order, the resulting impulse responses are not necessarily identical to
the sum of the impulse responses to the individual uncertainty shocks.
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Figure 3.5: Impulse responses to a joint two-standard deviation policy risk shock
(solid blue line) and to a joint technology risk shock (dashed red line)
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simultaneous two-standard deviation policy risk shock (solid lines) acts like a negative
supply shock. It leads to an immediate decrease in output of 0.025%, before output
slowly returns to its initial level as the shock subsides. This decrease in output is
driven by both consumption and investment, with investment dropping initially by
0.1%. While the capital stock reacts sluggishly due to the presence of relatively high
capital adjustment costs, capital services decline immediately due to an accompanying
decline in capital utilization. At the same time inflation rises. As a consequence, the
real wage rises for a few periods, reflecting the indexation to the rising inflation, and
then starts to decrease, reaching its minimum after 15 quarters. Due to monopolistic
competition in the labor market and the non-separability of the utility function, the
initial increase in the real wage does not induce an increase in labor supplied by the
household. Rather, household members decrease their labor supply and consume
more leisure. The real interest rate, computed as the difference between the policy
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rate and inflation, declines initially and then follows a hump-shaped pattern, reaching
its peak after 7 quarters. The initial decline in the real interest rate reflects both the
interest smoothing present in the estimated Taylor rule as well as the response of
the central bank to the initial decline in output. Only when output starts to recover
does the real interest rate rise to bring down inflation. The similarity in both the
size and the shape of the impulse response functions of a policy risk shock and the
labor tax risk shock indicates that the latter dominates the effects of the other policy
risk shocks.19
It is instructive to compare the policy risk results to the benchmark of uncertainty
about technology. The middle and right columns of Figure 3.4 show the impulse
responses to a two-standard deviation risk shock to total factor productivity and
investment-specific technology, respectively. The response to TFP risk is qualitatively
similar to what could have been expected from the previous literature: it triggers an
investment driven decline in output while inflation increases. In contrast, investment-
specific technology risk triggers exactly the opposite effect: output increases initially
and peaks after 4 quarters, with the response again being mainly driven by the
investment response. It is noteworthy that the response to TFP uncertainty is an
order of magnitude smaller than the effects of uncertainty about the investment-
specific technology shocks. This result suggests that the role of investment-specific
technology risk might be underappreciated in the uncertainty literature.20 Figure
3.5 also shows the impulse responses to a joint technology risk shock of the type
occurring in the middle of the 1970s. The comparison of technology risk (dashed
lines) with policy risk (solid lines) shows that policy risk generates responses that are
one order of magnitude larger.
19While strictly speaking the impulse responses to single shocks are not additive, the opposite signs
of the output response for some sources of uncertainty have important consequences for periods
of generally heightened uncertainty. The simultaneous increase in uncertainty from different
sources does not necessarily translate into a large output response. In times like the Great
Recession, where policy risk jointly increased, different sources of uncertainty may partially offset
each other, resulting in a low overall effect. For example, Figure 3.3 documents that capital
taxation risk acts expansionary and could more than offset the negative effect of government
spending risk on output and investment.
20While the effects of level shocks to investment-specific technology have received considerable
attention in recent years (Fisher, 2006; Justiniano et al., 2010; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2011),
we are to our knowledge the first to study the effects of uncertainty about investment-specific
technology.
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Summarizing, our results show that the finding of relatively minor effects of
uncertainty on aggregate activity for the case of TFP (Bachmann and Bayer, 2011;
Bachmann et al., 2010; Bekaert et al., 2010; Chugh, 2011; Popescu and Smets, 2010)
also holds true for policy risk and investment-specific technology risk.
3.6.2 What Drives the Response to Policy Risk?
Of the transmission channels discussed in Section 3.2, the precautionary savings
motive does not play a dominant role. In all sets of impulse responses, consump-
tion and investment move in the same direction, while in the case of a dominant
precautionary savings motive we would expect agents to decrease their consumption
in order to self-insure against aggregate uncertainty by investing in a buffer-stock.
Of course, it is conceivable that the precautionary savings motive counteracts the
observed effects, which then would have been larger in its absence.
While it is virtually impossible to disentangle the different real option, Hartman-
Abel, and general equilibrium effects, we can gain some insight into the transmission
of uncertainty by shutting off various features of the model. First, as can be seen
by fixing the relative price of investment to consumption at 1, the real option effect
embedded in the depreciation allowances via the stochastic resale price of capital
hardly plays a role. However, while their role in providing current investment with a
tax shield at historical investment prices does not seem to create strong real option
effects in our model, this does not mean that depreciation allowances do not play an
important role. With their effect on Tobin’s marginal q and the capital utilization
decision, they have an important amplifying effect on the investment response and
hence on output. When shutting them off completely, i.e. setting δτ = 0, capital
drops less and the negative consumption response is cut in half (figures omitted for
brevity).
Second, the low wealth effect on the labor supply implied by the preferences
being close to the GHH-form (σG ≈ 0) has a considerable effect on the responses
to uncertainty, amplifying the response to some shocks and dampening the one to
others. As shown in Figure 3.6, when setting the preferences to the standard King-
Plosser-Rebelo specification (σG = 1), the negative response to labor tax risk declines
by two orders of magnitude. At the same time, the effect of uncertainty shocks that
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Figure 3.6: Impulse responses to a two-standard deviation uncertainty shock to capital
taxes, labor taxes, and TFP (from left to right column)
5 10 15 20 25 30
−5
0
5
10
x 10−3 Y
5 10 15 20 25 30
−15
−7.5
0
x 10−4 C
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.02
0.01
0.04
Inv
5 10 15 20 25 30
0
2
4
6
x 10−3 π
5 10 15 20 25 30
0
50
στ k
5 10 15 20 25 30
−15
−10
−5
0
x 10−3 Y
5 10 15 20 25 30
−8
−4
0
x 10−3 C
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
Inv
5 10 15 20 25 30
0
2
4
6
x 10−3 π
5 10 15 20 25 30
30
60
90
120
στ n
5 10 15 20 25 30
−8
−5
−2
1
4
x 10−4 Y
5 10 15 20 25 30
−4
−2
0
x 10−4 C
5 10 15 20 25 30
−2
0
2
x 10−3 Inv
5 10 15 20 25 30
2
4
6
x 10−4 π
5 10 15 20 25 30
0
50
σz
Notes: solid blue line: KPR-preferences (σG = 1); red dashed line: preferences close to GHH
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mainly affect the capital margin, i.e. capital tax and TFP risk, substantially increases,
with the former now being the dominant policy risk factor. The output response to
government spending, monetary policy and investment-specific technology risk stays
largely unaltered (figures omitted for brevity).21
As noted in Section 3.2, the theoretical literature predicts an ambiguous effect of
21This finding of an important role of the preference specification for the transmission of uncertainty
shocks suggests that adopting a certain form of utility function may already predetermine the
sign of the output response to an uncertainty shock. Hence, future studies dealing with the
effects of uncertainty should devote more attention to tracing out which preference specification
may be the most suitable one. Our estimation results hint at a utility function featuring a low
wealth effect on the labor supply. This is in line with an increasing number of studies from
the fiscal policy (Monacelli and Perotti, 2008), open economy (Chang and Fernández, 2010;
Garcia-Cicco et al., 2010), and news literature (Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2009; Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe, 2010), which also suggest the presence of a low wealth effect on the labor supply.
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Table 3.7: Counterfactual calibration implying large uncertainty effects
Parameter Description Estimated mean Counterfactual
φc Consumption habits 0.96 0.9
κ Capital adjustment costs 10.1 5
θp Calvo parameter prices 0.96 0.9
σl Frisch elasticity parameter 0.07 4
ρR Interest smoothing 0.49 0.9
φy Taylor rule output growth 1.22 0
uncertainty as real option, Hartman-Abel, and general equilibrium effects drive the
dynamics and may work in opposite directions. That this is actually the case for the
specific types of uncertainty considered can be seen from, e.g., the impulse response of
consumption to a capital tax shock depicted in the middle left panel of Figure 3.6. The
consumption response is mostly negative for the case of σG ≈ 0 but unambiguously
positive for σG = 1. This suggests that different partial effects are dominating the
respective responses for the different parameterizations. While a contractionary effect
dominates in the GHH-case, an expansive effect prevails in the KPR-case. The strong
dependence of uncertainty effects on the specific parameterization underscores the
need for model estimation as opposed to calibration in order to trace out the aggregate
effects of uncertainty.
3.6.3 Why Are the Effects of Uncertainty Small?
We identify strong general equilibrium effects – constraining the amplification
of uncertainty shocks – as the main reason for the small effect of uncertainty on
economic activity. While the model is in principle capable of generating large real
effects of uncertainty, strong stabilizing effects are required to match the data moments.
Therefore, SMM estimates the model parameters to imply strong equilibrating effects.
Consider the simple counterfactual experiment displayed in Table 3.7. Here, we
decrease habit persistence, capital adjustment costs, price rigidities, and the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply. To dampen the general equilibrium response of the nominal
interest rate, we shut off the reaction to output growth and considerably increase the
interest smoothing. In this case, as shown Figure 3.7, policy risk leads to a drop in
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output of 1.5%, which is mostly driven by a large decline in investment. While this
Figure 3.7: Impulse responses to a two-standard deviation policy risk shock under
counterfactually volatile calibration
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calibration allows for larger effects of uncertainty, it comes at a cost: the model with
this calibration implies unrealistically large business cycles. As shown in Table 3.8,
output would be almost three times as volatile as found in the data, investment five
times, and wages almost four times as volatile.
Hence, given the estimated exogenous driving processes, SMM estimates the
parameters to imply a shock amplification more in line with the actually observed
data. First, consumption habits, capital adjustment costs, and price rigidities are
estimated to be quite high, generating a high persistence and thereby limiting the
reaction of consumption, investment, and inflation to shocks and thus the deviations
from the ergodic mean that are realized over time. Second, the parameter governing
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is estimated to be low so household’s labor supply
reacts quite flexibly to shocks. Third and most importantly, monetary policy reacts
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Table 3.8: Simulated and empirical moments: counterfactual with stronger amplifica-
tion
Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data
σ(xt) ρ(xt, yt) σxt/σyt ρ(xt, xt−1) ρ(xt, xt−2)
Y 4.47% 1.57% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.66 0.90 0.38 0.75
C 0.65% 0.95% 0.45 0.85 0.15 0.60 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.74
I 24.90% 5.30% 0.99 0.85 5.58 3.37 0.63 0.93 0.34 0.80
Π 0.29% 0.27% 0.76 0.17 0.07 0.17 0.80 0.50 0.53 0.32
W 3.55% 0.90% 0.85 0.10 0.79 0.57 0.83 0.84 0.57 0.69
R 0.31% 0.39% -0.90 0.34 0.07 0.25 0.82 0.86 0.57 0.67
Notes: Time Series Xt are output (Yt), consumption (Ct), investment (It), inflation (Πt), the real
wage (Wt), and the nominal interest rate (Rt). Small letters denote variables that are logged and
detrended using a one-sided HP-filter with smoothing parameter λ = 1600.
fast and decisively to current economic conditions and in particular to output. The
resulting transmission of both uncertainty and level shocks into the economy then
implies less pronounced business cycles.
The decisive reaction to output growth is evident from the large coefficient estimate
in the Taylor rule. The monetary authority’s aggressive reaction to changes in output
has a considerable dampening effect on the business cycle as it prevents output from
deviating too far from steady state. When keeping all parameters at their baseline
values but setting φy = 0, thus shutting off the response of interest rates to output
growth, triples the negative output response following a policy risk shock (figures
omitted for brevity). The main reason for this behavior is the response of the real
interest rate. The uncertainty shock acts like a negative supply shock, agents reduce
their labor and capital input, and inflation rises. The monetary authority responds
to this increase in inflation by raising the nominal interest rate without considering
the negative impact on output. As a result, the real interest rate now has a positive
impact response, amplifying the original shock’s contractionary effect on output. In
contrast, if the monetary authority also reacts to changes in output, the interest rate
hike is more muted and the negative output response lower. The real interest initially
declines to counteract the contractionary effect on output and only rises after several
quarters.
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The fast reaction of nominal interest rates to exogenous shocks can be seen from the
relatively low degree of interest smoothing, meaning that current economic conditions
affect nominal interests more than past interest rates. This low amount of interest
smoothing exerts a considerable influence on the economy’s response to uncertainty
shocks, allowing a stronger counteracting reaction of the nominal interest rate, which
dampens the uncertainty effects in a similar way as the output feedback of monetary
policy. When giving more weight to past interest rates compared to the currently
desired nominal interest, the nominal interest rate responds more sluggishly to shocks
to the system, thereby temporarily allowing for larger deviations from steady state.
Hence, our result lend support to the findings of Bachmann and Bayer (2011).
Their study showed for the case of idiosyncratic uncertainty about technology that
general equilibrium effects, most importantly the endogenous feedback to wages and
interest rates may considerably dampen the output effects of uncertainty shocks. Our
results indicate that this also holds true for the case of aggregate uncertainty in an
estimated DSGE-model.
These results suggest a potential issue for studies using a “proof-of-concept”-
approach. Such studies typically show that uncertainty may matter by putting
one source of uncertainty along one level shock into a model and then designing a
transmission mechanism that enables this source to explain the whole business cycle.
Our findings indicate that more attention needs to be devoted to what happens if
other shocks, both uncertainty and level are present. As soon as other competing
sources of aggregate fluctuations documented in the literature are added to these
models, the effects of uncertainty are bound to decrease. Moreover, the approach of
considering only one source of uncertainty and designing a particular amplification
mechanism to generate an output drop in response may neglect that specially designed
amplification mechanisms may interact with other types of shocks in undesired ways.22
22For example, expansionary output effects of uncertainty, which in our model e.g. arise with capital
tax risk, might be amplified in the same way.
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3.7 Conclusion
The current paper analyzes the effects of policy risk, i.e. aggregate uncertainty
about labor and capital tax rates, monetary policy, and government spending on
aggregate activity. We find that aggregate policy risk has only minor effects on
the business cycle. Although its effects are an order of magnitude larger than the
ones of technological uncertainty, a two standard-deviation policy risk shock still
only generates a 0.025% drop in output. The reason for this small effect is that
our parameter estimates imply strong general equilibrium effects that dampen the
aggregate effects of uncertainty on economic activity. Most notably, the monetary
authority’s estimated strong and rapid response to current conditions implies a
nominal interest rate reaction that considerably reduces aggregate fluctuations. While
our model is capable of generating strong uncertainty effects, such a calibration would
imply unrealistically large business cycle fluctuations. Thus, SMM estimates the
amplification of uncertainty shocks to be rather low.
The small effect of uncertainty on output does not imply that time-varying volatility
is unimportant. In accordance with the previous literature (e.g. Justiniano and
Primiceri, 2008; Primiceri, 2005), our findings suggest that the Great Moderation can
be explained through a combination of “good luck” and “good policy”. The historical
variance estimates indicate that the standard deviation of both technology and policy
shocks significantly decreased since the mid-1980s. However, most of the effect of
this time-varying volatility comes in the form of a different size of the realized level
shocks instead of through the uncertainty-effect.
As our analysis focuses on aggregate uncertainty, it does not necessarily contradict
studies finding large effects of idiosyncratic uncertainty. However, these studies
clearly require different transmission mechanisms that do not give rise to large general
equilibrium effects (see also Bachmann and Bayer, 2011).
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Appendix to Chapter 3
A Data construction
Unless otherwise noted, all data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)’s
NIPA Tables and available in quarterly frequency from 1960Q1 until 2010Q3.
Data for the exogenous processes
Capital and labor tax rates. Our approach to calculate average tax rates
closely follows Mendoza et al. (1994), Jones (2002), and Leeper et al. (2010). We first
compute the average personal income tax rate
τ p = IT
W + PRI/2 + CI ,
where IT is personal current tax revenues (Table 3.1 line 3), W is wage and salary
accruals (Table 1.12 line 3), PRI is proprietor’s income (Table 1.12 line 9), and
CI ≡ PRI/2 +RI + CP +NI is capital income. Here, RI is rental income (Table
1.12 line 12), CP is corporate profits (Table 1.12 line 13), and NI denotes the net
interest income (Table 1.12 line 18).
The average labor and capital income tax rates can then be computed as
τn = τ
p(W + PRI/2) + CSI
EC + PRI/2 ,
where CSI denotes contributions for government social insurance (Table 3.1 line 7),
and EC is compensation of employees (Table 1.12 line 2), and
τ k = τ
pCI + CT + PT
CI + PT ,
where CT is taxes on corporate income (Table 3.1 line 5), and PT is property taxes
(Table 3.3 line 8).
Government spending. Government spending is the sum of government con-
sumption (Table 3.1 line 16) and government investment (Table 3.1 line 35) divided
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by the GDP deflator (Table 1.1.4 line 1) and the civilian noninstitutional population
(BLS, Series LNU00000000Q).
Monetary policy shock. Computed as the residual from a Taylor rule as in
Clarida et al. (2000) (see Appendix B). The sample only starts in 1961Q1 as we lose
the first year of data due to the use of four time lags as instruments in the GMM
estimation.
Total factor productivity (TFP). The construction of TFP closely follows
Beaudry and Lucke (2010), i.e.
TFPt =
Yt
KαH1−α
.
To construct K, we use data on capital services for the private non-farm business
sector (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Historical Multifactor Productivity Ta-
bles),23 multiply it by the total capacity utilization rate (Federal Reserve System,
Statistical Release G.17 - Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization), and divide
it by the civilian noninstitutional population above 16 years of age (BLS, Series
LNU00000000Q). Real GDP per capita Y is nominal GDP (Table 1.1.5 line 1) divided
by the GDP deflator (line 1 in Table 1.1.4) and the population, and per capita hours
H are non-farm business hours worked (BLS, Series PRS85006033) divided by the
population. The capital share α is set at 0.295, the mean over the sample compiled
by the BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Historical Multifactor Productivity
Tables). The TFP-series ends in 2009Q4.
Relative price of investment. The relative price of investment is taken from
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2011) and only available until 2006Q4. They base their
calculations on Fisher (2006).
The different sample lengths are not an issue as we estimate each exogenous process
separately. Using the longest available sample assures that we make optimal use of
the available information for each series.
23Quarterly data is interpolated from the annual series using cubic spline interpolation.
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Data for SMM
Output. Nominal GDP (Table 1.1.5 line 1) divided by the GDP deflator (Table
1.1.4 line 1) and the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q).
Investment. Sum of Residential fixed investment (Table 1.1.5 line 12) and nonresi-
dential fixed investment (Table 1.1.5 line 9) divided by the GDP deflator (Table 1.1.4
line 1) and the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q).
Consumption. Sum of personal consumption expenditures for nondurable goods
(Table 1.1.5 line 5) and services (Table 1.1.5 line 6) divided by the GDP deflator (Table
1.1.4 line 1) and the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q).
Real wage. Hourly compensation in the nonfarm business sector (BLS, Series
PRS85006103) divided by the GDP deflator (Table 1.1.4 line 1).
Inflation. Computed as the log-difference of the GDP deflator (Table 1.1.4 line 1).
Nominal interest rate. Geometric mean of the effective Federal Funds Rate
(St.Louis FED - FRED Database, Series FEDFUNDS).
Additional data for GMM
Interest term spread. We use the difference of the quarterly geometric mean of
the 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (FRED Database, Series GS10) and
the quarterly geometric mean of the 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate
(FRED Database, Series TB3MS).
Money growth rate. Growth rate of the M2 Money Stock (FRED Database, Series
M2SL).
Commodity inflation. Commodity inflation is computed as the growth rate of the
X12-seasonally adjusted Producer Price Index: All Commodities (FRED Database,
Series PPIACO).
Output gap. The output gap is constructed as the percentage difference between
real GDP (FRED Database, Series GDPC96) and Real Potential Gross Domestic
Product (FRED Database, Series GDPPOT).
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B Econometric Methods
The Particle Filter
For ease of exposition, let xt be a generic observable AR(1) process
xt = ρxt−1 + eσtνt , νt ∼ N (0, 1) (3.19)
where the unobserved/latent state σt follows a stochastic volatility process
σt = (1− ρσ) σ¯ + ρσσt−1 + ηεt , εt ∼ N (0, 1), (3.20)
where σ¯ is is the unconditional mean of σt. The shock to the volatility εt is assumed
to be independent from the level shock νt.
Hence, a filter is required to obtain the so-called filtering density p (σt|xt; Θ). Due
to the nonlinearity embedded in the stochastic volatility setup of the shocks, we
cannot simply employ the Kalman filter as in the case of linearity and normally
distributed shocks. Instead, we employ the Sequential Importance Resampling (SIR)
particle filter, a special application of the more general class of Sequential Monte
Carlo methods, to evaluate the likelihood (Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez,
2007; Fernández-Villaverde et al., forthcoming). Given the structure in (3.19) and
(3.20) and some initial value x0, the factorized likelihood of observing xT can be
written as
p
(
xT ; Θ
)
=
T∏
t=1
p
(
xt|xt−1; Θ
)
=
∫
p (x1|x0, σ0; Θ) dσ0
T∏
t=2
∫
p (xt|xt−1, σt; Θ) p
(
σt|xt−1; Θ
)
dσt
=
∫ 1
eσ0
√
2pi
exp
[
−12
(
x1 − ρx0
eσ0
)2]
dσ0
×
T∏
t=2
∫ 1
eσt
√
2pi
exp
[
−12
(
xt − ρxt−1
eσt
)2]
p
(
σt|xt−1; Θ
)
dσt , (3.21)
where xt is a (t×1) vector that stacks the observations on x up to time t, Θ stacks the
parameters, and the last equality follows from the assumption of normally distributed
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shocks. Although we do not have an analytical expression for p (σt|xt−1; Θ) , t =
1, . . . , T , and can therefore not compute it directly, we can employ the particle filter
to estimate the likelihood by iteratively drawing from p (σt|xt−1; Θ).
The underlying idea of the particle filter is to use an approximation of the filtering
density p (σt|xt; Θ) with a simulated distribution generated from empirical data. This
distribution can be formed from mass points, or particles,
p
(
σt|xt; Θ
)
'
N∑
i=0
ωitδσit (σt),
N∑
i=0
ωit = 1, ωit > 0 (3.22)
where δ is the Dirac delta function and ωit is the weight attached to the respective
draw/particle σit (Godsill et al., 2004). We can then use a Sequential Importance
Resampling (SIR)-approach to update particles from time t to t+ 1 and obtain the
new filtering distribution at t+ 1 (see e.g. Fernández-Villaverde et al., forthcoming).
A convenient by-product of this filtering approach is that we also approximate
p (σt|xt−1; Θ), the distribution we need to build the likelihood.
The SIR is a two-step procedure that, by using a prediction and a resampling/filtering
step for each time period, ultimately allows to iteratively draw from p (σt|xt−1; Θ).
Starting with p (σ0|x0; Θ) = p (σ0; Θ), the prediction step uses the law of mo-
tion for the states f(σt+1|σt), equation (3.20), to obtain the conditional density
p (σ1|x0; Θ) = p (ε1) p (σ0|x0; Θ). That is, given N draws
{
σit|t
}N
i=1
from p (σt|xt; Θ),
(here p (σ0|x0; Θ)) and a draw of exogenous shocks εit ∼ N (0, 1), we can use equation
(3.20) to compute
{
σit+1|t
}N
i=1
.24
Next, the resampling/filtering step uses importance resampling to update the
conditional probability from p (σt|xt−1; Θ) to p (σt|xt; Θ). The crucial idea is that if{
σit|t−1
}N
i=1
is a draw from p (σt|xt−1; Θ) and {σ˜it}Ni=1 is a draw with replacement from{
σit|t−1
}N
i=1
using the resampling probabilities
ωit =
p
(
xt|xt−1, σit|t−1; Θ
)
∑N
i=1 p
(
xt|xt−1, σit|t−1; Θ
) , (3.23)
24The notation t+ 1|t indicates a draw at time t+ 1 conditioned on the information available at
time t.
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then
{
σt|t
}N
i=1
= {σ˜it}Ni=1 is a draw from p (σt|xt; Θ). The resampling with probabilities
given in (3.23) serves two purposes. First, the reweighting implements an importance
sampling approach, i.e. draws are obtained from a proposal density that is easy
to draw from and are then subsequently reweighted to reflect the density to be
approximated (see Arulampalam et al., 2002, for a derivation).25 Second, without
the resampling step, there would be an increase in the unconditional variance of ωt
over time, yielding only one particle with non-zero weight (known as degeneracy or
sample impoverishment, see Arulampalam et al. (2002)). By resampling, we keep
only those particles with high ωit (i.e. those that are closer to the true state vector).
Having now obtained draws from p (σt|xt; Θ), we can again start with the prediction
step to obtain draws for time period t+ 1.
After T iterations, we get an estimate of our likelihood as26
p
(
xT ; Θ
)
' 1
N
N∑
i=1
1
eσ0|0
√
2pi
exp
[
−12
(
x1 − ρx0
eσ0|0
)2]
×
T∏
t=2
1
N
N∑
i=1
1
eσt|t−1
√
2pi
exp
[
−12
(
xt − ρxt−1
eσt|t−1
)2]
. (3.24)
Particle Smoother
We employ the backward-smoothing routine suggested by Godsill et al. (2004) to
draw from the smoothing density p(σT |xT ; Θ) to get a historical distribution of the
volatilities. Specifically, we start with the factorization
p(σT |xT ; Θ) = p(σT |xT ; Θ)
T−1∏
t=1
p(σt|σt+1:T , xT ; Θ) . (3.25)
25In our case, we use the prior density p
(
σt|σt−1; Θ
)
as the importance density.
26See Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2007) and Doucet and Johansen (2009) and the
references contained therein for the conditions required for a central limit theorem to apply,
yielding a consistent estimator of p
(
xT ; Θ
)
.
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The second factor can be further simplified
p(σt|σt+1:T , xT ; Θ) = p(σt|σt+1, xt; Θ)
= p(σt|x
t; Θ)f(σt+1|σt)
p(σt+1|xt)
∝ p(σt|xt; Θ)f(σt+1|σt) , (3.26)
where the first equality results from the Markovian properties of the model and f
denotes the state transition density following from equation (3.20). Equation (3.22)
describes how to approximate p(σt|xt; Θ) by forward filtering. Therefore, we can
approximate p(σt|σt+1:T , xT ; Θ) ∝ p(σt|xt; Θ)f(σt+1|σt) by
p(σt|σt+1, xT ; Θ) '
N∑
i=1
ωit|t+1δσit(σt) , (3.27)
where the new weights ωit|t+1 are given by
ωit|t+1 =
ωitf(σt+1|σit)∑N
j=1 ω
j
t f(σt+1|σjt )
. (3.28)
and the ωit are the weights obtained in the filtering step. Denote with σ˜it the ith draw
from the smoothing density at time t. At time T, we can obtain draws σ˜iT by drawing
from p(σT |xT ) with the weights ωiT . Then, going backwards in time, we can use the
above recursions to iteratively obtain draws σ˜it by resampling using the weights given
in (3.28).
Tailored Randomized Block Metropolis Hastings Algorithm
Let Θ, p
(
xT |Θ
)
, and pi(Θ) denote the vector of parameters to be estimated, the
likelihood function, and the prior distribution of the parameters, respectively. The
posterior distribution pi(Θ|xT ) can be computed as
pi
(
Θ|xT
)
∝ p
(
xT |Θ
)
pi (Θ) . (3.29)
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Given this usually analytically intractable posterior, most macroeconomic applications
employ a Random Walk Metropolis-Hastings (RW-MH) algorithm to generate draws
from the posterior distribution. However, the standard RW-MH algorithm often has
poor mixing properties, leading to highly autocorrelated draws, and is therefore often
very inefficient. Hence, to increase the efficiency, we use the Tailored Randomized
Block Metropolis Hastings (TaRB-MH) algorithm proposed by Chib and Ramamurthy
(2010).27 Instead of in each iteration step simultaneously drawing an entire new
parameter vector from a proposal density, the parameter vector is randomly split
up into several blocks. Each block is then subsequently updated by a separate MH
run, conditional on the previous step’s values of the parameters in the other blocks.
Ideally, the blocks should be formed according to the correlation between parameters,
with highly correlated parameters belonging to the same block. However, we have no
a priori knowledge about the correlation between parameters and resort to a blocking
scheme where both the number of blocks and its composition are randomized in each
step. This algorithm provides a good compromise between the standard RW-MH and
tailored multiple block MH algorithms that use multiple blocks, which are particularly
designed for the problem at hand. The second feature that improves on the standard
RW-MH is that in each step the proposal density is “tailored” to the location and the
curvature of the posterior density in that block by using a non-derivative based global
optimizer. We deviate from Chib and Ramamurthy (2010) by using the CMAES
algorithm (Hansen et al., 2003) instead of a simulated annealing as the former has been
shown to be more efficient (Andreasen, 2010).28 Moreover, it requires considerably
less tuning than a simulated annealing. The TaRB-MH algorithm proceeds as follows.
1. At each iteration step n, n = 1, . . . , N , the elements of the parameter vector θ
are separated into random blocks (θn,1, θn,2, . . . , θn,pn) by perturbing their initial
ordering and assigning the first parameter in the perturbed vector to the first
block and each following parameter with probability p = 0.5 to a new block,
leaving us with 2.5 blocks on average as we estimate 5 parameters.
2. At each iteration step n, each block θn,l, l = 1, . . . , pn is sampled by a Metropolis-
27Using the TaRB-MH decreased the inefficiency factors from values around 10 to below 2.
28For an intuitive introduction to the working of the CMAES algorithm, see Binsbergen et al.
(2010).
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Hastings step using a proposal density adapted to the posterior in the following
way. Denote with θn,−l the most current value of all blocks except for the lth
one, i.e. their value at the end of step n− 1. To generate a new draw for θn,l,
the CMAES-algorithm is used to find
θˆn,l = arg max
θn,l
log
[
p
(
xT |θn,l, θn,−l
)
pi (Θ)
]
. (3.30)
That is, we use a global optimizer to maximize the posterior over the current
block l, given the value of all other parameters at the end of step n− 1. Having
found the “conditional mode” θˆn,l, we compute the curvature of the target
posterior distribution in the standard way as the negative inverse of the Hessian
at the “conditional mode”
Vn,l =
−∂ log
[
p
(
xT |θn,l, θn,−l
)
pi (Θ)
]
∂θn,lθ′n,l
−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
θn,l=θˆn,l
. (3.31)
Following Chib and Ramamurthy (2010), we use a multivariate t-distribution
with ν degrees of freedom as proposal density for θn,l, ql
(
θn,l| θn,−l, xT
)
. Mean
and variance are set to the “conditional mode” and the negative inverse of the
Hessian at this point:
ql
(
θn,l| θn,−l, xT
)
= t
(
θn,l| θˆn,l, Vn,l, ν
)
. (3.32)
In the Metropolis-Hastings-step, a proposed value θ∗n,l is accepted as the new
value of the block with probability
αl
(
θn,l, θ
∗
n,l
∣∣∣ θn,−l, xT) = min
p
(
xT |θ∗n,l, θn,−l
)
pi
(
θ∗n,l
)
p (xT |θn,l, θn,−l) pi (θn,l)
t
(
θn,l| θˆn,l, Vn,l, ν
)
t
(
θ∗n,l
∣∣∣ θˆn,l, Vn,l, ν) , 1
 .
(3.33)
If the proposed value θ∗n,l is rejected, we set θn+1,l = θn,l. This step is repeated
for all pn blocks before the algorithm starts over with step 1.
Setting ν = 5 and iterating over steps 1 and 2, we can - after a suitable burn-in-
period - obtain samples from the desired posterior distribution, which is the invariant
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distribution of the resulting Markov Chain. In our case, a burn-in of 2500 proved
sufficient.
Model Solution
Let st denote the ns × 1 vector of state variables in deviations from steady state,
including the exogenous shocks and the perturbation parameter Λ, and let sit denote
its ith entry. The policy function/law of motion for an arbitrary model variable X̂t
then has the form
X̂t =
ns∑
i=1
ξXi s
i
t +
1
2
ns∑
i=1
ns∑
j=1
ξXi,js
i
ts
j
t +
ns∑
i=1
ns∑
j=1
ns∑
l=1
ξXi,j,ls
i
ts
j
ts
l
t , (3.34)
where the ξ’s are scalars that depend on the deep parameters of the model and
hats denote percentage deviations from steady state. Equation (3.34) shows why
lower-order approximations would not be sufficient for our purpose.
As is well known, a first-order approximation exhibits certainty equivalence. This
implies ξXv = 0, where v denotes the position of a volatility shock in the state vector
s. That is, up to first order, uncertainty shocks do not enter the policy function at
all.
For a second-order approximation, it is well known from Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2004) for the homoskedastic case that uncertainty only enters the policy function
through a constant term via the second derivative with respect to the perturbation
parameter, i.e. through ξΛ,Λ 6= 0. However, things are more complicated in the
heteroscedastic case where shocks to the variance occur, leading to an additional
effect. Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2010) prove that in this case, the volatility
shocks additionally only enter the policy function with non-zero coefficients in their
interaction term with the respective level shock. Algebraically, only the cross-product
of σˆi × νˆi is different from 0. In contrast, all other cross-terms with the uncertainty
shocks are zero, i.e ξXv,j 6=u = 0, where v and u denote the positions of a volatility and
its corresponding level shock in the state vector s, respectively. Hence, the effect of
uncertainty is always mediated through level shocks. It is not possible to shock the
variance of the level shocks independently from the level shock as its effect would be
0 by construction.
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Only in the third-order approximation do the volatility shocks enter the policy
function separately from the level shocks in a non-constant form. Most importantly,
the term ξi,Λ,Λ is in general different from 0 for all volatility shocks.
Simulated Method of Moments
The idea of the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) is the following. Let xt
be a time t vector of observables from a stationary and ergodic distribution and
let {xt}Tt=1 be the corresponding sequence. Furthermore, let m (xt) denote a k × 1
vector of empirical moments computed from this data. Denote with {xsimt (θ)}aTt=1 the
corresponding time series of length aT generated from simulating the model using
the p × 1 parameter vector θ ∈ Θ, with Θ ⊂ Rp. Let m (xsimt (θ)) be the vector of
simulated moments computed from the artificial data. The SMM estimator is the
value of θ that satisfies
θ̂ = arg min
θ∈Θ
[
m (xt)−m
(
xsimt (θ)
)]′
W
[
m (xt)−m
(
xsimt (θ)
)]
, (3.35)
where W is a p× p positive definite weighting matrix. Under the assumption that
the model with θ = θ0 is a correct representation of the true process that generated
m (xt) and the regularity conditions spelled out in Duffie and Singleton (1993), θˆ is a
consistent estimator of θ0 with asymptotic distribution
√
T
(
θ̂ − θ0
)
d−→ N
(
0, (1 + 1/τ) (J ′WJ)−1 J ′WSWJ (J ′WJ)−1
)
, (3.36)
where
S = lim
T→∞
V ar
(
(1/
√
T )
T∑
t=1
m(xt)
)
, (3.37)
and J = E(∂m(xsimt )/∂θ) (see Ruge-Murcia, 2010).
This estimator is asymptotically efficient when using the weighting matrix
W =
(
V longrun
)−1
=
[
lim
T→∞
V ar
(
1√
T
T∑
t=1
m (xt)
)]−1
. (3.38)
The ideal weighting matrix places the most weight on the linear combination of
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moments that are the most precisely measured in the data. However, for two reasons,
we use only the diagonal of the optimal weighting matrix:
W diag = diag
(
V longrun
)−1
. (3.39)
First, we would like to put more weight on moments that are actually observed in
the data and that are economically meaningful, rather than on a linear combination
of moments (see also Cochrane, 2005). Second, in practice, fully specified weighting
matrices often lead to diverging parameter estimates. As shown in Ruge-Murcia
(2010), using only the main diagonal of the optimal weighting matrix leads to a loss
in efficiency but nevertheless delivers good results in most cases.
The simulation proceeds as follows. Starting at the deterministic steady state, we
simulate the model for 3015 quarters using shocks drawn from the estimated shock
distributions. Shocks larger than two standard deviations are trimmed. To assure
non-explosive behavior of the simulations, we use the pruning algorithm of Kim et al.
(2008). We discard the first 2000 quarters as a burn-in in order to reach the ergodic
distribution. We then use the remaining 1015 quarters to compute the respective
moments. The results are robust to using a longer burn-in period. The choice of
using five times the length of the original data sample (i.e. a = 5) to compute the
moments is motivated by the simulations in Ruge-Murcia (2010), who finds this choice
to deliver a good balance between the precision of the estimates and computation
time.
Impulse Responses
The nonlinearity of our model complicates the computation of impulse responses
compared to linear models. We follow Fernández-Villaverde et al. (forthcoming) and
generate impulse responses as the response to a two standard deviation shock to
uncertainty at the ergodic mean. First, we simulate the model for 2,000 quarters by
drawing shocks from the respective estimated distributions. Shocks larger than two
standard deviations are trimmed to assure convergence, which technically depends on
the shocks being bounded. To assure non-explosive behavior of the simulations, we
use the pruning algorithm of Kim et al. (2008). We discard the first 2,000 quarters as
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a burn-in in order to reach the ergodic distribution and use the next 675 quarters to
compute the ergodic mean. Starting at the ergodic mean, we compute the IRFs as
the percentage difference of the respective variables between the system shocked with
the respective shock and the baseline model response, i.e. the model response without
shocks. To account for sampling uncertainty, we generate 50 different IRFs with
different starting values of the random number generator and take the cross-sectional
average as our impulse response.
GMM
We construct the monetary policy shocks by specifying the Federal Reserve’s policy
reaction function and estimating it by the generalized method of moments (GMM).
Our approach is similar to the one used in Clarida et al. (2000), with the difference
that Clarida et al. (2000) use a forward-looking policy reaction function, while we
use a rule that reacts to contemporaneous variables to stay consistent with our
DSGE-model. Specifically, the policy reaction function to be estimated is given by
rt = ρrt−1 + (1− ρ) [r¯ + φpi (pit − p¯i) + φyygapt ] + εt , (3.40)
where pit is inflation with target rate p¯i, ygapt is the output gap, rt−1 allows for interest
smoothing, r¯ ist the target nominal interest rate, and εt is an error term. Using
the vector of instruments zt, the set of moment conditions for our GMM estimation
procedure can be written as
E [{rt − ρrt−1 − α− βpit − γygapt } zt] = 0 (3.41)
where α = (1− ρ) (r¯ + φpip¯i) collects all constant terms, β = (1 − ρ)φpi, and γ =
(1− ρ)φy.
Hence, we regress the average effective Federal Funds Rate in the first month of
the quarter on the lagged FFR, the inflation rate, and the output gap, where all rates
are annualized. The set of instruments includes four lags of the FFR, the inflation
rate, the output gap, commodity price inflation, money growth, and the interest term
spread. Because we are only interested in the residuals of the policy reaction function
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Table 3.9: GMM estimation of Taylor rule
Coefficient Mean Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
ρ 0.898 0.018 48.926 0.000
α 0.001 0.001 0.874 0.383
β 0.1741 0.027 6.361 0.000
γ 0.102 0.017 5.950 0.000
R-squared 0.890 Mean dependent var 0.058
Adjusted R-squared 0.888 Sum squared resid 0.027
S.E. of regression 0.012 J-statistic 18.545
Durbin-Watson stat 2.314 pval(J-statistic) 0.552
Note: Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth: Fixed (4), No prewhitening; Simultaneous weighting matrix &
coefficient iteration; Convergence achieved after: 28 weight matrices, 29 total coef iterations.
ε̂t, we do not need to separately identify the target nominal rate r¯ and target inflation
p¯i.
Table 3.9 presents the estimation results, which are all in the range typically
reported in the literature. There is strong evidence of interest smoothing with
ρ = 0.898. The point estimates of the feedback parameters are φpi = 1.718 and
φy = 1.003. The test of overidentifying restrictions shows that the model cannot be
rejected at conventional significance levels.
C Diagnostics
Testing for Heteroskedasticity
Table 3.10 presents evidence of the need to model time-varying volatility. Despite
our relatively short sample size and the low power of tests for heteroskedasticity, the
null hypothesis of homoskedastic shocks can be rejected at the 10% level for all series
except labor taxes. This result is consistent with evidence that the standard deviation
of structural shocks has changed over time (see e.g. Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008;
Primiceri, 2005).
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Table 3.10: Tests for heteroskedasticity
τ k τn z zI g m
White 0.000* 0.932 0.001* 0.042* 0.360 0.068*
WW 0.169 0.523 0.265 0.005* 0.076* 0.068*
BPK 0.004* 0.890 0.126 0.770 0.511 0.298
Notes: Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% level. White refers to the standard White (1980)-
test, WW refers to the Wooldridge (1990)-version of this test, and BPK refers to the Breusch and
Pagan (1979)/Koenker (1981)-test.
Convergence Diagnostics
Table (3.11) shows the results from the Geweke (1992)-convergence diagnostics
that compares the means of the first 20% of draws with that of the last 50% of the
draws. In general, all MCMC chains have converged to their stationary distribution
as indicated by the p-values of the χ2-test for equal means. Figures 3.8 to 3.13 show
the corresponding mean plots.
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Table 3.11: Geweke (1992) convergence diagnostics
Parameter 4% taper 8% taper 15% taper 4% taper 8% taper 15% taper
Capital Tax Rates Labor Tax Rates
ρ1 0.160 0.165 0.145 0.909 0.890 0.887
ρ2 0.947 0.941 0.937 0.926 0.913 0.904
ρσ 0.623 0.596 0.566 0.648 0.652 0.653
ησ 0.929 0.927 0.919 0.327 0.319 0.271
σ¯ 0.760 0.744 0.738 0.922 0.921 0.917
Total Factor Productivity Investment Specific Technology
ρ1 0.891 0.887 0.879 0.199 0.174 0.124
ρ2 0.679 0.681 0.665 0.353 0.340 0.297
ρσ 0.643 0.615 0.583 0.546 0.534 0.520
ησ 0.456 0.453 0.391 0.638 0.649 0.638
σ¯ 0.772 0.765 0.706 0.304 0.260 0.187
Government Spending Monetary Policy Shock
ρ1 0.608 0.598 0.572 0.192 0.200 0.181
ρ2 0.605 0.606 0.558
ρσ 0.550 0.561 0.562 0.231 0.227 0.155
ησ 0.293 0.267 0.232 0.885 0.870 0.860
σ¯ 0.412 0.402 0.369 0.066 0.078 0.071
Notes: Numbers are p-values of the χ2-test for equal means of the first 20% of draws and the last
50% of the draws (after the first 2500 draws are discarded as burn-in).
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Figure 3.8: Evolution of MCMC sampler over time for τ k
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Figure 3.9: Evolution of MCMC sampler over time for τn
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Figure 3.10: Evolution of MCMC sampler over time for z
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Figure 3.11: Evolution of MCMC sampler over time for zI
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Figure 3.12: Evolution of MCMC sampler over time for g
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Figure 3.13: Evolution of MCMC sampler over time for m
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C Diagnostics
Model Misspecification Diagnostics
Following Kim et al. (1998), we can test the specification of our SV-model. Using
N draws from the prediction density p (xt|xt−1; Θ), we can compute the probability
that x2t+1 will be less or equal than the actually observed value of
(
xobst+1
)2
:
Pr
(
x2t+1 6
(
xobst+1
)2 ∣∣∣xt ; Θ) ' ut+1 = 1
N
Pr
(
x2t+1 6
(
xobst+1
)2 ∣∣∣xt, σt+1|t ; Θ) , (3.42)
∀t = 1, . . . T − 1. If the SV-model is correctly specified, the sequence of ut converges
in distribution to i.i.d. uniform variables as the number of particles N goes to infinity
(Rosenblatt, 1952). Under the null hypothesis of a correctly specified model, the ut
can be transformed to i.i.d. standard normal variables using the inverse normal CDF.
Hence, we can perform a simple test for misspecification by testing the resulting
series for their normality. Figure 3.14 shows the corresponding QQ-plots.
Table 3.12 presents the results from three commonly used normality tests. In
general, a correct specification of the model tends to not be rejected. Only for z,
the Jarque-Bera and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reject normality. However, this
effect is driven by the outliers visible in the bottom left corner of Figure 3.14. In
contrast, when shutting off the time-varying volatility and setting the volatility to
its unconditional mean, the specification is generally rejected (results are not shown
here).
Table 3.12: Tests for model misspecification
JB KS SW
τ k 0.066 0.039** 0.125
τn 0.141 0.960 0.135
z 0.037** 0.035** 0.085
zI 0.377 0.076 0.586
g 0.500 0.747 0.528
m 0.052 0.377 0.012**
Note: Asterisks indicate significance at the 5% level. JB refers to the Jarque and Bera (1987)-test,
KS refers to the Kolmogorov (1933)/Smirnov (1948)-test, and SW refers to the Shapiro and Wilk
(1965)-test.
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Figure 3.14: QQ-plots
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Notes: From left to right and top to bottom: capital taxes, labor taxes, TFP, investment-specific
technology, monetary policy shocks, and government spending.
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Chapter4
Central Bank Communication on Financial
Stability
4.1 Introduction
The global financial crisis has triggered heated discussions on how best to achieve
financial stability in the future. An important role in that regard has been assigned to
central banks, many of which have explicit financial stability mandates. In the light
of this, a large number of central banks have communicated extensively on financial
stability-related matters, e.g. through the publication of Financial Stability Reports
(FSRs) and financial stability-related speeches and interviews.
The aim of the current chapter is to shed light on the potential effects of central bank
communication about financial stability. It takes a financial market perspective and
studies how financial sector stock indices react to the release of such communication,
given that the financial sector is one of its main addressees. Doing so, it covers a
large number of countries over nearly one and a half decades, and studies the effects
of FSRs as well as of speeches and interviews by central bank governors.
An assessment of the effects of financial stability-related communication requires
a view on its aims. In line with the aims put forward by Blinder et al. (2008),
we focus on the potential of such communication to “create news” and to “reduce
noise”. A number of central banks have specified the purpose of their FSRs. The
ECB’s reports, for instance, aim “to promote awareness in the financial industry and
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among the public at large of issues that are relevant for safeguarding the stability
of the euro area financial system. By providing an overview of sources of risk and
vulnerability for financial stability, the Review also seeks to play a role in preventing
financial crises” (European Central Bank, 2010, p.7).1 In light of these statements,
it is interesting to study to what extent the views that a central bank expresses in
its communications get reflected in the markets. For instance, if the central bank
expresses a rather pessimistic view about the prospects for financial stability, and
this view gets heard in financial markets, we would expect that stock prices for the
financial sector decline. In that sense, these communications “create news”. The other
motive, to “reduce noise”, should then be reflected in market volatility, in the sense
that a communication by the central bank should contribute to reducing uncertainty
in financial markets, thereby reducing volatility.
But why, and through what channels should central bank communications have
an effect on financial markets at all? A number of factors could come into play
here. First, the central bank is obviously an important player in financial markets.
For instance, if it is ready to change its policy rates, it can directly affect asset
prices. Its communication can therefore exert effects through what has been labelled
the “signalling channel” in the literature on foreign exchange interventions (e.g.
Kaminsky and Lewis, 1996). Second, the analyses that feed into the communications
are potentially of high quality, and there are few other institutions communicating
about financial stability, such that a central bank publication might indeed contain
news. Thus, a co-ordination channel might be at play, whereby communication by
the central bank works as a co-ordination device, thereby reducing heterogeneity in
expectations and information, and thus inducing asset prices to more closely reflect
the underlying fundamentals, a channel that has also been found to be important
to explain the effect of foreign exchange interventions (Fratzscher, 2008; Sarno and
Taylor, 2001). This channel might imply that communications have longer-lasting
effects, as they might change the dynamics in financial markets.
To conduct the empirical analysis, the chapter constructs a unique and novel
1In a similar vein, the Bank of England’s FSRs aim “to identify the major downside risks to the UK
financial system and thereby help financial firms, authorities and the wider public in managing
and preparing for these risks.” See http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/
index.htm.
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database on communication comprising more than 1000 releases of FSRs and speeches
and interviews by central bank governors from 37 central banks and over the past 14
years. We not only identify the precise timing of these communications, but we also
determine their content. We employ a computerized textual-analysis software (called
DICTION 5.0), which allows us to grade each of the central bank financial stability
statements, based on different semantic features, according to the degree of optimism
that is expressed.
A first striking finding from this classification is that the tone of FSRs had con-
tinuously become more optimistic after 2000, reaching a peak already in early 2006
and becoming more pessimistic thereafter. This stylized fact, together with formal
tests conducted in the chapter, suggests that FSRs comment on the current market
environment, but also contain forward-looking assessments of risks and vulnerabilities.
The chapter’s findings suggest that communication about financial stability has
important repercussions for financial sector stock prices. Moreover, there are clear
differences between FSRs, on the one hand, and speeches and interviews, on the
other. FSRs clearly create news in the sense that the views expressed in FSRs move
stock markets in the expected direction. This effect is quite sizeable as, on average,
FSR releases move equity markets by more than 1% during the subsequent month.
Another important finding is that FSRs also reduce noise, as market volatility tends
to decline in response to FSRs. These effects are particularly strong if the FSR
contains an optimistic assessment of the risks to financial stability, when FSRs are
found to move equity markets upwards in up to two thirds of the cases. Speeches
and interviews, in contrast, have only modest effects on stock market returns, and
cannot reduce market volatility.
However, the effects of FSRs and speeches crucially depend on market conditions
and other factors. Importantly, during the financial crisis, FSRs were moving financial
markets less than before the crisis, while speeches by governors did move financial
markets. Finally, the results indicate that financial stability communication of central
banks influences financial markets primarily via a coordination channel, i.e. it provides
relevant information which exerts a significant and persistent effect on markets.
The chapter shows that while the release schedule of FSRs is pre-scheduled, speeches
and interviews are a much more flexible communication tool. For instance, their
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number is clearly positively correlated with financial market volatility. Given their
flexibility, speeches and interviews by definition carry some surprise element. Since
it is mostly at the discretion of the central bank governors whether or not to make
statements about financial stability, the fact that a governor feels compelled to raise
financial stability issues in a speech or an interview can therefore be an important
additional news component. In contrast, due to the fixed release schedule for Financial
Stability Reports, financial markets expect statements about financial stability issues
on the release days. There might be surprising elements in their content, but the
mere fact that the FSR is released does not come as a surprise. This difference might
be at the heart of the different effects of the two instruments on market volatility.
The empirical findings of the chapter raise a number of policy issues. Communica-
tion on financial stability issues by a central bank has been and will likely be watched
even more closely in the future, and thus can potentially have an important influence
on financial markets. Does this imply that central banks should limit transparency
and their communication on certain financial stability issues, as argued by Cukierman
(2009), or does this make the case for enhanced transparency and accountability, as
argued by others? The findings of the chapter underline that communication by
monetary authorities on financial stability issues can indeed influence financial market
developments. Yet the findings also show that such communication entails risks as
they may unsettle markets. Hence central bank communication on financial stability
issues needs to be employed with utmost care, stressing the difficulty of designing a
successful communication strategy on these matters.
The chapter proceeds in Section 4.2 by outlining a more general motivation and
relating the current chapter to the existing literature. Section 4.3 explains the dataset
underlying the empirical analysis. In particular, it reports how the measures for
central bank communication have been extracted and quantified. It also shows
how the incidence and the content of the communications relate to the external
environment, and presents the event study methodology that we employ. Section
4.4 discusses the empirical results and implications, and presents robustness tests.
Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 Motivation and Literature
Given the important role of monetary authorities for financial stability, correspond-
ing central bank communication has always played an important role as a policy
instrument, for mainly three reasons. First, financial markets are inherently charac-
terized by asymmetric information and co-ordination problems, characteristics which
lie at the heart of the potential risks to financial stability. To address these problems,
transparency and communication are crucial. In particular, the central bank can be
much more effective in promoting financial stability if it has established a reputation
that its analysis and communication are of high quality. Accordingly, communication
also serves the role of making the central bank credible. Finally, any body that is
entrusted with financial stability tasks will need to be accountable, which calls for a
clear mandate, and a transparent conduct of the assigned task. Although Oosterloo
and Haan (2004) found that there is often a lack of accountability requirements for
central banks’ financial stability objectives, this is very likely to change in the future,
once financial stability has become a more important and explicit objective of central
banks.
As argued by Born et al. (2011b), these aspects of communication for financial
stability do therefore closely resemble the role of monetary policy-related communica-
tion, as established in the recent literature on central bank communication (see e.g.
Blinder et al., 2008; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007a; Gosselin et al., 2009). Also in
the monetary policy sphere, communication serves i) to make central banks credible
(mirroring the importance of financial stability communication for reputational pur-
poses), ii) to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy (just like good financial
stability communication can contribute to financial stability), and iii) to make central
banks accountable.
While being very similar along these three dimensions, there are also differences be-
tween monetary policy-related and financial stability-related communication. Central
banks have become much more transparent about their conduct of monetary policy
over the last decades, along with an increasing importance given to communication.
There is a debate on possible limits to central bank transparency (e.g. Mishkin, 2004;
Morris and Shin, 2002; Svensson, 2006), but the arguments are much more contentious
than in the case of financial stability-related communication. As demonstrated by
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Cukierman (2009), a clear case for limiting transparency can be made when the
central bank has private information about problems within segments of the financial
system. Release of such information may potentially be harmful, e.g. by triggering a
run on the financial system. This suggests that policy makers need to be even more
careful when designing their communication strategy with regard to their financial
stability objectives.
While the literature on central bank communication for monetary policy purposes
has been growing rapidly over the recent decade, the communication on financial
stability has received considerably less attention. Svensson (2003) argues that through
the publication of indicators of financial stability in FSRs, central banks can issue
early warnings to economic agents, thereby ideally preventing financial instability from
materializing, and thereby ensuring that financial stability concerns do not impose a
constraint on monetary policy. Cihak (2006, 2007) provides a systematic overview of
FSRs as the main communication channel that central banks use for this purpose.
He documents, on the one hand, that the reports have become considerably more
sophisticated over time, with substantial improvements in the underlying analytical
tools, and on the other hand, that there has been a large increase in the number of
central banks that publish FSRs. The frontrunners are the Bank of England, the
Swedish Riksbank, and Norges Bank (Norway’s central bank), all of which started
publication in 1996/1997. It is probably not a coincidence that these three central
banks are typically also listed in the group of the most transparent central banks
with regard to monetary policy issues (Dincer and Eichengreen, 2009; Eijffinger and
Geraats, 2006). In the meantime, around 50 central banks are now releasing FSRs.
A first empirical analysis of FSRs has been conducted by Oosterloo et al. (2007),
with the aim to understand who publishes FSRs, for what motives, and with what
content. Their results indicate that there are mainly three motives for publication,
namely to increase transparency, to contribute to financial stability, and to strengthen
co-operation between different authorities with financial stability tasks. They also
find that the occurrence of a systemic banking crisis in the past is positively related
to the likelihood that an FSR is published.
Even less work has been done with regard to the effects of financial stability-related
communication. To our knowledge, the only exception is Allen et al. (2004), who
114
4.3 Measuring Communication and Effects
conducted an external evaluation of the Riksbank’s work on financial stability issues,
and came up with a number of recommendations, such as making the objective of
the Riksbank’s FSRs explicit, providing the underlying data, or expanding the scope
of the FSR to, e.g., the insurance sector. Born et al. (2011b) primarily deal with
the conceptual issues of communication about macroprudential issues, making a case
for clarity, transparency and predictability, in particular outside crisis times, and
stressing the importance to manage expectations by clearly communicating what
macroprudential policy can and what it cannot do. While they also provide some
empirical evidence as to the role of central bank communication for financial markets,
the present chapter goes much deeper in analyzing how central bank communications
about financial stability are received in financial markets.
4.3 Measuring Communication and the Effects on
Financial Markets
This section introduces the dataset that we develop to study the effects of financial
stability-related communication. We start by explaining the choice of data frequency,
the sample of countries and time that we use, and the choice of the financial sector
stock market indices as our measure for financial markets. Subsequently, we describe
the process for identifying the relevant communications, how their content is coded,
and the econometric methodology.
4.3.1 Choice of Data Frequency, Data Sample and Relevant
Financial Markets
We are interested in the effects of financial stability-related communication on
financial markets. A first choice that is required relates to the frequency of the analysis.
Given the speed of reactions in financial markets, it is necessary to identify the timing
of the events as precisely as possible. Identification of a precise time stamp will allow
for an analysis in a very tight time window around the event, thereby ensuring that
the market reaction is not distorted by other news. We opted for a daily frequency
for two practical reasons. First, given the aim to provide a cross-country study
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over a relatively long horizon, financial market data are not consistently available
at higher frequencies. Second, the identification of the precise days of the release of
central bank communications has already not been trivial in many cases, whereas
the identification of the exact time of the release within a day is largely impossible.
While a higher frequency might have been desirable, it is important to note that the
daily frequency is commonly employed in the announcements effect literature - for
instance, two classic references with regard to the effect of monetary policy on stock
markets, Rigobon and Sack (2004) as well as Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) both use
daily data.
The sample of countries and the time period of the study have been determined on
the basis of the release of FSRs. We tried to identify the release dates of the FSRs
or relevant speeches or interviews by central bank governors for all those central
banks listed in Cihak (2006, 2007), i.e. for all central banks which release FSRs. We
succeeded to identify such release dates for 35 countries, 24 of which are advanced
economies according to the IMF’s country classification. Additionally, we included
the euro area, as well as the United States as the only country that does not release
an FSR, restricting ourselves to studying the effect of speeches and interviews in this
case. In total, our sample therefore covers 37 central banks (see Table ). Our sample
starts in 1996, i.e. the year when the first FSR was released by the Bank of England.
The data were extracted in October 2009, such that the sample ends on September
30, 2009.
As to the selection of a financial market that shall be subject of this study, we opted
for stock market indices relating to the financial sector, as we expect that empirical
effects of financial stability communication should be most easily detectable for this
sector. Such data are available from Datastream back to 1996, i.e. to the start of our
sample period, for all the countries in our sample. This choice is partially owed to
the large cross-country dimension and the need to get historical data for nearly one
and a half decades, which limited the availability of less traditional market measures,
such as implied volatilities or expected default frequencies (EDFs). While the link
of these measures to financial stability would have been relatively direct, we hope
that the financial sector stock indices (using MSCI indices) provide a measure that
is reasonably closely related to financial stability issues, too. All stock indices are
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expressed in local currency, given that we are interested in the response of national
financial markets to national communication. We will furthermore show that our
results are robust to using the overall stock market indices, rather than focusing on
the financial sector stocks alone.
4.3.2 Choice and Identification of Communication Events
At the core of this chapter is a measure of communication events that quantifies
the content of communication. We focus on the two most important channels of
communication about financial stability issues, namely FSRs and speeches and
interviews. FSRs are typically relatively comprehensive documents that discuss
various aspects of financial stability. They normally begin with an overall assessment
of financial stability in the respective country, often including an international
perspective. They usually contain an evaluation of current macroeconomic and
financial market developments and the assessment of risks to banks and systemically
relevant non-banking financial institutions. Cihak (2006) calls these sections the
“core” part of an FSR and differentiates them from the “non-core” part that includes
research articles on special issues, often written by outside experts. The weights
attributed to these two parts vary considerably across central banks. The spectrum
ranges from FSRs that only cover the core part (e.g. Norway) to FSRs which only
consist of articles covering a special topic (e.g. France). Most central banks lie
somewhere in between this range and are usually closer to the first type. Typically,
FSRs are published twice a year, i.e. are relatively infrequent communications.
A second important channel for central banks to communicate about financial
stability issues is to give speeches and interviews. By their very nature, these are
much more flexible than FSRs. Their timing can be chosen flexibly (Ehrmann and
Fratzscher (2007b, 2009) have shown this for monetary policy-related speeches), and
their content can be much more focused. Of course, this is also due to the fact that
they are much shorter than FSRs.
As we are interested in testing the response of financial markets to central bank
communication, we need to identify the release dates as a first step (recall that we
will conduct the analysis at a daily frequency, hence there is no need to identify
the timing within a given day - as long as the release takes place before markets
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close). As to FSRs, we carefully ensured a proper identification of their release dates,
mainly based on information provided on central banks’ websites and by central
bank press offices, and complemented with information from news reports about the
release of FSRs as recorded in Factiva, a database that contains newspaper articles
and newswire reports from 14,000 sources. As shown in Table , the dataset contains
information on 367 FSRs. The increasing tendency of central banks to publish FSRs
is reflected in this database. Starting from less than 10 FSRs per annum in the 1990s,
we could identify around 50 FSRs each year in the mid 2000s (note that the drop in
numbers in 2009 is entirely due to the fact that the sample ends in September, i.e.
covers only three quarters of the year). We tried to be as encompassing as possible
with respect to the country coverage. The early publishers are obviously represented
more frequently, with 20 and more reports, whereas “late movers” have far fewer
observations, down to 1 for the case of the Bank of Greece, which published its first
FSR in June 2009.2
To identify speeches and interviews is more difficult. Our objective is to extract all
relevant public statements that relate to financial stability. For tractability reasons,
we restricted our search to speeches by the central bank governor - even in cases where
a central bank has a member of its governing body that has an explicit assignment
regarding financial stability. We used Factiva and extracted all database entries
containing the name of the policy maker together with some keywords that appear
with certain regularity in the editorials of the FSRs.3 From all hits obtained, we
extracted those containing statements by the relevant policy maker with a reference
to financial stability issues. Since newswire reports typically record the precise time
stamp, we were in a position to allocate the speeches and interviews to the appropriate
trading days. Communications during weekends were allocated to the subsequent
Monday, communications in the evening - such as dinner speeches - to the subsequent
trading day. Furthermore, we very carefully chose only the first report about a
given statement, which typically originated from a newswire service. This choice has
2Although we could not identify the FSR release dates for Indonesia and the Philippines, we kept
them in the sample as we were able to identify a number of relevant speeches; note that dropping
these two countries from the sample does not affect our results in any substantive way.
3To be precise, we used the following search terms: “financial stability or systemic or systemically
or crisis or instability or instabilities or unstable or fragile or fragility or fragilities or banking
system or disruptive or imbalances or vulnerable or strains”.
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the advantage that the reporting is very timely, usually comes within minutes of
each statement, and that it is mostly descriptive without providing much analysis
or interpretation. To avoid double counting, we discarded all subsequent reports or
analysis of the same statement.
A number of issues are worth noting about this data extraction exercise. First,
the search was conducted only in English language. We might therefore not have
discovered all statements, if these were made and reported upon exclusively in other
languages. However, due to the fact that Factiva contains also newswire reports and
due to the extensive coverage of this topic by newswires, this issue should not be very
problematic.
Second, one can easily think of other keywords to use in the database search.
We have experimented with larger sets, e.g. including also the terms “volatile”,
“volatility”, “risk”, “adverse” or “pressures”. However, the additional hits typically
related to monetary policy communications (such as central bank governors talking
about inflationary “pressures”, “risks” to price stability, etc.), such that the resulting
dataset on financial stability communications was basically unaltered.
Third, the news sources might be selective in their reporting, thus possibly not
covering all relevant statements. However, given the sensitivity of the topic and the
importance that it has for financial markets, we are confident that the coverage is
close to complete. Furthermore, as we are interested in testing the market response
to communication, it makes sense to focus only on those statements that actually
reach market participants, and this is best achieved by looking at prominent newswire
services.
Fourth, our news sources may wrongly report or misinterpret a statement by
policy makers. Again, our objective is to assess communication from the perspective
of financial markets and therefore we analyze the information market participants
actually receive.
The resulting dataset contains 768 communication events. The breakdown by
year in Table reveals large time variations, with a massive increase in the number
of speeches in 1998, i.e. during the Asian and the Russian crisis, as well as during
the financial crisis of 2007-2010. This suggests that the occurrence of speeches and
interviews is responsive to the prevailing circumstances, which is in stark contrast to
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FSRs, which are typically released at pre-specified dates. Speeches and interviews do
therefore provide the central bank with a very flexible instrument to communicate
financial stability concerns, as their timing can be chosen flexibly.
Figure 4.1: Stock market volatility and the occurrence of speeches and interviews
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Notes: The figure shows the total number of speeches and interviews in all countries in a given
quarter on the right-hand axis (solid line), and the standard deviation of daily returns of the global
financial stock index in each quarter on the left-hand axis (dashed line).
Figure 4.1 provides a first stylized fact of the relation between financial markets
and the frequency of financial-stability related speeches and interviews, by plotting
their total number in all countries in a given quarter on the right-hand axis, and the
standard deviation of daily returns of the global financial stock index in each quarter
on the left-hand axis. The evolution of the two lines is extremely close, suggesting
that communication intensifies in times of financial market turbulence.
Given the low frequency nature of Figure 4.1, we provide a more formal test of the
higher frequency-relationship between volatility and the occurrence of speeches in
Table 4.2. The table calculates the cumulated stock market returns and the standard
deviation of daily stock market returns preceding the communication events, and
compares them to equivalent figures for non-event days (with tests for statistically
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significant differences given in the columns denoted by “Diff”). The left part of the
table contains the results for FSRs, the right part for speeches and interviews. The
different rows of the table relate to different time windows prior to the event, with
the first row measuring returns on the day prior to the event, the second row on the
2 days prior to the event, and so on. Standard deviations are calculated for time
windows exceeding 3 days. The non-event comparison figures are calculated for a
sample where no communication event has occurred in the preceding 60 business
days, and no communication event follows in the subsequent 60 business days. The
sample is furthermore restricted to non-overlapping observations.
The picture that resulted from Figure 4.1, i.e. that the occurrence of speeches and
interviews is closely related to stock market volatility, is confirmed in the very last
set of columns in Table 4.2: on days before an event (“event days”), volatility is
substantially higher than on non-event days, with the difference being statistically
significant at the 1% level throughout all time windows considered. This is in contrast
to the results for the FSRs, the publication schedules of which, as we know, are
pre-determined. Even though there are some time windows where the volatility is
statistically significantly different, the results are far less consistent. Furthermore, if
anything, market volatility tends to be lower on event days than on non-event days,
a pattern which is most likely driven by the fact that most central banks started to
release their FSRs in the early 2000s, when market volatility was comparatively low.
A similar comparison for the stock market returns also reveals that communication
by central banks intensifies during periods of stock market declines. Whereas the
average stock return prior to non-event days is typically positive, it is on average
negative prior to speeches and interviews, and differences are statistically significant
at the 1% level, regardless of the time window. No such pattern is visible for FSRs.
The main conclusion from this analysis therefore is that while the release schedule of
FSRs is pre-defined, speeches and interviews are a much more flexible communication
tool, and react to the current market environment.
In the light of these findings, one might ask whether speeches and their content are
predictable, such that financial markets might have priced in the effects already prior
to the communication event. In such a case, the subsequent event study methodology
would not be appropriate. However, it is important to note that while speeches and
121
Chapter 4
interviews occur more frequently in times of high market volatility and declining
stock markets, this does not imply any predictability of speeches or their content.
Probit models including measures of stock market misalignment, the market trend
and its volatility (either directly or their absolute values), do a poor job in predicting
the events: the 99th percentile of the predicted probabilities of the events is smaller
than 0.025.
4.3.3 Measuring the Content of Communications
Once we have identified the communication events, it is necessary to measure their
content in order to make the data amenable to econometric analysis. In other words,
we want to capture those dimensions and elements of FSRs and speeches/interviews
which are relevant for financial market participants and thus will be reflected in asset
prices.
A discussion of the various possibilities of achieving this is provided in Blinder et al.
(2008). The simplest option consists of assigning a dummy variable that is equal to
one on event days, and to zero otherwise. While easily done, this approach limits
the analysis severely, namely to a study whether communication affects volatility or
absolute returns. If we are interested in the effect of the content of communication, a
method for quantification of such content is required. The approach adopted in some
part of the literature on monetary policy-related communication, namely to read the
communications and code them on various scales, was not feasible for our purposes,
given the amount of text that needed to be quantified. We have therefore opted for
an automated approach for the current chapter.4
We employed the computerized textual-analysis software DICTION 5.0,5 which
searches text for different semantic features by using a corpus of several thousand
words, and scores the text along an optimism dimension. This dimension may be
4An alternative approach is used by Lucca and Trebbi (2009), where FOMC statements are cut
down into small segments of text, the semantic orientation of which is then calculated by checking
how often these text segments appear in conjunction with the words dovish or hawkish in a large
body of text.
5See http://www.dictionsoftware.com. Beyond the optimism score, Diction also generates
scores on certainty, activity, realism and commonality. As the latter are less immediately relevant
for financial stability purposes, and for brevity, we have restricted the analysis to optimism.
Results for activity are reported in the working paper version, Born et al. (2010).
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important as it provides agents with information about the current state and the
prospects of the financial system and underlying risks. The respective scores are
computed by adding the standardized word frequencies of various subcategories
labelled as optimistic, and by subtracting the corresponding frequencies of pessimistic
subcategories. In broad terms, optimism refers to “language endorsing some person,
group, concept or event, or highlighting their positive entailments”.
This software has been used extensively in communication sciences and in political
sciences, e.g. to analyze speeches of politicians (Hart, 2000; Hart and Jarvis, 1997),
but has also been applied in the context of central banks (Armesto et al., 2009;
Bligh and Hess, 2007). Furthermore, Davis et al. (2006) have used it to measure
the reaction of financial markets to earnings announcements, and find a significant
incremental market response to optimistic and pessimistic language usage in earnings
press releases.
There are a number of advantages of this approach over human coding of the text.
First, the software creates a coding that is more mechanical and thus objective, com-
pared to human coding which tends to be more judgmental. While some subjectivity
could arise due to the choice of the content of the dictionaries against which a text is
assessed, it is important to note that the corpus has been defined based on linguistic
theory and without an active participation by the authors of this chapter. Another
advantage is the replicability of the coding, which is in stark contrast to human
coding, and also allows more text to be added without distorting the scoring process.
Third, the automated approach allows a consistent coding of long passages of text,
and across a large number of communications. Human coding of long texts with
various points is rather difficult, as no part should in principle be given a larger weight
in the assessment. Given the breadth of FSRs, this issue is particularly severe in the
current application. At the same time, a drawback of the automated approach is that
it does not consider the context of the text, and thus cannot generate a “tailor-made”
coding for financial stability-related communication.
Based on this computerized textual-analysis software, we computed a score for each
individual speech or interview (note that, effectively, we are coding the content of
the related news reports, rather than the original source text), and for the overview
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part of each FSR.6 Subsequently, we transformed the resulting scores into a discrete
variable, which takes the value of −1 for the lowest third of the distribution, a value of
0 for the middle part of the distribution, and the value of +1 for the upper third of the
distribution. That is, a value of +1 denotes a relatively optimistic text, while a value
of −1 corresponds to a relatively pessimistic statement. The discretization of scores
is required for the subsequent analysis, where we are interested in the market effects
of optimistic vs. pessimistic communication, rather than the effect of an incremental
change in tone. This transformation was applied for the speeches as well as for the
FSRs. Note that we will test for robustness using a very different measurement
approach, which also attempts to capture the surprise component contained in the
respective communications, as well as (for the parts of the subsequent analysis where
a discretization is not required) using the raw optimism scores given by the software.
It is important to note that this implies a relative coding, i.e. a given communication
is scored in a comparative fashion against the other texts in the sample. However,
due to the large sample, both across countries and along the time dimension, our
communications cover periods of relative stability and tranquillity, as well as periods
of financial market crises or turbulence. Accordingly, the overall sample of text should
be relatively balanced, such that text which is coded with plus or minus one should
indeed represent a corresponding opinion. We denote the resulting indicators by
Ioptimism,FSRit and I
optimism,speech
it , respectively, where i denotes a given country, and t
stands for time. In the appendix, we provide a number of examples of speeches and
interviews, and how they were coded.
4.3.4 The Event Study Methodology
What are the effects of FSRs and speeches/interviews on financial markets? The
natural econometric approach to test our hypotheses of interest is the event study
methodology. We use this methodology because we are interested not only in the
6While this overview carries different names across central banks, e.g. editorial, introductory
chapter, executive summary, etc., it is rather similar in nature for all FSRs. As mentioned above,
the Financial Stability Review of the Bank of France is special in that it only consists of articles
covering a special topic. However, given the regular newswire reporting about the Editorial
written by the Bank of France Governor, we decided to compute the scores also for the French
reports.
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contemporaneous effect of financial stability statements, but we also want to know
how persistent the effect is over time. We can define the release of an FSR, or the
delivery of a speech or an interview as an event. The question we want to address
is whether the event affects stock markets in a causal fashion. For that purpose, it
is essential that we can compare the stock market evolution following the event to
the counterfactual, i.e. a predicted value that we believe would have occurred had
the event not happened. A crucial issue in any event study is therefore to find a
benchmark model to calculate expected returns, which in turn allows calculation
of excess returns.7 Most event studies look at the effect of events, such as earnings
announcements or stock splits, on individual stocks, and use some variant of a factor
model, such as the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model, or the Carhart (1997)
four-factor model, which extends the previous model by a momentum factor.
Given that we are interested in the evolution of national stock market indices
rather than of individual stocks, the book-to-market ratio and the size factor of the
Fama-French model are not applicable. Following Edmans et al. (2007) and Pojarliev
and Levich (2007), we start by defining normal returns as:
Rit = γ0i + γ1iRit−1 + γ2iRmt−1 + γ3iRmt + γ4iRmt+1
+ γ5iDt + γ6iTit−1 + γ7iSit−1 + γ8iMit−1 + εit , (4.1)
where Rit is the daily local currency return on the financial sector stock market index
for country i on day t, Rmt is the daily US dollar return on Datastream’s global
financial sector stock market index, and Dt denotes dummy variables for Monday
through Thursday. Tit−1 stands for the trend in stock markets over the 20 days prior
to the event, Sit−1 for the standard deviation of daily stock market returns over the
20 days prior to the event, and Mit−1 for the “misalignment” of stock indices on the
day preceding the event, measured as the percentage deviation of the stock indices
from their national average over the entire sample period.
The first 5 factors follow Edmans et al. (2007). The lagged index return controls
for possible first-order serial correlation. The global stock market index is meant to
capture the effects of international stock market integration, and since some indices
7For overviews of the event study literature see, e.g., MacKinlay (1997) or Kothari and Warner
(2007).
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might be lagging or leading the world index, Edmans et al. (2007) not only include
the contemporaneous global returns, but furthermore a lead and a lag. The last three
terms are owed to earlier event studies on exchange rates such as Pojarliev and Levich
(2007) or Fratzscher (2008). The trend factor attempts to allow for persistence in
stock market movements, and is therefore closely related to the momentum factor in
the Carhart four-factor model. The inclusion of the standard deviation is an attempt
to capture the effect of market volatility. Finally, the misalignment factor is based
on the idea that there might be booms or busts in stock markets, and that over a
sufficiently long sample, there could be some mean reversion (albeit possibly allowing
for a drift). We test for robustness to the exclusion of these last three terms, given
that they are derived from the exchange rate literature rather than the stock market
event studies, and find our results to be qualitatively unaltered.
Model (4.1) is estimated country by country, only including days that were neither
preceding nor preceded by communication events for 60 days (in each direction).
Based on the estimated parameters (denoted by hats), it is then possible to calculate
excess returns on event days as
ε̂it = Rit−
(
γ̂0i + γ̂1iRit−1 + γ̂2iRmt−1 + γ̂3iRmt + γ̂4iRmt+1
+ γ̂5iDt + γ̂6iTit−1 + γ̂7iSit−1 + γ̂8iMit−1
)
(4.2)
The hypothesis to be tested is whether communication leads to excess returns in the
expected direction, i.e. whether
ε̂it > 0 if Ioptimism,cit = 1 or ε̂it < 0 if I
optimism,c
it = −1 , (4.3)
where the superscript c stands for the two communication types, FSR and speeches
or interviews. A more complex approach is required if we want to calculate the
longer-term effects of communication beyond the event day. While we assume that
world markets are exogenous to a communication in an individual country also over
extended time windows, this is obviously not the case for the own lag, the recent
trend, standard deviation and misalignment: as of the second day, it is necessary to
calculate predicted returns for the preceding day, and to plug these into equation
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(4.2), thus yielding
ε̂it+k = Rit+k−
(
γ̂0i + γ̂1iR̂it+k−1 + γ̂2iRmt+k−1 + γ̂3iRmt+k + γ̂4iRmt+1+k
+ γ̂5iDt+k + γ̂6iT̂it+k−1 + γ̂7iŜit+k−1 + γ̂8iM̂it+k−1
)
. (4.4)
Note that compared to equation (4.2), Rit−1, Tit−1, Sit−1 and Mit−1 have all been
replaced by their predicted value in the absence of a communication event. For
k = 0, the two coincide, whereas for all days k > 0, it is important to calculate the
appropriate predicted values. Tests for the effects of communication over longer time
horizons with a time window of K days then amount to asking whether
K∑
k=0
ε̂it+k > 0 if Ioptimism,cit = 1 or
K∑
k=0
ε̂it+k < 0 if Ioptimism,cit = −1 . (4.5)
Following common practice in the event study literature, we employ two types of
tests for the effects of communications (both described in detail in MacKinlay, 1997).
First, we apply a non-parametric sign test to study whether the above conditions
hold in more than 50% of all cases. The underlying idea is that by construction -
if the factor model is correct - excess returns and cumulated excess returns are on
average zero, and that it is equally probable that they are positive or negative. If
the events systematically move stock markets in the expected direction, we should
find that the excess returns are non-zero, and of the expected sign, in significantly
more than 50% of cases. For the second (parametric) test, we compute the average
size of the (cumulated) excess returns and test the null hypothesis that they are zero
against the alternative.
In a similar vein, to test whether communications reduce noise, i.e. lower stock
market volatility, we furthermore test whether
σεˆi,t/t+k < σεˆi,t−1/t−1−k if D
c
it = 1 , (4.6)
with σεˆi,t/t+k the standard deviation of daily excess returns in country i from time t
to t+ k , σεˆi,t−1/t−1−k their standard deviation over the k days prior to the event, and
Dcit = 1 a dummy variable that is equal to one on the days when a communication
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of type c is released in country i.8 Also here, we apply the non-parametric sign test
whether the above conditions hold in more than 50% of all cases and the test whether
the difference of the two standard deviations is equal to zero.
4.4 The Effects of Financial Stability-Related
Communication
This section starts by providing some stylized facts of how the content of FSRs and
speeches evolved over time - and to what extent it managed to be forward-looking and
identify risks and vulnerabilities rather than reflect market developments (Section
4.4.1). It then proceeds by identifying and testing for the effects of communication on
financial markets (Section 4.4.2) and presents a number of sample splits and robustness
tests that also sheds further light on the channels trough which communication affects
markets (Section 4.4.3).
4.4.1 Stylized Facts About Timing and Content of
Communication
How did the content of FSRs and speeches evolve over time and across countries?
And to what extent was such communication forward-looking rather than reflecting
market developments? Figure 4.2 provides an overview of how the optimism expressed
in FSRs (upper panel) as well as speeches and interviews (lower panel) has evolved
over time. It plots, for each year, the average and median optimism for the respective
communication events, as well as the 25th and the 75th percentiles. Note that the
figure for FSRs starts only in 1999, given that in the years before, there were too few
FSRs being published to provide a meaningful picture.
A number of interesting issues emerge from this figure. Most importantly, it is
striking that the tone of FSRs had continuously become more optimistic after 2000,
reaching a peak in early 2006. This suggests that FSRs contain commentaries on
8Excluding the daily excess returns on day t from calculating the post-event standard deviations
does not alter our results. This implies that the results are not driven by the initial market
reaction on the day of the announcement.
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Figure 4.2: Evolution of optimism over time
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Notes: The figure plots the average, median, and 25th and 75th percentiles of the optimism scores
for FSRs (upper panel) and speeches and interviews (lower panel) in any given year.
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the current market environment, but that they are also forward-looking, with some
anticipation of the 2007-2010 crisis. However, there is a relatively large heterogeneity
across countries, as shown by the breadth of the scores encompassed by the 25th and
the 75th percentiles. This is especially the case for speeches and interviews, which do
not seem to follow any obvious pattern over time.9
Table 4.3 looks further into the question to what extent the content of communi-
cations reflects previous financial market developments, and reports corresponding
test results. Separately for FSRs and speeches and interviews, it reports the average
return and standard deviation of financial sector stock indices over the usual time
windows (from one day to 60 days prior to the event), separately for communications
coded as −1, 0 and +1 on the optimism scale in columns (1), (2) and (3), respectively.
The statistical significance of a test for equality is provided for each pair, i.e. (1) vs.
(2), (1) vs. (3), and (2) vs. (3).
The results show that the content of FSRs reflects to some extent prior financial
market developments. There is a monotonic relation between the tone of FSRs and
the preceding stock market returns: the more optimistic the FSR, the larger have
been the preceding returns. However, these differences are typically not statistically
significant. At the same time, pessimistic FSRs (i.e. those coded with −1) have, on
average, been preceded by considerably larger stock market volatility than neutral
or positive FSRs, regardless of the length of the time window, with the differences
being highly statistically significant.
Interestingly, no such relations are identifiable for speeches and interviews: there
is not a single case where stock market volatility or returns would be related to the
content of speeches in a statistically significant manner. If anything, it seems to be
the case that there is quite some “leaning against the wind”: the returns preceding
optimistic speeches are consistently lower than the returns preceding pessimistic ones,
suggesting that a positive picture is given especially in cases of bad stock market
performance.
9Note that the raw scores cannot be read as direct indications of optimism, as it is not the case
that scores below 50 would represent pessimistic text. The interpretation of the scores should be
made relative to a large number of texts within the same category.
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4.4.2 Effects of FSRs and Speeches/Interviews
We now turn to the question to what extent central bank communication was
affecting financial markets. A first test is provided in Figure 4.3, which compares the
actual evolution of stock markets following communication events to the predicted
evolution on the basis of the benchmark model (4.1). The upper panel reports the
results for the FSRs, the lower panel those for speeches and interviews. The solid line
plots the average actual cumulated returns over 60 days following the communication
events. The dashed line, in contrast, shows the expected cumulated returns that
would result from the benchmark model in the absence of a communication event. To
combine pessimistic as well as optimistic communications in one chart, the cumulated
returns are multiplied by −1 for pessimistic communications, whereas they are left
unchanged for optimistic communications. Accordingly, we would expect the actual
returns to lie above the predicted returns after statements if the markets follow the
point of view expressed by the central bank (i.e. we observe negative excess returns
in response to pessimistic statements, and positive ones in the case of optimistic
communications).
The figure provides a compelling picture about the effects of central bank com-
munication. The upper panel for FSRs shows that markets move in the direction
of the central bank view, since the actual returns are substantially larger than the
predicted returns. Moreover, the effect is quite sizeable economically: for several
time windows, FSR releases move equity markets on average by more than 1% in the
direction indicated by the FSRs.
Interestingly, expected cumulated returns in this case are relatively close to zero,
suggesting the predictions of the benchmark model are close to those of a random
walk model. In other words, due to the fact that the release pattern of FSRs is not
systematically related to the previous stock market performance, the benchmark
model has a hard time in predicting the subsequent returns.
Looking at the lower panel of Figure 4.3, the findings are remarkably different
for speeches and interviews. As we have seen above, speeches and interviews typi-
cally follow stock market declines, and the model clearly predicts further declines
subsequently (the dashed line in the figure). As a matter of fact, actual returns do
on average decline after a speech or an interview; however, comparing the expected
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Figure 4.3: Cumulated abnormal returns after communication events
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Notes: The figure compares the actual evolution of cumulated stock market returns (in %) following
communication events to the predicted evolution on the basis of the benchmark model (1). The
cumulated abnormal returns are therefore given by the area between the two graphs. The upper
panel reports the results for the FSRs, the lower panel those for speeches and interviews. The
solid line plots the average actual cumulated returns starting from day 1 after the communication
event and up to day 60. The dashed line shows the expected cumulated returns that would result
from the benchmark model in the absence of a communication event. The cumulated returns are
multiplied by -1 for pessimistic communications, whereas they are left unchanged for optimistic
communications.
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with the actual evolution, it is also apparent that the stock markets decline by
less than expected in the presence of central bank communications. The difference
between predicted and actual cumulated returns is substantially smaller than for
FSRs, however.
The figure also suggests that central bank communications are potentially affecting
financial markets even at very long horizons, given that the gap between predicted
and actual cumulated returns is present for the entire horizon of time windows we
look at, and begins to narrow only towards the end of the horizon.
The formal test results for the effects of central bank communication are provided
in Tables 4 and 5, covering FSRs and speeches and interviews, respectively. The
first set of results relates to equation (4.5), i.e. tests whether optimistic statements
yield positive excess returns, and pessimistic ones lead to negative excess returns.
The first column shows the share of cases in which the condition was met, as well
as the results of the non-parametric sign test. Shares above 0.5 would suggest that
stock markets move in the direction of the content of communications. The statistical
significance is assessed by stars (*** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10% significance) -
whereas numbers that are significantly smaller than 0.5 would be characterized by
apostrophes (''' for 1%, '' for 5%, and ' for 10% significance).
There is clear evidence that the views represented in FSRs get reflected in financial
markets, in significantly more than 50% of all cases. In terms of magnitudes, which
are reported in the second column, FSRs generate excess returns on the day of the
release of 0.27% on average, and cumulated excess returns up to 1.6% in the longer
run, with the largest effects found after 25 to 50 trading days, i.e. after 5 to 10 weeks.
Such an effect is indeed sizeable and economically meaningful, in particular when
considering that FSRs are generally released twice a year per country.
How are these effects generated? Table 4.4 also provides a breakdown according to
the type of the FSR, and reveals that in particular optimistic FSRs affect financial
markets. They typically generate positive excess returns, which are furthermore large
in magnitude, thus leading to statistically significant estimates. The cumulated excess
returns are largest after 55 days, amounting to more than 3%. This suggests that
an optimistic assessment provided in FSRs leads to an improvement in stock market
sentiment over a fairly long horizon, in a way that is not matched by pessimistic
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FSRs leading to a deterioration in sentiment.
Table 4.4 also provides the results for tests whether the release of FSRs lowers
stock market volatility, i.e. tests whether condition (4.6) holds, again using both the
non-parametric sign test and the parametric test. There is compelling evidence that
FSRs do indeed lead to a significant reduction in market volatility.
Moving on to the effect of speeches as reported in Table 4.5, a rather different
picture emerges. The effect on returns is less systematic than for FSRs. With some
delay, optimistic speeches generate positive excess returns. The effect for pessimistic
speeches on returns is, on average, non-existent, however. Of course, this is not
to say that no speech would ever exert reactions on financial markets - rather, on
average, there seems to be very little effect. At the same time, speeches do not lower
stock market volatility - if anything, there is some tendency, especially of optimistic
speeches, to somewhat increase it. This suggests that financial stability-related
speeches are less able to reduce noise.
To summarize, these findings suggest, first, that communication about financial
stability has the potential to affect financial markets. FSRs exert very different effects
than speeches and interviews: The views expressed in FSRs get reflected in stock
market returns, and in a long-lasting fashion, in particular if the FSR contains an
optimistic assessment of the risks to financial stability. FSRs also manage to reduce
market volatility somewhat. Speeches and interviews, in contrast, only modestly affect
market directions, and do leave market volatility mainly unaffected. An assessment
of the effects of these tools therefore needs to clearly distinguish between the two.
4.4.3 Sample Splits and Robustness
We have subjected our benchmark results to a number of sample splits and robust-
ness tests, which we will describe now. There are basically four dimensions to these
tests. The first analyzes whether the breadth of the underlying panel dataset masks
important heterogeneity, and we test for robustness by introducing various sample
splits. The second is concerned with speeches and interviews in particular, and tests
whether their effects are different if they are clustered. Third, we test whether our
focus on financial stocks is important, or whether the results are robust to using
the entire stock market indices. Fourth, we ask whether the split into optimistic
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and pessimistic content determines our results by providing an alternative way of
identifying the content of communication, and by using the raw scores as generated
by Diction. All results are provided in Tables 4.6 and 4.7, with FSRs being covered
in Table 4.6, and speeches and interviews in Table 4.7. Given the large number of
tests, we only show results for a time window of 25 business days.
The first set of results relates to various sample splits. Given the large number of
countries and the long time sample, it might be the case that there is substantial
heterogeneity across countries or over time that we do not capture in the full sample.
The first such split addresses possible cross-country heterogeneity, by re-running the
estimation separately for all advanced and all emerging economies (following the
IMF’s country classification). Results are overall robust. The interesting insight,
though, is that there is a reduction in volatility following FSRs by central banks
in advanced countries, whereas the main effects on returns originate in emerging
countries.
Also the second split along the time dimension reveals interesting patterns. Separate
tests for the period prior to the financial crisis 2007-2010 (defining the starting date
in September 2007, i.e. with Northern Rock; defining the start of the crisis with
Lehman does not affect our results) and the time of the crisis shows that FSRs have
exerted no systematic effect on stock markets during the crisis, whereas the effects of
speeches and interviews are precisely driven by the period of the crisis, underlining
that speeches and interviews may be much more influential during periods of financial
stress.
The third sample split intends to identify whether the role of the central bank in
financial supervision matters, by testing once for the effects of communication by
central banks that do have a formal role in financial supervision, and once for those
central banks without such a task. The classification is based on the CBFA index
developed in Masciandaro and Quintyn (2009).10 This differentiation does not seem
to play an important role, given that the results are robust, and no major differences
overall between the two groups emerge.
10This index takes the value 1 if the central bank is not assigned the main responsibility for banking
supervision; 2 if the central bank has the main (or sole) responsibility for banking supervision; 3
if the central bank has furthermore responsibility for either insurances or the securities markets;
4 if the central bank has responsibility in all three sectors. We allocate central banks to the
group with supervisory functions if their index value is larger than one.
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Table 4.7 shows furthermore whether there are differences if speeches and interviews
are clustered, i.e. the central bank governor might give a sequence of speeches or
interviews in a relatively short time window. Such a sequence might be inherently
different from one isolated event. We define a communication event to be part of a
cluster if other speeches or interviews occur within 60 days after the event, or have
occurred within 60 days before the event. As a matter of fact, these types exert
very different effects. Speeches that are part of a cluster are not influencing the
market view, and tend to increase market volatility. This is in sharp contrast to
the stand-alone speeches, which create news, i.e. move markets along with the views
expressed, and tend to do so largely without changing volatility.
The rows of section C in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present additional robustness tests.
First, replacing the financial sector stock indices with the broad national stock market
index, we can test whether our results apply more broadly, or are confined to the
financial sector. The results are remarkably robust. Furthermore, results are also
not sensitive to the precise way we had split the communications into optimistic
and pessimistic content. To test for this, we take two routes: First, by defining
an alternative approach to discretizing the codes that attempts to control for the
expected component contained in the communication, and to construct a surprise
measure instead. We do so by means of the following auxiliary regression:
Coptimism,cit = α0i + α1q + α2Tit−1 + α3Sit−1 + α4Mit−1 + µit , (4.7)
where Coptimism,cit denotes the raw Diction coding of a given communication of type c
along the optimism dimension, and α0i and α1q are country fixed effects and time
fixed effects for each quarter of the sample, respectively. The country fixed effects
allow for the possibility that there is a different style in the reporting, thus leading to
a different mean coding for each country. Such differences should be well known to
observers, and therefore not be a surprise. The time fixed effects control for a common
evolution across countries, given that often developments in financial markets are
internationally determined. Such common time patterns should also not come as a
surprise to financial markets. The last three explanatory factors are as described in
benchmark model (4.1), i.e. they control for the trend, for stock market volatility,
and for a possible stock market misalignment. We retrieve the residuals µ̂it from
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these regressions, and define a communication to be optimistic if µ̂it is above the
66th percentile in the distribution, as pessimistic if it is below the 33rd percentile,
and as neutral otherwise. Even though this classification is very different from the
original, unconditional, one, it turns out that the results are remarkably robust. Our
second test for the role of our discretization method reverts to the original, raw, scores
generated by Diction. Higher scores denote more optimistic communications, such
that we would expect stock returns to increase correspondingly. This is indeed what
we find, consistently with our earlier results: both FSRs and speeches exert some
effects, with those of FSRs being substantially larger than those of speeches. With
this measure, we are of course not able to separate out optimistic and pessimistic
communications, such that we are neither able to conduct the non-parametric test, nor
to fill the tables where we break down the results by the content of the communication.
The final point we address here is the question through which channel communi-
cation affects financial markets. Is it that communication affects markets because
it contains relevant information, and thus coordinates markets and functions as a
focal point - akin to what is known as a coordination channel (e.g. Fratzscher, 2008;
Sarno and Taylor, 2001)? Or is it that market participants believe that financial
stability communication has a bearing on monetary policy decisions by central banks
- or what is referred to as a signalling channel? The evidence discussed so far, in
particular the persistence of the effects of communication, strongly points towards the
coordination channel being at work (see Sarno and Taylor, 2001). Yet a more direct
test of these two channels is to ask whether financial market participants perceive that
financial stability communication by central banks could be followed by monetary
policy decisions, which should imply that market interest rates are reactive to such
communications. As can be seen in the bottom panels of Tables 6 and 7, it is clear
that there is no systematic reaction of short (3-month) or long (5 to 10 year) interest
rates. Thus, this is further evidence suggesting that there is very little role for a
signalling channel, but that it is rather the coordination channel that is at work.
To summarize, the findings suggest that the effects of communication are not
universal. Market conditions seem to matter, with different effects during the financial
crisis. The origin of the communication also is important, with central banks in
advanced economies exerting different effects from those in emerging economies. A
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sequence of speeches and interviews seems to be affecting stock markets less than an
isolated communication by the central bank governor. But importantly, speeches and
interviews were moving stock returns during the crisis, while they were not in the
pre-crisis period. Finally, the evidence here further supports the conclusion that it
is mainly a coordination channel that is at work - i.e. that communication provides
relevant information about financial stability itself, rather than giving a signal about
monetary policy, thereby affecting financial markets.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has provided an empirical assessment of the effects of central bank
communication about financial stability, a topic that has remained almost entirely
unexplored in the literature to date. The chapter has studied the impact of central
bank statements on financial markets, arguably one of the most important target
groups of this type of communication. In more detail, it has constructed a unique
dataset covering over 1000 communication events (a third of which being FSRs,
and two thirds being speeches and interviews by central bank governors) by 37
central banks over a time period from 1996 to 2009, i.e. spanning nearly one and
a half decades, and analyzed the reaction of financial sector stocks to these events.
The emphasis of the chapter has been to identify whether financial stability-related
communication “creates news” and/or “reduces noise”.
The chapter’s findings suggest that communication about financial stability has
important repercussions on financial sector stock prices. However, there are clear
differences between FSRs on the one hand and speeches and interviews on the other.
FSRs clearly create news in the sense that the views expressed in FSRs get reflected
in stock market returns. These effects are furthermore long-lasting. They also reduce
noise, as market volatility tends to decline in response to FSRs. These effects are
particularly strong if FSRs contain optimistic assessments of the risks to financial
stability. Speeches and interviews, in contrast, do on average move financial markets
far less. In particular, while having only modest effects on stock market returns, they
do not reduce market volatility. However, speeches and interviews were affecting
market returns significantly more during the 2007-10 global financial crisis, indicating
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the potential importance of this communication tool during periods of financial stress.
The mechanism by which the central bank affects financial markets seems to be
related to the notion of a co-ordination channel, whereby communication by the
central bank works as a co-ordination device, thereby reducing heterogeneity in
expectations and information, and thus inducing asset prices to more closely reflect
the underlying fundamentals (Sarno and Taylor, 2001). This conclusion is based on
the finding that statements have longer-lasting effects, which seems to imply that
they have the potential to change the dynamics in financial markets, and based on
the result that central bank communication about financial stability does not affect
market interest rates in a systematic fashion.
The chapter has also demonstrated how flexibly speeches and interviews can be
used as a communication tool, with a higher frequency in times of heightened financial
market volatility. In contrast to FSRs with their pre-defined release schedules, the
mere occurrence of a speech or an interview can constitute news to financial markets
in itself, a fundamental difference that might explain why the two communication
channels have so different effects on market volatility. The findings of the chapter
therefore underline that communication by monetary authorities on financial stability
issues can influence financial market developments, but that it needs to be employed
with utmost care, stressing the difficulty of designing a successful communication
strategy on financial stability.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
Examples of speeches/interviews and their coding
05 March 1996: “Brazil Central Bk President Denies Bank Sector Insta-
bility”
“Central bank President Gustavo Loyola Tuesday denied rumors of instability in
Brazil’s banking sector and said increasing bank investigations and encouragement
for bank mergers have quelched any possibility of a crisis [. . .]” Source: Dow Jones
International News
Coded: Optimism =1
27 October 1997: “China c.banker sees more small bank bankruptcies..”
“Some smaller Chinese banks and credit cooperatives could sink into bankruptcy
due to bad loans, although a banking crisis was unlikely, central bank governor Dai
Xianglong has said.” Source: Reuters News
Coded: Optimism =-1
28 January 1998: “U.K. BOE’s George Confident Asia Contagion Can
Be Avoided”
“Governor of the Bank of England Eddie George said Wednesday he was ’reasonably
confident’ wider financial contagion from the Asia crisis could be avoided.” Source:
Dow Jones International News
Coded: Optimism =1
09 November 2000: “Korea markets unstable as worries linger-c.bank.”
“South Korea’s financial markets continue to show signs of instability as the second
phase of financial restructuring progresses, the governor of the central Bank of Korea
said on Thursday.” Source: Reuters News
Coded: Optimism =-1
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19 September 2002: “Mboweni Confident of Financial Stability.”
“SA’s financial regulators are highly optimistic about the stability of the country’s
financial system, Tito Mboweni, the SA Reserve Bank governor, said yesterday [. . .]”
Source: All Africa
Coded: Optimism =1
10 April 2003: “Fukui says should consider preemptive move on banks.”
“Bank of Japan Governor Toshihiko Fukui said on Thursday that Japan should con-
sider ways to provide ailing banks with capital as a preemptive measure before any
financial crisis occurred.” Source: Reuters News
Coded: Optimism =0
24 September 2003: “Argentina’s Central Bank Downplays Big Bank Re-
structuring”
“Plans to restructure the Argentine financial sector in the wake of last year’s financial
crisis do not entail a widespread shakeup of the country’s banks, top Argentine
Central Bank officials said Tuesday.” Source: Dow Jones International News
Coded: Optimism =0
17 March 2004: “Greenspan says U.S. banking system healthy.”
“Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan said on Wednesday the U.S. banking
system weathered the 2001 recession well, and was in good shape to help finance the
economic recovery.” Source: Reuters News
Coded: Optimism =1
11 September 2007: “CREDIT WRAPUP 5-Trichet sure major banks
sound, Bernanke silent”
“Europe’s banks are sound despite the confidence blow from a U.S. subprime crisis,
said the head of the European Central Bank on Tuesday, while the [. . .]” Source: Dow
Jones International News
Coded: Optimism =1
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05 February 2008: “ECB’s Noyer: Global Fincl System In Crisis For More
Than A Year”
“The global financial system has been in a crisis situation for over a year, and the
crisis isn’t over, Bank of France Governor Christian Noyer said Tuesday.” Source:
Dow Jones International News
Coded: Optimism =-1
24 September 2008: “Swedish c.bank head repeats financial system sta-
ble”
“Swedish Riksbank Governor Stefan Ingves said on Wednesday Sweden was now feeling
the effects of the recent market turmoil more strongly, but repeated reassurances that
the financial system was stable.” Source: Reuters News
Coded: Optimism =1
03 October 2008: “Bernanke: Fed to do all it can to combat crisis”
“Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke said on Friday the U.S. central bank will do
whatever it can to combat the credit crisis and help the economy.” Source: Reuters
News
Coded: Optimism =0
06 October 2008: “Turkish banks face narrower credit channels-c.bank”
“Central Bank Governor Durmus Yilmaz said on Monday Turkish banks were facing
narrower credit channels due to the global credit crisis, but said they faced no difficulty
in renewing external loans.” Source: Reuters News
Coded: Optimism =0
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics for FSRs and speeches
FSRs Speeches & Interviews
By country Argentina 12 13
Australia 11 25
Austria 17 11
Belgium 7 3
Brazil 14 9
Canada 14 22
Chile 11 15
China 5 28
Czech Republic 5 11
Denmark 11 2
Euro Area 10 48
Finland 23 12
France 13 31
Germany 5 58
Greece 1 26
Hong Kong 12 44
Hungary 17 17
Indonesia 6
Ireland 4 2
Israel 6 7
Japan 8 32
Netherlands 8 17
New Zealand 10 18
Norway 20 3
Philippines 50
Poland 10 13
Portugal 5 8
Singapore 7 1
South Africa 11 20
South Korea 9 14
Spain 14 10
Sri Lanka 3 2
Sweden 24 18
Switzerland 7 16
Turkey 8 22
United Kingdom 25 23
United States 111
By year 1996 1 14
1997 3 39
1998 5 118
1999 7 56
2000 10 37
2001 14 17
2002 18 33
2003 25 32
2004 40 26
2005 53 17
2006 51 17
2007 54 68
2008 51 179
2009 35 115
Overall 367 768
 
Notes: The table shows the number of FSRs and speeches that are contained in the database, by
country and by year.
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Table 4.2: Stock market conditions and the occurrence of communications
#  d a y s
B e n c h -
m a r k
E v e n t  
d a y s D i f f
B e n c h -
m a r k
E v e n t  
d a y s D i f f
B e n c h -
m a r k
E v e n t  
d a y s D i f f
B e n c h -
m a r k
E v e n t  
d a y s D i f f
1 0 . 0 4 6 - 0 . 1 1 3 - - - - - - 0 . 0 4 6 - 0 . 1 3 5 * * - - - - - -
2 0 . 1 1 0 - 0 . 0 6 9 - - - - - - 0 . 1 1 0 - 0 . 2 7 2 * * * - - - - - -
3 0 . 1 7 3 - 0 . 0 8 7 - - - - - - 0 . 1 7 3 - 0 . 5 2 2 * * * - - - - - -
4 0 . 1 9 1 - 0 . 0 2 8 4 . 8 2 3 4 . 2 1 1 * * 0 . 1 9 1 - 0 . 6 2 8 * * * 4 . 8 2 3 7 . 8 2 0 * * *
5 0 . 1 6 1 - 0 . 0 0 8 4 . 9 0 5 4 . 3 6 1 * * 0 . 1 6 1 - 0 . 7 9 7 * * * 4 . 9 0 5 7 . 8 4 8 * * *
1 0 0 . 3 5 4 - 0 . 2 6 0 * 5 . 1 2 5 4 . 6 7 6 * 0 . 3 5 4 - 1 . 4 0 0 * * * 5 . 1 2 5 7 . 7 8 3 * * *
1 5 0 . 8 0 0 - 0 . 1 4 8 * * 5 . 3 0 8 4 . 8 6 7 * * 0 . 8 0 0 - 1 . 4 7 6 * * * 5 . 3 0 8 7 . 7 8 0 * * *
2 0 0 . 9 4 9 0 . 1 8 7 5 . 3 0 9 4 . 9 8 1 0 . 9 4 9 - 2 . 2 3 5 * * * 5 . 3 0 9 7 . 7 6 6 * * *
2 5 1 . 3 1 3 0 . 5 3 8 5 . 3 6 9 5 . 0 2 3 * 1 . 3 1 3 - 2 . 4 5 8 * * * 5 . 3 6 9 7 . 8 0 8 * * *
3 0 1 . 3 9 4 1 . 2 7 2 5 . 4 8 4 5 . 1 1 1 * 1 . 3 9 4 - 2 . 9 5 7 * * * 5 . 4 8 4 7 . 8 1 1 * * *
3 5 1 . 7 4 2 1 . 8 2 1 5 . 5 0 3 5 . 2 1 7 1 . 7 4 2 - 2 . 9 6 7 * * * 5 . 5 0 3 7 . 8 2 6 * * *
4 0 2 . 0 7 1 2 . 2 3 1 5 . 4 7 4 5 . 2 9 1 2 . 0 7 1 - 2 . 9 7 2 * * * 5 . 4 7 4 7 . 8 0 3 * * *
4 5 2 . 5 1 0 2 . 3 2 9 5 . 6 8 2 5 . 3 5 9 2 . 5 1 0 - 3 . 2 2 4 * * * 5 . 6 8 2 7 . 7 5 9 * * *
5 0 2 . 7 6 1 2 . 7 3 2 5 . 5 4 7 5 . 3 8 3 2 . 7 6 1 - 3 . 4 8 2 * * * 5 . 5 4 7 7 . 7 5 7 * * *
5 5 2 . 4 2 6 2 . 8 5 4 5 . 6 8 2 5 . 3 9 4 2 . 4 2 6 - 3 . 8 0 1 * * * 5 . 6 8 2 7 . 7 3 3 * * *
6 0 3 . 0 7 3 3 . 4 0 9 5 . 6 0 0 5 . 4 0 8 3 . 0 7 3 - 3 . 7 0 4 * * * 5 . 6 0 0 7 . 7 4 4 * * *
F i n a n c i a l  S t a b i l i t y  R e p o r t s S p e e c h e s  &  I n t e r v i e w s
R e t u r n s S t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n R e t u r n s S t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n
 
Notes: The table shows cumulated stock market returns and the standard deviation of daily stock market returns preceding the
communication events (in columns “Event days”) and for non-event days (in columns “Benchmark”). Results of mean comparison tests
are given in the columns denoted by “Diff”. The different rows of the table relate to different time windows prior to the event, starting
from a time window of 1 business day to a time window of 60 business days. Standard deviations are only calculated for time windows
exceeding 3 business days. The non-event comparison figures are calculated for a sample where no communication event has occurred in
the preceding 60 business days, and no communication event follows in the subsequent 60 business days. The sample is furthermore
restricted to non-overlapping observations. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4.3: Stock market conditions and the content of communications
# days
(1)      
'-1'
(2)      
'0'
(3)      
'1'
(1) 
vs 
(2)
(1) 
vs 
(3) 
(2) 
vs 
(3)
(1)      
'-1'
(2)      
'0'
(3)      
'1'
(1) 
vs 
(2)
(1) 
vs 
(3) 
(2) 
vs 
(3)
(1)      
'-1'
(2)      
'0'
(3)      
'1'
(1) 
vs 
(2)
(1) 
vs 
(3) 
(2) 
vs 
(3)
(1)      
'-1'
(2)      
'0'
(3)      
'1'
(1) 
vs 
(2)
(1) 
vs 
(3) 
(2) 
vs 
(3)
1 -0.343 -0.208 0.186 ** ** -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.112 -0.078 -0.212 -- -- -- -- -- --
2 -0.225 -0.222 0.215 -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.248 -0.134 -0.428 -- -- -- -- -- --
3 -0.186 -0.301 0.203 -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.443 -0.287 -0.821 -- -- -- -- -- --
4 -0.157 -0.095 0.151 4.975 3.902 3.806 ** ** -0.612 -0.473 -0.794 8.305 7.714 7.475
5 -0.022 -0.143 0.132 5.145 4.005 3.985 ** ** -0.703 -0.541 -1.130 8.268 7.783 7.524
10 -0.948 -0.038 0.156 5.493 4.232 4.352 ** ** -1.448 -0.988 -1.751 7.753 7.956 7.643
15 -0.765 -0.408 0.655 5.809 4.284 4.559 *** ** -1.245 -1.059 -2.091 7.774 8.035 7.539
20 -0.744 0.007 1.199 * 5.916 4.413 4.666 *** ** -2.240 -1.645 -2.799 7.773 8.092 7.445
25 -0.449 0.377 1.584 6.014 4.393 4.714 *** ** -1.759 -2.428 -3.131 7.783 8.123 7.529
30 0.246 1.264 2.210 6.157 4.479 4.755 *** *** -2.613 -2.451 -3.760 7.755 8.145 7.540
35 1.349 1.808 2.261 6.356 4.554 4.805 *** *** -2.364 -2.837 -3.648 7.755 8.171 7.559
40 1.235 2.099 3.258 6.478 4.603 4.861 *** *** -2.136 -2.504 -4.194 7.720 8.161 7.534
45 1.239 2.142 3.493 6.572 4.665 4.910 *** *** -2.425 -2.791 -4.376 7.700 8.106 7.478
50 0.928 2.914 4.195 6.602 4.723 4.896 *** *** -2.797 -3.081 -4.502 7.736 8.072 7.471
55 1.248 2.933 4.237 6.643 4.721 4.892 *** *** -3.197 -3.427 -4.723 7.682 8.064 7.461
60 2.137 2.897 5.043 6.654 4.751 4.896 *** *** -2.755 -3.438 -4.842 7.701 8.062 7.476
Speeches & InterviewsFinancial Stability Reports
Returns Standard deviation Returns Standard deviation
 
Notes: The table shows cumulated stock market returns and the standard deviation of daily stock market returns preceding pessimistic
(columns (1)), neutral (columns (2)) and optimistic communications (columns (3)). Results of tests for statistically significant differences
are given in the columns (1) vs (2), (1) vs (3) and (2) vs (3). The different rows of the table relate to different time windows prior to
the event, starting from a time window of 1 business day to a time window of 60 business days. Standard deviations are only calculated
for time windows exceeding 3 business days. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4.4: Effects of FSRs
#  d a y s
1 0 . 5 4 0 . 2 7 * * * - - - - - - - - 0 . 4 4 ' - 0 . 3 3 - - - - - - - - 0 . 4 9 - 0 . 0 9 - - - - - - - - 0 . 5 3 0 . 2 0 * - - - - - - - -
2 0 . 5 4 0 . 3 3 * * - - - - - - - - 0 . 4 6 - 0 . 5 4 - - - - - - - - 0 . 5 2 0 . 1 0 - - - - - - - - 0 . 5 5 0 . 1 4 - - - - - - - -
3 0 . 5 8 * * 0 . 4 6 * * * - - - - - - - - 0 . 4 0 ' ' - 0 . 7 5 - - - - - - - - 0 . 5 3 0 . 1 8 - - - - - - - - 0 . 5 5 0 . 2 0 - - - - - - - -
4 0 . 5 7 * * 0 . 5 4 * * * 0 . 5 1 - 0 . 0 8 * 0 . 3 9 ' ' ' - 0 . 7 3 0 . 5 0 - 0 . 1 0 0 . 5 1 0 . 1 2 0 . 5 2 - 0 . 1 3 * * 0 . 5 4 0 . 3 7 * * 0 . 5 1 - 0 . 0 2
5 0 . 5 3 0 . 4 4 * * 0 . 5 3 - 0 . 0 7 * 0 . 4 7 - 0 . 4 9 0 . 5 1 - 0 . 0 5 0 . 5 5 0 . 2 1 0 . 5 5 - 0 . 1 1 * 0 . 5 4 0 . 3 9 * 0 . 5 3 - 0 . 0 5
1 0 0 . 5 3 0 . 6 3 * * 0 . 5 5 * * - 0 . 0 8 * * 0 . 5 0 - 0 . 4 0 0 . 4 8 - 0 . 0 4 0 . 4 8 - 0 . 3 8 0 . 5 5 - 0 . 0 8 0 . 5 6 * 0 . 8 4 * * * 0 . 6 1 * * * - 0 . 1 1 * *
1 5 0 . 5 7 * * 0 . 6 4 * * 0 . 5 2 - 0 . 0 6 * 0 . 4 4 ' - 0 . 2 9 0 . 5 1 - 0 . 0 8 0 . 5 1 0 . 0 2 0 . 5 0 - 0 . 0 2 0 . 5 8 * * 0 . 9 5 * * * 0 . 5 5 * - 0 . 0 8 * *
2 0 0 . 5 6 * * 0 . 9 2 * * 0 . 5 5 * * - 0 . 0 5 * 0 . 5 0 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 5 6 * - 0 . 0 7 0 . 6 1 * * 0 . 5 1 0 . 5 5 - 0 . 0 2 0 . 6 1 * * * 1 . 7 5 * * * 0 . 5 5 - 0 . 0 6 * *
2 5 0 . 5 7 * * 1 . 2 7 * * * 0 . 5 6 * * * - 0 . 0 7 * * 0 . 4 8 - 0 . 2 8 0 . 6 0 * * - 0 . 1 3 * * 0 . 5 9 * * 0 . 6 9 0 . 5 5 - 0 . 0 4 0 . 6 2 * * * 2 . 1 8 * * * 0 . 5 4 - 0 . 0 5
3 0 0 . 5 8 * * * 1 . 3 9 * * * 0 . 5 6 * * * - 0 . 0 5 * 0 . 4 9 - 0 . 3 6 0 . 5 7 * * - 0 . 1 1 * 0 . 5 9 * * 0 . 9 0 * 0 . 5 7 * - 0 . 0 2 0 . 6 5 * * * 2 . 3 3 * * * 0 . 5 5 - 0 . 0 3
3 5 0 . 5 7 * * 1 . 2 7 * * * 0 . 5 6 * * * - 0 . 0 5 * 0 . 5 1 0 . 1 1 0 . 5 6 * - 0 . 1 0 * 0 . 6 2 * * * 1 . 5 0 * * 0 . 5 5 - 0 . 0 4 0 . 6 4 * * * 2 . 5 3 * * * 0 . 5 8 * * - 0 . 0 1
4 0 0 . 5 3 1 . 2 1 * * 0 . 5 5 * * - 0 . 0 4 0 . 5 4 0 . 3 3 0 . 5 2 - 0 . 0 7 0 . 6 1 * * 1 . 4 7 * * 0 . 5 7 * - 0 . 0 3 0 . 5 9 * * 2 . 6 3 * * * 0 . 5 6 * - 0 . 0 1
4 5 0 . 5 6 * * 1 . 4 1 * * * 0 . 5 5 * * - 0 . 0 5 * 0 . 5 2 0 . 1 7 0 . 5 6 * - 0 . 1 2 * * 0 . 5 7 * 1 . 4 5 * * 0 . 5 8 * * - 0 . 0 4 0 . 6 3 * * * 2 . 8 6 * * * 0 . 5 2 - 0 . 0 1
5 0 0 . 5 6 * * 1 . 6 0 * * * 0 . 5 6 * * * - 0 . 0 6 * * 0 . 5 1 - 0 . 1 1 0 . 5 6 * - 0 . 1 2 * * 0 . 5 9 * * 1 . 4 6 * 0 . 5 8 * * - 0 . 0 5 0 . 6 3 * * * 2 . 9 7 * * * 0 . 5 5 - 0 . 0 1
5 5 0 . 5 6 * * 1 . 4 7 * * 0 . 5 6 * * - 0 . 0 5 * 0 . 5 5 0 . 3 1 0 . 5 8 * * - 0 . 1 1 * * 0 . 6 1 * * 2 . 1 2 * * 0 . 5 7 * - 0 . 0 4 0 . 6 6 * * * 3 . 0 9 * * * 0 . 5 2 0 . 0 0
6 0 0 . 5 5 * 1 . 2 1 * * 0 . 5 5 * * - 0 . 0 5 * 0 . 5 4 0 . 6 2 0 . 5 8 * * - 0 . 1 1 * * 0 . 6 1 * * 2 . 6 6 * * * 0 . 5 5 - 0 . 0 5 0 . 6 3 * * * 2 . 8 7 * * * 0 . 5 2 0 . 0 0
n o n -
p a r a m e t r i c
R e t u r n s S t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n
n o n -
p a r a m e t r i c
p a r a m e t r i cp a r a m e t r i c n o n -
p a r a m e t r i c
p a r a m e t r i cn o n -
p a r a m e t r i c
p a r a m e t r i c n o n -
p a r a m e t r i c
p a r a m e t r i c
O p t i m i s t i c  F S R s
R e t u r n s S t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n R e t u r n s S t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n
J o i n t  m o d e l P e s s i m i s t i c  F S R s N e u t r a l  F S R s
R e t u r n s S t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n
n o n -
p a r a m e t r i c
p a r a m e t r i cn o n -
p a r a m e t r i c
p a r a m e t r i c n o n -
p a r a m e t r i c
p a r a m e t r i c
 
Notes: Notes: The table shows results of the test for communication effects. The first set of results (Returns, non-parametric)
tests the share of cases in which
∑K
k=0 ε̂it+k > 0 if I
optimism,FSR
it = 1 or
∑K
k=0 ε̂it+k < 0 if I
optimism,FSR
it = −1, for different time
windows K in the rows of the table. The second column (Returns, parametric) shows the average size of the cumulated excess returns
1
N
∑N
n=1
∑K
k=0 I
optimism,FSR
nt ε̂nt+k and tests whether these are different from zero. The columns for “standard deviation” show the
share of cases in which the standard deviation of excess returns over K days after the release of an FSR is smaller than the standard
deviation during the K days prior to the release, i.e. σεˆi,t/t+K < σεˆi,t−1/t−1−K if Dcit = 1 (non-parametric), and their average difference
(parametric), and tests these against 0.5 and 0, respectively. The second to fourth panel of the table repeats the exercise for FSRs that
have been coded as Ioptimism,cit = −1, Ioptimism,cit = 0 and Ioptimism,cit = 1, respectively. Standard deviations are only calculated for
time windows exceeding 3 business days. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance against the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively. ”’, ”, and ’ indicate statistical significance against the alternative hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Table 4.5: Effects of speeches and interviews
# days
1 0.45 '' -0.09 -- -- -- -- 0.54 0.12 -- -- -- -- 0.48 -0.06 -- -- -- -- 0.45 '' -0.05 -- -- -- --
2 0.48 -0.10 -- -- -- -- 0.57 ** 0.38 ** -- -- -- -- 0.44 '' -0.27 -- -- -- -- 0.52 0.17 -- -- -- --
3 0.49 -0.10 -- -- -- -- 0.52 0.28 -- -- -- -- 0.46 -0.59 -- -- -- -- 0.50 0.07 -- -- -- --
4 0.51 0.11 0.47 ' 0.02 0.51 0.07 0.50 -0.18 * 0.45 ' -0.49 0.46 0.08 0.53 0.28 0.46 0.15 '
5 0.53 * 0.26 0.48 0.01 0.49 -0.02 0.53 -0.19 ** 0.45 '' -0.47 0.45 ' 0.10 0.55 * 0.48 * 0.46 0.11
10 0.55 *** 0.55 ** 0.49 0.00 0.46 0.05 0.51 -0.04 0.48 -0.29 0.49 0.04 0.57 ** 1.11 *** 0.46 0.01
15 0.54 * 0.74 ** 0.48 0.04 0.47 0.06 0.49 0.05 0.49 -0.49 0.50 0.04 0.54 1.47 *** 0.45 ' 0.03
20 0.52 0.73 ** 0.49 0.06 ' 0.50 0.17 0.46 0.06 0.45 ' -0.70 0.53 0.05 0.54 1.54 *** 0.47 0.07
25 0.55 ** 1.04 ** 0.50 0.06 '' 0.47 0.04 0.48 0.04 0.45 ' -0.42 0.56 ** 0.02 0.56 ** 2.02 *** 0.48 0.12 ''
30 0.54 ** 1.04 ** 0.51 0.06 '' 0.50 0.63 0.50 0.04 0.46 -0.39 0.53 0.02 0.57 *** 2.55 *** 0.49 0.12 ''
35 0.56 *** 1.06 ** 0.50 0.06 ' 0.48 0.70 0.51 0.04 0.49 -0.29 0.52 0.01 0.60 *** 2.67 *** 0.49 0.12 ''
40 0.54 * 1.01 * 0.50 0.05 ' 0.51 0.93 0.52 0.03 0.49 0.07 0.51 0.01 0.57 *** 2.78 *** 0.47 0.11 ''
45 0.52 0.95 * 0.50 0.05 ' 0.52 1.13 0.53 0.01 0.50 0.05 0.51 0.01 0.56 ** 2.83 *** 0.47 0.12 ''
50 0.55 *** 1.24 ** 0.51 0.04 ' 0.49 1.06 0.54 * 0.00 0.50 0.20 0.51 0.02 0.59 *** 3.33 *** 0.48 0.11 ''
55 0.55 ** 1.58 ** 0.52 0.04 ' 0.50 0.58 0.53 0.01 0.50 0.06 0.53 0.01 0.59 *** 3.55 *** 0.50 0.10 ''
60 0.55 ** 1.63 ** 0.50 0.03 0.50 0.38 0.51 0.00 0.49 0.25 0.52 0.00 0.60 *** 3.45 *** 0.48 0.09 '
Returns Standard deviation Returns Standard deviation
Joint model Pessimistic speeches and interviews Neutral speeches and interviews Optimistic speeches and interviews
non-
parametric
parametric non-
parametric
parametric
Returns Standard deviation Returns Standard deviation
non-
parametric
parametric non-
parametric
parametricnon-
parametric
parametric non-
parametric
parametricnon-
parametric
parametric non-
parametric
parametric
 
Notes: See notes to Table 4, but all results relate to speeches and interviews rather than FSRs.
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Table 4.6: Effects of FSRs – sample splits and robustness
A  -  B e n c h m a r k 0 . 5 7 * * 1 . 2 7 * * * 0 . 5 6 * * * - 0 . 0 7 * * 0 . 4 8 - 0 . 2 8 0 . 6 0 * * - 0 . 1 3 * * 0 . 5 9 * * 0 . 6 9 0 . 5 5 - 0 . 0 4 0 . 6 2 * * * 2 . 1 8 * * * 0 . 5 4 - 0 . 0 5
B  -  S a m p l e  s p l i t s
1 .  C o u n t r y  G r o u p
A d v a n c e d  e c o n o m i e s 0 . 5 6 * 0 . 9 1 * * 0 . 5 9 * * * - 0 . 1 1 * * * 0 . 4 6 - 0 . 3 1 0 . 6 2 * * * - 0 . 2 0 * * * 0 . 5 7 * 1 . 1 0 * * 0 . 5 9 * * - 0 . 0 9 * * 0 . 5 8 * 1 . 6 2 * * * 0 . 5 5 - 0 . 0 3
E m e r g i n g  e c o n o m i e s 0 . 6 2 * * 2 . 2 7 * * 0 . 4 8 0 . 0 5 0 . 5 5 - 0 . 1 4 0 . 5 0 0 . 2 0 0 . 6 4 - 0 . 8 3 0 . 4 0 0 . 1 7 0 . 6 9 * * * 3 . 2 1 * * * 0 . 5 1 - 0 . 0 7
2 .  C r i s i s  v e r s u s  p r e - c r i s i s
P r e - c r i s i s 0 . 6 3 * * * 2 . 1 0 * * * 0 . 5 5 * - 0 . 0 5 * * 0 . 3 9 ' ' - 1 . 0 6 0 . 6 1 * * - 0 . 0 8 * 0 . 6 1 * * 0 . 7 7 * 0 . 5 5 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 6 4 * * * 2 . 7 3 * * * 0 . 5 1 - 0 . 0 5 *
F i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s  2 0 0 7 - 2 0 1 0 0 . 4 5 - 0 . 5 5 0 . 6 0 * * - 0 . 1 3 * 0 . 5 8 0 . 6 5 0 . 5 8 * - 0 . 2 0 0 . 5 2 0 . 4 7 0 . 5 8 - 0 . 1 1 0 . 5 2 - 0 . 3 2 0 . 6 5 * * - 0 . 0 1
3 .  S u p e r v i s o r y  r o l e
C B  i s  s u p e r v i s o r 0 . 5 6 1 . 4 7 * * 0 . 5 5 * - 0 . 0 9 * 0 . 6 1 0 . 9 6 0 . 3 9 - 0 . 1 5 0 . 6 3 * 0 . 5 0 0 . 5 6 - 0 . 0 5 0 . 6 4 * * 2 . 6 3 * * * 0 . 6 3 * * - 0 . 1 0 *
C B  i s  n o t  s u p e r v i s o r 0 . 5 8 * * 1 . 1 7 * * 0 . 5 7 * * - 0 . 0 6 * 0 . 4 4 - 0 . 6 7 0 . 6 6 * * * - 0 . 1 3 * 0 . 5 7 0 . 7 9 0 . 5 5 - 0 . 0 4 0 . 5 9 * 1 . 8 0 * * * 0 . 4 6 0 . 0 0
C  -  R o b u s t n e s s
A l l  s t o c k s 0 . 5 8 * * * 1 . 1 6 * * * 0 . 5 5 * * - 0 . 0 2 0 . 5 0 - 0 . 3 1 0 . 5 8 * * - 0 . 0 5 0 . 5 4 0 . 0 0 0 . 4 8 0 . 0 4 0 . 6 6 * * * 1 . 9 6 * * * 0 . 6 0 * * * - 0 . 0 6 * *
A l t e r n a t i v e  c o d i n g 0 . 5 3 0 . 7 2 * 0 . 5 6 * * * - 0 . 0 7 * * 0 . 5 2 0 . 4 3 0 . 5 2 0 . 0 1 0 . 5 7 * 0 . 4 0 0 . 6 3 * * * - 0 . 1 2 * * 0 . 5 9 * * 1 . 8 6 * * * 0 . 5 4 - 0 . 1 0 * *
R a w  D i c t i o n  s c o r e s - - 0 . 5 0 * * * 0 . 5 6 * * * - 0 . 0 7 * * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
D  -  T e s t i n g  f o r  t h e  s i g n a l l i n g  c h a n n e l
S h o r t - t e r m  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s 0 . 5 4 * 0 . 0 5 0 . 5 5 * * 0 . 0 1 0 . 5 0 - 0 . 0 6 0 . 5 9 * * 0 . 0 0 0 . 5 8 * 0 . 1 2 * 0 . 5 1 0 . 0 1 ' ' ' 0 . 5 8 * * 0 . 0 4 0 . 5 5 0 . 0 0
L o n g - t e r m  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s 0 . 5 3 0 . 0 2 0 . 5 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 4 5 - 0 . 0 3 0 . 5 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 5 7 * 0 . 0 3 0 . 5 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 5 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 5 6 * 0 . 0 0
R e t u r n s S t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n
n o n -
p a r a m e t r i c
p a r a m e t r i cn o n -
p a r a m e t r i c
p a r a m e t r i c
J o i n t  m o d e l P e s s i m i s t i c  F S R s
n o n -
p a r a m e t r i c
p a r a m e t r i cn o n -
p a r a m e t r i c
p a r a m e t r i c
R e t u r n s S t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n
N e u t r a l  F S R s
R e t u r n s S t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n
n o n -
p a r a m e t r i c
p a r a m e t r i c n o n -
p a r a m e t r i c
p a r a m e t r i c
O p t i m i s t i c  F S R s
R e t u r n s S t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n
n o n -
p a r a m e t r i c
p a r a m e t r i c n o n -
p a r a m e t r i c
p a r a m e t r i c
 
Notes: See notes to Table 4. All results relate to the effect of FSRs at a time window of 25 days. Row 1 reports the benchmark
results, each subsequent row reports results of a specific sample split or robustness test. Sample splits for advanced/emerging economies,
pre-crisis/financial crisis, CB as supervisor or not. Robustness tests relate to using overall stock indices rather than financial sector
stocks indices, as well as to using an alternative coding of the content of the communications, or using the raw Diction optimism scores
directly, rather than their discretized versions. The last panel shows the effects on short- and long-term interest rates.
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Table 4.7: Effects of speeches and interviews – sample splits and robustness
A - Benchmark 0.55 ** 1.04 ** 0.50 0.06 '' 0.47 0.04 0.48 0.04 0.45 ' -0.42 0.56 ** 0.02 0.56 ** 2.02 *** 0.48 0.12 ''
B - Sample splits
1. Country Group
Advanced economies 0.54 * 1.02 ** 0.48 0.07 '' 0.50 0.56 0.47 0.04 0.45 ' -0.34 0.52 0.02 0.58 ** 2.53 *** 0.46 0.15 ''
Emerging economies 0.57 * 1.10 0.56 ** 0.04 0.36 '' -1.74 0.50 0.03 0.47 -0.63 0.65 *** 0.03 0.52 0.60 0.52 0.06
2. Crisis versus pre-crisis
Pre-crisis 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.02 0.48 -0.10 0.47 0.06 0.48 -0.88 0.55 * 0.01 0.52 0.84 0.52 0.01
Financial crisis 2007-2010 0.59 *** 1.87 ** 0.49 0.11 '' 0.45 0.29 0.48 0.02 0.43 '' 0.10 0.56 * 0.03 0.62 *** 3.58 *** 0.43 ' 0.27 ''
3. Supervisory role
CB is supervisor 0.54 0.75 0.50 0.06 0.50 0.61 0.49 -0.03 0.48 0.11 0.50 0.08 0.56 * 1.81 ** 0.50 0.12
CB is not supervisor 0.56 ** 1.37 ** 0.51 0.06 0.44 ' -0.49 0.47 0.10 ' 0.43 ' -0.97 0.62 *** -0.04 0.57 * 2.30 *** 0.45 0.12
4. Clustering
Speeches as part of cluster 0.51 -0.04 0.35 ''' 0.43 ''' 0.47 -0.20 0.24 ''' 0.50 ''' 0.56 1.84 0.37 ' 0.36 ''' 0.50 -0.22 0.41 0.45 ''
Speeches outside cluster 0.56 ** 1.25 *** 0.53 ** -0.01 0.47 0.08 0.52 -0.03 0.43 '' -0.86 0.59 *** -0.05 0.58 ** 2.50 *** 0.49 0.05
C - Robustness
All stocks 0.51 0.87 *** 0.48 0.06 '' 0.51 -0.22 0.48 0.05 0.48 -0.28 0.53 0.01 0.52 1.46 *** 0.44 '' 0.13 '''
Alternative coding 0.53 0.75 * 0.50 0.06 '' 0.48 0.37 0.47 0.09 ' 0.48 -0.51 0.53 0.01 0.53 1.84 *** 0.51 0.08
Raw Diction scores -- 0.13 ** 0.50 0.06 '' -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
D - Testing for the signalling channel
Short-term interest rates 0.49 -0.07 0.53 * -0.03 * 0.44 '' -0.01 0.53 -0.02 0.41 ''' -0.17 0.54 * -0.02 0.42 ''' -0.15 0.52 -0.04 *
Long-term interest rates 0.49 -0.06 0.50 0.00 0.48 -0.02 0.50 -0.01 ** 0.42 ''' -0.04 0.53 0.00 0.47 -0.12 0.48 0.01
non-
parametric
parametric non-
parametric
parametric
Returns Standard deviation
Neutral speeches and interviews Optimistic speeches and interviews
Returns Standard deviation Returns Standard deviationReturns Standard deviation
Joint model Pessimistic speeches and interviews
non-
parametric
parametric non-
parametric
parametric non-
parametric
parametric non-
parametric
parametric non-
parametric
non-
parametric
parametricparametric
 
Notes: See notes to Table 8, but all results relate to speeches and interviews rather than FSRs. The table also contains test results for
speeches and interviews that are part of a cluster or not.
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